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SUMMARY
In the first chapter, first we review the famous Taylor (1979, 1980a) model
of staggered wage setting and then we present original work in describing the
structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered wage setting
a la Taylor. This model is central to the thesis since the results presented in
chapters 2, 3 and 4 are based on it. Moreover, also the models in chapters 5
and 6, while somewhat different, originate from it.
Chapter 2 addresses the issue of superneutrality of money using the model
presented in the previous chapter. It demonstrates that, once staggered
wages are introduced in an optimising framework, a mild permanent change
in the rate of growth of money could have substantial effects on the steady
state aggregate level of output and welfare. Previous studies fail to reproduce
these results because they consider restrictively simple utility and production
functions. The model exhibits high costs of inflation and provides a rationale
for the pursuit of price stability observed in western countries.
Chapter 3 studies analytically the output costs of a reduction in monetary
growth in the dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered wages of the
previous chapters. We show that the introduction of microfoundations helps
to resolve the puzzle recently raised by Laurence Ball (1994), namely that
disinflation in staggered pricing models causes a boom. In our model disinfla-
tion, whether unanticipated or anticipated, unambiguously causes a slump.
The analytical results are restricted to the tractable case (log-linearisation of
the model around a zero steady state inflation), but a long appendix checks
the robustness of these results through non-linear simulations.
Chapter 4 investigates whether staggered wages could induce a high de-
gree of persistence in the real effects of money shocks. We show how the
parameters of Taylor's model depend upon the microeconomic fundamentals
and the conduct of monetary policy. We conclude that high persistence is an
unlikely outcome. Either sensible values of the microeconomic parameters
or a moderate rate of underlying inflation imply a low degree of persistence.
This is the persistence puzzle we referred to above. Furthermore, we show
that: (i) the model is highly non-linear; (ii) the conduct of monetary policy
affects the structural parameters of Taylor's wage setting equation, provid-
ing a clear example of the Lucas critique; (iii) the inertia of the system is
inversely related to the level of average inflation.
In Chapter 5 we incorporate explicit relative wage concern on the part
of wage-setters into the dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered
wages developed in the previous chapters. We then investigate the effects of
money shocks on both inflation and output. In contrast to previous models of
staggered wages/prices, output and inflation persistence are a robust finding
of the model. Moreover, they hold for all the sensible parametrisations.
Given the empirical evidence on relative wage concern, we conclude that this
may be the missing piece in the money shocks persistence puzzle.
Chapter 6 presents a unifying framework to analyse the ability of price
versus wage staggering to generate persistence. The results are fairly gen-
eral in that they derive from a stylised log-linear model which encompasses
most of the microfounded models of price/wage staggering, found recently in
the literature. The results highlight the importance of the underlying eco-
nomic structure for the ability of staggered price/wage models to generate
persistence of the real effects of money shocks.
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Introduction
The first staggered wage models appeared in the literature at the end of the
'70's and they immediately occupied the front stage of the macroeconomic
debate of the time. The so-called New Classical Macroeconomics had just
demonstrated, through the famous Lucas aggregate supply curve, that sys-
tematic demand-management policies are of no use to stabilise output, since
only unanticipated policies could have an effect (and only a temporary one)
on output levels - the so called "policy ineffectiveness proposition" of Sargent
and Wallace (1975). This critique of the Keynesian theory of active stabil-
isation policies was based on two main cornerstones: market clearing and
rational expectations. The first reaction of the Keynesian school to this at-
tack rests on the sticky wage models of Fischer (1977) and Gray (1976). One
cornerstone of the New Classical theory, i.e., market clearing, was removed
by recognising that workers engage in long-term labour contracts leading to
sticky wages. The purpose was to demonstrate that the "policy ineffective-
ness proposition" was due to the flexible price assumption rather than to
10
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the rational expectations one. Fischer (1977) and Gray (1976) assumed that
wages were set one (or more than one) period in advance, such that the
labour market cleared in expectations, in the sense that the expected quan-
tity of labour supplied equalled the expected quantity of labour demanded.
In the case when a shock occurred, then supply and demand would have
differed from what was expected and it was assumed that demand deter-
mined employment in this case. Fischer (1977) then showed that in a model
with rational expectations and sticky wages, monetary policy can play a role
in stabilising the economy. The focus on sticky wages was quite a natural
one, deriving from simple casual observation. In the US, formal labour con-
tracts prevail in heavily unionised industries like steel, automobiles, rubber,
etc.. Many of these contracts extend for more than one year (most for three
years). Moreover, wage contract negotiations in unionised industries are
likely to influence the level of wages in all industries, since they tend to be
imitated elsewhere, and even in the non-unionised industries nominal wages
are mostly fixed for one year.
However, these first sticky wage models provided no explanations of the
persistence of the real effects of monetary shocks. In particular, the persis-
tence could not last longer than the duration of the nominal wage contracts.
Taylor (1979, 1980a), in trying to build an empirical model which could mimic
the fluctuations in U.S. time series, overcame this problem by removing the
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assumption of synchronisation of wage setting decisions. Taylor observed
not only that wages are negotiated discretely in time, but also that contracts
are not renewed all at the same time, that is, contract negotiations are stag-
gered. The staggering of wage decisions creates a rational expectations nomi-
nal propagation mechanism which propagates shocks over time. In such a set
up, Taylor (1980a) demonstrated that, following supply shocks, systematic
demand-management policies could help in stabilising output. In particu-
lar, in a staggered wage economy policymakers face a trade-off between the
variance of prices and that of output, a so-called second-order Phillips curve.
While Taylor's original article focused on the optimal response of monetary
policy to supply shocks, most of the followers (e.g., Taylor (1983), Blanchard
(1983), Blanchard (1986), West (1988), Phaneuf (1990)) focused on the ef-
fects of monetary disturbances. They showed that the nominal propagation
mechanism generated by staggered wage models could be particularly appeal-
ing for the study of the role of monetary disturbances in the business cycle.
In fact, it can help explain how monetary shocks could generate the type of
output fluctuations observed in actual data, particularly the persistence of
the real effects of money shocks, or, more generally, of demand-management
policies. As a proof of how much these early staggered wage models have
been influential in the literature, it is probably enough to say that nowadays
every textbook presents or, at least, mentions them.
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Apart from synchronisation vs. staggering, there is another important
difference between the type of wage contracts in Fischer (1977), Gray (1976)
and Taylor (1979, 1980a). Fischer (1977) studied the implication of predeter-
mined multi-period wage contracts for the efficacy of stabilisation policies.
The Fischer-type wage contracts are called predetermined (see Blanchard and
Fischer (1989)) because they allow agents to set different wage rates in the
different future periods of the contract, even if all the wages specified in the
contract have been negotiated in the period of renewal of the contract (and
cannot be renegotiated in the future periods for which the wage contract will
last). This contract structure should correspond in practice to multi-year
labour contracts. For example, if unions sign today contracts for more than
one year, say three, then they would probably call for predetermined wage
rate increases each year (for example, to take into account the expected in-
flation). Gray (1976) explicitly considered the question of the optimal degree
of indexation of multi-period nominal wage contracts. However, multi-year
wage contracts are not the general rule outside heavily unionised industries.
Taylor (1979, 1980a) instead analysed the implications of a different kind of
contracts, called fixed staggered wage contracts. In this case, the wage rate
is not allowed to vary in the different periods of the contract. Workers sign
a contract that specifies a fixed wage rate for each period for which the con-
tract will last, that is, the wage rate has to be the same in each period of the
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contract. This contract structure should correspond in practice to one year
labour contracts, where the periods can be interpreted as semesters, quarters
or months.1
Actually, most of the wage contracts in the economy are generally re-
newed every year and fixed within the year. Moreover, obviously different
workers negotiate the contracts in different periods of the year. After the
'80's, especially in the US and UK, the activity of the unions, both in terms
of number of members and of the amount of coverage, has been progressively
narrowed. This diminished the importance of multi-year labour contracts
in the whole economy. Indeed: "... wages [are almost always fixed between
adjustments] outside the North American union sector. More than 80 per-
cent of US wages are set for one year or less with no time-variation; [..] in
many countries, such as the United Kingdom, virtually all wages are set for
one year or less with no time-variation" (Ball (1994), p. 288, emphasis as
in the original). Taylor (1998) reviews price and wage setting behaviour in
market economies based on direct and indirect evidence. He concludes that:
(1) since not everyone sets prices or wages at the same time, wage and price
1-Another very popular staggered wage/price model in the literature is the model by
Calvo (1983a,b). This is a continuous time model where the duration of the contract is
stochastic and governed by a Poisson process. Even if very elegant from a formal point
of view, its empirical relevance seems doubtful (see Taylor (1998)). Calvo's model will be
analysed in Chapter 2 and 3.
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setting appears to be staggered, such that contract periods overlap with each
other; (2) wages and prices are set at fixed values for fairly long periods of
time and are frequently, though not always, non-contingent on events that
occur during the contract period; (3) most of the wages, though not all of
them, are negotiated annually. This suggests that Taylor-type of contract
structure is the most relevant in economies nowadays and quantitatively it
seems a good approximation to take one year as the duration of the contract.
For this reason, we will focus on this type of contract structure in this thesis.
Even if the first generation of staggered wage models were consistent with
certain observed features of wage setting behaviour, they have been seriously
criticised for being ad hoc because of lacking rigorous theoretical foundations.
Particularly, they left open three key questions: (i) why we observe wage
contracts fixed for so long; (ii) why we observe staggering of wage setting
decisions; (iii) why, given the constraint due to the staggering structure,
the wage was not chosen optimally. From the mid '80's a huge literature,
the so-called New Keynesian literature, has been devoted to these issues,
which are however still somewhat unsettled. Good surveys and discussions
of these points are provided by Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Romer (1996),
and, more recently, by Taylor (1998), and here we sum up very briefly some
results from those references.'
2 Most of the New Keynesian literature actually focused on sticky prices rather than on
sticky wages for reasons summarised, for example in Mankiw (1990). However, "Econo-
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With respect to (1) a first major puzzle is why contracts are not indexed
to all relevant information. Gray (1976) provides part of the answer, showing
that full indexation with regard to a single variable such as the price level
is not optimal in the presence both of demand and supply shocks. In a
real word with many types of different shocks, the practical answer probably
rests on complexity, asymmetric information and measurement problems.
A second major issue concerns the distinction between time-dependent and
state-dependent rules. While the first type of rule (as in the models discussed
above) takes the time interval between subsequent wage/price adjustments
as exogenous and the size of the adjustment as endogenous, the latter does
vice versa. That is, the difference between the actual and the desired level
of wage/price triggers the adjustment after a certain level. Sheshinski and
Weiss (1977), Sheshinski and Weiss (1983), and Benabou (1989) investigate
the optimal (S, ․) rule for a firm under different conditions. 3 In the aggregate
mists differ about whether they view these criticisms [of nominal wage contracting models]
as serious" (Mankiw (1990), P. 1657). For a survey of theories of price rigidities see
Andersen (1994).
3 Such rules are called (S, ․) rules, because they take the following form: when the
difference between the actual and the desired optimal price exceeds an upper bound S > 0
or become less than a lower bound s < 0, the actual price is changed and set equal to the
optimal one. (S, ․) models are the dynamic versions of the first static menu costs models
of Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b) and Mankiw (1985). They assume a cost of physically
changing the price (printing new catalogue or menu in a restaurant, from which the name
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not every firm will change its price every period and therefore we have a sort
of state-dependent staggering. Caplin and Spulber (1987) demonstrate the
surprising, and much discussed, result that if firms follow (S, ․) rules, money
can be completely neutral in the aggregate. However, Caplin and Spulber's
(1987) result seems not to be robust, as shown by Benabou (1988), Caplin and
Leahy (1991), Caballero and Engel (1991, 1993a,b), Tsiddon (1991, 1993),
and Conlon and Liu (1997). The fact is that the aggregation over the whole
economy of (S, ․) rules is particularly difficult, and not always possible; thus
these models are not very tractable and need to rest on special assumptions
to be solved. Hence, they have not been used so far in quantitative models
or in dynamic general equilibrium models (a notable exception as a first
attempt in this direction is Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1996)). In reality,
probably both time-dependent and state-dependent elements are present in
wage and price contracts. Which are the most important will depend on the
kind of contract. There are two main costs in adjusting prices: the first is to
understand the state of the economy (and then calculate the optimal price
or negotiate a wage contract, i.e., negotiation costs) and the second one is
to physically change the price in accordance with the state of the economy
(printing new catalogue, the so-called "menu costs"). If the first one is the
higher, than a time-dependent rule would probably be optimal, while if the
"menu cost" models). Hence the price would be changed only if the benefit exceeds the
(menu) cost.
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second one is higher then a state-dependent rule would probably be optimal.
It follows that time-dependent rules a, la Taylor are probably a very good
approximation for wage contracts (as in this thesis), while for final good
prices, a state-dependent rule would presumably be a better approximation.
Several papers have been devoted to the second question, (ii), that is,
why we observe staggering in wage/price decisions. Fethke and Policano
(1984, 1986) demonstrate that staggering can arise as a stable equilibrium
when there are sector specific shocks, while Ball and Romer (1989) do the
same assuming asymmetric seasonal shocks. Ball and Cecchetti (1988) show
that a staggering equilibrium can be supported as an equilibrium because it
allows price-setter agents to obtain information about the prices of the others,
before choosing their own prices. Maskin and Tirole (1988), Lau (1996),
Fraja (1993) show that staggering can arise endogenously in oligopoly models
because of strategic considerations. Very recently, Bhaskar (1998) proves
that staggering can be an equilibrium in a model with many heterogeneous
firms, which have stronger strategic complementarity within-industry than
across-industry. This result is particularly important since it does not rest
on strategic considerations between 'few large' price-setters, but it arise in
a model with 'many small' firms, as in the usual monopolistic competition
macromodels.
This last point brings us to (iii) and specifically to the role of monop-
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olistic competition. First, nominal rigidities logically require price-setting
agents and hence imperfect competition. If agents are price setters, then they
would fix the price optimally. Imperfect competition then delivers an optimal
wage/price setting rule, in contrast to the ad hoc expected-market-clearing
approach of the first generation of sticky wage/price models, where we were
left with the question of who was actually setting the wage/price. Second,
among the different types of imperfect competition market structures, mo-
nopolistic competition is usually employed in macromodels, because it avoids
strategic interactions between different price-setting agents. Third, monopo-
listic competition provides theoretical foundations for a demand-determined
output. Given the monopolistic distortion, firms are pricing above marginal
costs and hence are willing to satisfy the extra demand at given prices (at
least up to a point), following a shock. Monopolistic competition thus solves
some inconsistencies of the early expected-market-clearing nominal rigidity
models. The pioneering works investigating the macroeconomic consequences
of sticky prices and monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium model
are Svensson (1986) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). A first attempt
to introduce dynamics and staggering in these models is Blanchard and Fis-
cher (1989), but the model is not intrinsically dynamic, because dynamics is
actually superimposed ad hoc on a simplified version of the static model of
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
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In the '80's, another school of thought antithetical to the New Keyne-
sian started to develop a different approach to the study of business cycle
fluctuations, following the work of the Nobel prize winner Robert E. Lucas.
According to this approach, modern macroeconomics, and particularly busi-
ness cycle research, requires us to build explicitly dynamic models, with full
microfoundations and intertemporally optimising agents in a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium context. Obviously such models are much more complicated
than ad hoc models and early attempts at building them were bound to be
stylised. The pioneering works in this area are Kydland and Prescott (1982)
and Long and Plosser (1983). From then onwards, the title of this latter work
has been used to indicate a new branch of the literature: the Real Business
Cycle literature.
Early real business cycle models tried to reproduce actual business cycle
features as the response of optimising agents to exogenous real shocks in a
purely real economy and under Walrasian market clearing. Macroeconomic
fluctuations were explained only with technological shocks, while demand
and nominal shocks were absent from these purely real models. During the
'80's the Real Business Cycle and the New Keynesian practitioners did not
talk constructively to each other, and instead engaged in a fierce debate (see
e.g., Prescott (1986) and Summers (1986) or Plosser (1989) and Mankiw
(1989)). However, during the '90's convergence between the two approaches
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starts to develop. Clearly early Real Business Cycle models were too stylised
and their restrictions could not last for long. Researchers of both approaches
began to introduce different features in the benchmark Real Business Cy-
cle model, such as imperfectly competitive markets (e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford (1993, 1995)), money (e.g., Cooley and Hansen (1989), Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992)) and nominal rigidities (e.g., Hairault and Portier
(1993), Kimball (1995)). As B6nassy (1995, p. 304) noted: "... a number of
researchers 14 have convincingly argued that the consideration of price, and
especially wage rigidities, in monetary economies subject to real and mon-
etary shocks allowed to substantially improve the capacity of these business
cycle models to match a number of stylized facts in actual economies." Par-
ticularly important works are the ones by Hairault and Portier (1993) and
Benassy (1995). Hairault and Portier (1993), following Kydland and Prescott
(1982), is the among the first works that numerically simulates and evaluates
a dynamic general equilibrium model with money and nominal rigidity, in the
form of adjustment costs in price changes. Bênassy (1995), instead, following
the analytical approach of Long and Plosser (1983), inspects the analytical
mechanism of a dynamic general equilibrium model with preset wages. In the
recent years an increasing number of papers have been devoted to enlarging
the stylised framework of the early real business cycle models and a good
early survey of this literature is provided by Cooley (1995). 4 It seems that
4 Given the rapid development of this literature, especially with respect to money, nom-
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a new 'hybrid' paradigm for macroeconomic modelling has emerged combin-
ing the elegant methodology of the Real Business Cycle paradigm with the
elements of realism of the New Keynesian paradigm. In particular, these
hybrid models introduce money, sticky prices and monopolistic competition
in an otherwise standard Real Business Cycle framework. In order to do
that, they necessarily leave aside more fundamental questions about the mi-
crofoundations of money and sticky prices/wages to concentrate on their
macroeconomic implications.
In this thesis we will develop further this new hybrid approach and we
will combine the two strands of the literature mentioned above. In partic-
ular, we will introduce the idea of staggered multi-period nominal wages in
a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Following the 'hybrid' approach,
we will therefore not consider questions (i) and (ii) above. Hence, even if
our wage setting rule is derived by intertemporally optimising agents, we
would acknowledge from the start that our microfoundations are not com-
plete. Specifically, we superimpose Taylor's (1979) staggered wage structure
on a dynamic general equilibrium framework, without providing - within the
model - a justification of why this structure should exist in an optimising
inal rigidities and the monetary transmission mechanism, the several works of Christiana
Eichenbaum and Evans are a more up-to-date reference (see, as a late references, Chris-
tiana Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) and Christiana Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998))
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framework. 5 In other words, we look at the macroeconomic implications of
something we observe in reality, i.e., staggered wages, in a dynamic general
equilibrium framework. 6 We then will analyse the effects of changes in mon-
etary policy in such a framework. The motivation for this work is therefore
given by the fact that modern business cycle research is almost entirely car-
ried out within the context of dynamic general equilibrium macromodels. In
this approach, the role of monetary shocks in generating the output fluctua-
tions observed in actual data is still controversial. Monetary dynamic general
equilibrium macromodels need to incorporate some forms of nominal rigidi-
ties to generate short-run monetary non-neutralities. At the beginning of the
research which led to this thesis, we thought that the overlapping contracts
model of Taylor (1979, 80a) could have some prominent role to play in this
approach. As explained above, the reason is that such contracting schemes
bring in not only the nominal rigidity necessary for the impact effect of the
monetary innovation, but also provide a nominal propagation mechanism in
a framework otherwise lacking endogenous propagation mechanisms.
The dynamic general equilibrium model described in Chapter 1 has in-
deed proved to be more fruitful than expected. Almost all the work of this
5 Actually this staggered wage structure acts as an additional constraint and hence can
not be optimal in our model, that is, households would be better off without it.
6 .As it appears from what was discussed above, there is now quite a huge parallel
literature dealing with the issue of why staggering is observed.
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thesis is actually based on that model and on its modifications, providing
consistency to the chapters of this thesis. In particular, in Chapter 2, we
investigate the steady state properties of the model addressing the superneu-
trality issue. Chapters 3 and 4 look at the effects in such a model of changes
in monetary policy, in the form respectively of a disinflation and of a money
shock. Chapters 5 and 6 are respectively based on a modification of the basic
model and on a generalisation of it. That is, there is in practice one basic
model which runs all the way through the thesis.
A further point to note is that this model is, to my knowledge, the first
dynamic general equilibrium model to include wage staggering and monop-
olistic unions. 7 During the years I devoted to this research project, some
closely related studies appeared in the literature, but almost all of them
focused on price staggering. A very small sample of early dynamic general
equilibrium models with staggered prices focusing on various issues and prob-
lems are: Ireland (1995), Woodford (1996), Yun (1996), Chari et al. (1996).
The latter has already been quite influential and has already generated a very
lively debate. Our thesis fits exactly into this very recent debate. Chapter 4,
developed contemporaneously and independently from Chari et al. (1996),
7 Cho and Cooley (1995) is an earlier attempt, but monopolistic competition is absent
from the analysis. The hypothesis on wage setting is therefore the expected-market-
clearing one as in the old ad hoc model. As explained above, this approach does not seem
to be coherent with a microfounded general equilibrium model.
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reproduces their main result in a wage staggering economy. This result gen-
erates a puzzle about the degree of persistence of the real effects of money
shock in dynamic general equilibrium staggered wage (Chapter 4) or price
(Chan et al. (1996)) models. Chapter 5 proposes a solution to this puzzle,
introducing explicit relative wage concern on the part of the workers. This
chapter is hence among the recent contributions which suggest reasons why
this persistence puzzle may arise. The debate, still under way, is at the heart
of the attempt to build a quantitative macroeconomic model describing the
monetary policy transmission mechanism which could be used to analyse the
effects of monetary policy changes and to design optimal monetary policy
rules (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). Main contributors to this
debate are: Erceg (1997), Kiley (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
Andersen (1998a,b), Bergin and Feenstra (1998), Jeanne (1998). Chapter
6 provides a unifying framework for the already quite large literature on
this topic and it thus may be useful for interpreting and understanding the
current debate.
More specifically, the thesis is organised as follows. In the first chapter,
first we review the famous Taylor (1979, 1980a) model of staggered wage
setting and then we present original work in describing the structure of the
basic model of the thesis: a dynamic general equilibrium model with stag-
gered wage setting a la Taylor.
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Chapter 2 addresses the issue of superneutrality of money using the model
presented in the previous chapter. It demonstrates that, once staggered
wages are introduced in an optimising framework, a mild permanent change
in the rate of growth of money could have substantial effects on the steady
state aggregate level of output and welfare. Previous studies fail to reproduce
these results because they consider restrictively simple utility and production
functions. The model exhibits high costs of inflation and provides a rationale
for the pursuit of price stability observed in western countries.
Chapter 3 studies analytically the output costs of a reduction in monetary
growth in the dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered wages of the
previous chapters. We show that the introduction of microfoundations helps
to resolve the puzzle recently raised by Laurence Ball (1994), namely that
disinflation in staggered pricing models causes a boom. In our model disinfla-
tion, whether unanticipated or anticipated, unambiguously causes a slump.
The analytical results are restricted to the tractable case (log-linearisation of
the model around a zero steady state inflation), but a long appendix checks
the robustness of these results through non-linear simulations.
Chapter 4 investigates whether staggered wages could induce a high de-
gree of persistence in the real effects of money shocks. We show how the
parameters of Taylor's model depend upon the microeconomic fundamentals
and the conduct of monetary policy. We conclude that high persistence is an
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unlikely outcome. Either sensible values of the microeconomic parameters
or a moderate rate of underlying inflation imply a low degree of persistence.
This is the persistence puzzle we referred to above. Furthermore, we show
that: (i) the model is highly non-linear; (ii) the conduct of monetary policy
affects the structural parameters of Taylor's wage setting equation, provid-
ing a clear example of the Lucas critique; (iii) the inertia of the system is
inversely related to the level of average inflation.
In Chapter 5 we incorporate explicit relative wage concern on the part
of wage-setters into the dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered
wages developed in the previous chapters. We then investigate the effects
of money shocks on both inflation and output. In contrast to Chapter 4,
output and inflation persistence are a robust finding of the model. Given the
empirical evidence on relative wage concern, we conclude that this may be
the missing piece in the money shocks persistence puzzle.
Chapter 6 presents a unifying framework to analyse the ability of price
versus wage staggering to generate persistence. The results are fairly gen-
eral in that they derive from a stylised log-linear model which encompasses
most of the microfounded models of price/wage staggering, found recently in
the literature. The results highlight the importance of the underlying eco-
nomic structure for the ability of staggered price/wage models to generate
persistence of the real effects of money shocks.
Chapter 1
A Dynamic General
Equilibrium Model with
Staggered Wage Setting
1.1 Introduction
This first chapter introduces the tools needed to tackle the main issues that
will be treated in the following chapters. In particular, we describe two
models that will continually be coming up in the following analysis.
Firstly, we review the famous Taylor (1979, 1980a) model of staggered
wage setting. Even though the model is very well known, the description of
the model will be quite extended given the central role that, for comparison
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purposes, the literature based on it will have all through the thesis.
Secondly, we start to present original work in describing the structure of a
dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered wage setting a la Taylor.
This model is central to the thesis since the results presented in chapters 2,
3 and 4 are based on it. Moreover, also the models in chapters 5 and 6, while
somewhat different, originate from it.
1.2 Taylor's (1979, 1980a) Staggered
Wage Model
In Taylor's (1979) model the economy is divided into two sectors, say sectors
A and B. In each sector the nominal wage is negotiated every two periods
and it is kept fixed between the two periods. Moreover, contract decisions
are staggered in the sense that wage negotiations are not made at the same
time in the two sectors. In other words, sector A fixes the wages in periods
t, t + 2, t + 4..., while sector B in period t — 1, t + 1, t + 3... . 1 Let us call xt
the 'new' nominal wage contract which is negotiated in period t. 2 Then, the
1 "To make things simple suppose that wage contracts last one year and that decision
dates are evenly staggered: half of the contracts are set in January and half in July."
(Taylor (1979), p. 109)
2 Hence xt , x t+2 , x t+4 ... are the wage contracts negotiated in sector A, while
st _ i , xt+ i , Xt+3... are the ones negotiated in sector B.
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fundamental equation of Taylor's model is the following wage setting rule
x t = b xt_i d Et_ixt+ i
 +	 d(b Et—iYt 	 Et_ot+i)
where p -= price level, x = 'new' nominal wage; y = output and all the
variables are expressed in terms of log-deviation from an initial trend. Et_1
is the expectation operator and in front of a variable represents its conditional
expectation based on the information available at the beginning of period t
(or end of period t — 1). Hence, the wage contract are signed at the beginning
of the period, before the realisation of period t shock, that is, based on period
t — 1 information set. As Taylor explains:3
Equation [(1.1)] states the assumption that the contract wage set
at the start of each semiannual period depends on three factors: the
contract wage set in the previous period, the contract wage expected
to be set in the next period, and a weighted average of excess demand
expected during the next two periods. Since, by assumption, x t will
prevail for two periods, firms and/or unions contemplating a wage
adjustment in period t will be concerned with wage rates which will
be in effect during periods t and t+1. (Taylor (1979), p. 109)
Most theories of wages adjustment suggest that labor market
conditions will influence wages and, in particular, that wages will be
bid up relative to the prevailing wage during periods when the unem-
ployment rate is low, and conversely when the unemployment rate is
high. This, for example, is the explicit assumption used in my 1980
article. [...] The behavioral equations reflect a relative wage concern
on the part of the workers. (Taylor (1983), p. 987-988)
Let us assume that b + d = 1 so that the current contract decision
is homogenous of degree 1 in these lag and lead contracts. If b = d =
3 Since actually Taylor's model is central to all the thesis, this long quotation from
Taylor will turn out to be very useful in what follows. In particular, it helps to see what
new interpretations of Taylor's reasoning microfoundations make possible.
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1/2 then the lag and lead distribution is symmetric. This has been the
parametric assumption of my previous work and reflects the plausible
assumption that current negotiations weight other contracts according
to the number of periods that they overlap with the current contract.
In this sense, when b and d are equal to 1/2, contract decisions are
unbiased. Wage setters look forward to the same degree they look
backward. However, I will allow for the possibility of biased weights
in this paper by permitting b and d to differ from 1/2. This permit a
spectrum of contract determination hypotheses between the extremes
of pure backward looking (b = 1) and pure forward looking (d =
1). As will be demonstrated below the size of b vs. d is important
for the dynamic behavior of contracts, and for the sensitivity of wage
behavior to excess demand. (Taylor (1979), p. 109) ...more backward-
looking wage determination increases the persistence or the inertia of
the aggregate wages.[...] more forward-looking contract determination
increases the impact of aggregate demand policy on wages. (Taylor
(1979), p. 110-111)
The model is closed by the following two equations
Pt = —2 xt—i ±xt)
1 ,	 (1.2)
Yt = int — Pt	 (1.3)
where m is the log-deviation from trend of the money supply. Equation (1.2)
is simply a mark-up equation, which states that the aggregate price level is
given by an average of the existing nominal wage contracts. This equation
implicitly assumes constant returns to labour. Equation (1.3) is just a static
aggregate demand equation.
In Taylor's words above, "the behavioral equations reflect a relative wage
concern on the part of the workers". However, substituting equation (1.2)
into (1.1), it yields
xt = b pt
 + d Et-iPt+i +
	 Et-iYt + d Et-Ot+1) •	 (1.4)
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As already noted by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and Blanchard (1990), this
equation shows that Taylor's wage setting rule can have actually a different
interpretation. In setting the wage, workers care only about their absolute
real wage. Hence they look at the general price level in the two periods
in which the wage is fixed (plus the labour market conditions in the two
periods). It follows that since the price level depends on the wage in the
other sector of the economy, then one can write the wage setting rule as
(1.1). In other words, workers care about the wages in the other sectors only
through the effect these wages have on the price level and, in turn, on their
own absolute real wage. Hence, there is no actual relative wage concern per
sê in Taylor's model. In Blanchard's (1990, note 19, p. 805) words: "It
is sometimes argued that the Taylor model depends on the assumption that
workers care directly about their wages in comparison to other wages 14
this is not the case." This remark will be important for Chapter 5, where,
following probably the original intention of Taylor (1979), we will explicitly
introduce relative wage concern on the part of the workers in the dynamic
general equilibrium model presented in the following section of this chapter.
Taylor in his original articles (1979, 1980a) focused on real shocks and on
the optimal monetary policy response to such shocks. However, the subse-
quent literature focuses on monetary shocks (e.g., West (1988), Ambler and
Phaneuf (1989), Phaneuf (1990)). Thus, the money supply is assumed to
follow an exogenously given stochastic process. For a given expected path of
the money supply, the model exhibits the following saddle path solution
xt
 = A sxt-i +	
((p — 1)A, ( 1 y
b	 Au	 [bEt_ i (mt-Fi) + dEt- ( mtd-i+j)1	 (1.5)i=o
cp - -002 - 4d(1 - d) co + 00 2 - 4d(1 - d)	 1+ 22A, =	 u -=A;	 2d2d ; (P = 1 - 2	 •2
CHAPTER 1. A DGEM WITH STAGGERED WAGE SETTING 33
where
(1.6)
A, and Au are respectively the stable and the unstable root of the saddle
equilibrium. Now suppose m t
 follows a random walk. Then, (1.5) becomes
Xt A8 x _1 + ( 1 - As) mt-i
	
(1.7)
and the dynamics of output are given by
1
yt = A s yt-i + (mt - mt-i) + -2 (1 - As) (mt-i - mt-2)
The first important thing to note therefore is that the model exhibits
persistence in the real effect of money shocks. This issue regarding the per-
sistence of money shocks in staggered wage models will be one of the main
focuses of the thesis and will be discussed in depth in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
A second point to note is that in the long run while money is naturally
neutral in Taylor's model, it is not superneutral, unless b = d = 1/2. In
the above model when the variables are all at their initial steady state level,
the log-deviations are equal zero and the equations are trivially satisfied.
Suppose a permanent step increase in the money supply such that in the
new steady state, instead of having mt = 0, we have rn t =777,  0, Vt. Then,
in the new steady state 13 8 -= r-T1 and y- = 0, that is, the nominal
variables increase as much as the money supply and money is neutral in the
long run. Now suppose a change in the trend such that the money supply
grows forever at a different rate than the initial one. Then, in the new steady
state mt - mt_i =	 0 and the nominal variables will grow in steady state
such that pr	 1 q 0, xr -x7 =	 0, Vt. It is thus trivial to show
(1.8)
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that the equations of the model imply y— = b-d Iq) Then, output is constant
7
in steady state, but it depends on the new rate of growth of money, that is,
money is not superneutral in steady state. This occurs unless b = d = 1/2.4
Finally, the third and most important point is that Taylor's model is
an ad hoc log-linear structural model in which the behavioural equations
are exogenously specified at the outset. It lacks microfoundations and in-
tertemporal optimisation. Taylor (1979) openly acknowledges the need for
microfoundations. 5 In the model presented in the following section, we incor-
porate staggered wage setting a la Taylor (1979) in an optimising dynamic
general equilibrium framework. One aim is to open the 'black box' of the
structural ad hoc parameters of Taylor's famous wage setting equation to
show how these parameters depend upon the microeconomic fundamentals
and the conduct of monetary policy. Besides, intertemporal optimisation
adds new features to the model due to the intertemporal links missing in the
simple Taylor model.
Such a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered wage setting
will allow us to address several issues: (i) the superneutrality of money in the
next chapter; (ii) the adjustment dynamics following disinflationary policies
in Chapter 3; (iii) the persistence in the real effect of money shocks in Chapter
4.
4 The issue of the non-superneutrality of money in staggered wage models will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
5 "Unfortunately, the assumed contract formation behavior is not explictly derived from
a utility maximization model. 1..] the micro foundations of the staggered contract model
presented here are far from complete." (Taylor (1979), p. 111) "The microfoundations of
such models need to be developed more rigourously" (Taylor (1979), p. 112).
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1.3 A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
with Staggered Wage Setting
The model introduces staggered wage setting a la Taylor (1979) in the frame-
work presented in Rankin (1998). The economy consists of a continuum
of industries indexed by i E [0, 1], and of a continuum of industry-specific
household-unions. 6 Every industry produces a single differentiated perishable
product and the goods market in each industry is competitive. Since labour
is not allowed to move across industries, the household-union has monopoly
power in the labour market. Preferences are CES over consumption goods
which are gross substitutes. All firms have the same technology and house-
holds have the same preferences. The symmetry of the economy is broken by
supposing staggered wages. The economy is divided into two sectors of equal
size: industries i E [0, and industry-specific household-unions j E [0,
compose sector A, while industries i E 1] and industry-specific household-
unions j E ( , 1] compose sector B. Exactly as in Taylor's model structure
in the previous section, in each sector every two periods household-unions set
nominal wages which are fixed and constant between the two periods. Then,
staggering is introduced by assuming that sector A fixes the wages in even
periods, while sector B in odd periods.
Furthermore, we assume no uncertainty in the model. Actually this hy-
6 A continuum of industries means that no imperfectly competitive agent is 'large'
relative to the economy as a whole. The 'household-union' should be thought of as an
aggregate of all the households which work in the industry, who collude in the setting of
the wage.
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pothesis is only made for reasons of simplicity. It is in fact not crucial for the
results concerning the dynamics of the model, since the latter will be studied
log-linearising the model around the deterministic steady state. 7 The expec-
tations operator could be straightforwardly incorporated in the model, as the
model in Chapter 5 will show.
Demands for output and labour in the two sectors
All the household-unions have the same utility function
00
=
	 Otu(Cjt , Mit/Pt, Lit)	 (1.9)
i=0
where 0 < 13 < 1. C3 t is a consumption index defined by the CES function
01	 0_1
	 0-1
iCit = [f C..9 dizt
0
(1.10)
where the elasticity of substitution 0 is bigger than 1. Here, Mjt /Pt represents
the real money balances held at the end of period t. Real money balances
enter the utility function because of the liquidity services that money pro-
vides. The last term in the utility function, L3t , is the quantity of labour
supplied by household j during period t. The CES preferences give rise to
the standard demand functions for good i by household j
C 'it = t[ —1? Epit (1.11)
2 t t
where Pt is the price index defined as
1 1-0
o	 l -	 7it	 ° az
[f p (1.12)
and Ejt is total goods expenditure of household j. As a consequence, the
maximised sub-utility Cjt is equal to Eit/Pt•
7 Hence the dynamic model will be linear and certainty equivalence holds.
= (aa)E [
0
± (1 
coo,
	 Kt
1
Et (1.15)=E
ptl -0 Eit djJ .13
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Firms are price-takers in both the goods and labour markets and they
all have the following production function Yit = CEL°:t , 0 < a < 1. The
nominal wage is fixed by the monopolistic household-unions, before firms
choose employment. Thus, firms maximise profits given the nominal wage
W. The demands for labour and the output of firm i are
[ 1 Wit]Lit =
au Pit
a
1 Wit ] ---1
oa
Yit = a (1.13)
When choosing the wage, the union realises that its behaviour influences
the price of the output i, and therefore the demand for labour. Given the total
demand for industry i's output (i.e., Cit	 fol Cdj), simply by imposing
the equilibrium condition on goods market, Cz t	 t , the following relation
between the labour demand and the nominal wage is found
Lit = K W E
	 (1.14)
where
This is the demand function faced by the monopoly union in industry i and
it exhibits a constant money-wage elasticity, E, which is a function of the un-
derlying parameters of preferences and technology. Moreover, since industry
i has measure zero in the economy as a whole, aggregate expenditure, Et,
and the price index, Pt , are considered as given by the union. Thus, the term
Kt is parametric to the union.
In period t, unions in sector A (if t is even), set their wage for the next
two periods. Although they act independently of each other, the complete
symmetry within each sector implies that all sector-A unions will set the
same wage, WAt, and likewise in sector B. As before, let us denote the 'new
-0H]PBt
Pt	 Pt'
(1.17)
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wage' for periods t and t + 1, Xt , so that WAt = WAt+1 = X. Meanwhile
sector B unions are locked into the wage they set one period before, so
WBt WBt-1 Xt_1. Therefore Xt , Xt+2, Xt+4,..., are the wages fixed by
sector A, and Xt+1 7 Xt+3, Xt+5,..., are the wages fixed by sector B. If PAt
is the common price charged in all sector-A industries, and likewise PBt in
sector B, then the supplied output levels of a typical industry in each of the
two sectors in period t are
a[ 1 Xt ] -1
Yrsit = a — ,
au PAt
a
[ 1 Xt_11
Bt	
acr PBt
(1.16)
The demands for the outputs of a typical industry in each of the two sectors
in period t are
,vd _ PA E t vd
At -
[ 
Pt —Pt' Bt
where Pt = 1-0 ipi-ei 1-01_-` DAt 1- 2 Bt J	 •
In equilibrium, aggregate nominal output is equal to aggregate nominal
expenditure on consumption
1 D	 1 n	 n r,t	 1 n ry	 1 n	 1	 1 E,
-2 At I At+ -2 -r	 Bt	 = -rt u t -2 irtUAt 2 1-t t-/Bt = E At+ -2 -E Bt	 )
where (for example) E At Pt CAt is expenditure by a typical sector-A house-
hold. Note that PAtYm PAtCAt7 in general. This is for two reasons:
households which work in sector A receive profits also from sector B; and
households in sector A can borrow from or lend to households in sector B.
The intertemporal behaviour of the household-union
Every period the household-union j chooses the level of consumption and
the quantities of money and bonds it will transfer to next period; while every
alternate period it chooses the level of the money wage. Each household
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enters period t with a predetermined level of wealth, given by money M_ 1
-jt-1
and by the gross interest on bonds /t_ i Bit_ i , where It
 = (Pt+i/Pt)Rt and Rt
is the gross real interest rate. During period t it receives a common lump-sum
transfer Tt , wage income Wit Lit , and an equal share in every firm's profits,
totalling H. In certain periods it may also receive (or make, if negative) an
insurance payment, Hit (this is explained below). Its budget constraint is
therefore given by
P Cit + Mit + Bjt	 Jt-1 +	 + WjtLit + Ht +Tt + Hit . (1.19)
Since the nominal wage is fixed for two periods, at the beginning of period
t the household-union decides the nominal wage, Xit , to be charged in t
and in t 1. After two periods the problem faced is again the same. The
household hence maximises the utility function with respect to consumption,
real balances and labour subject to the sequence of the following constraints:
the budget constraints (1.19), the labour demands (1.14), and the additional
constraint that nominal wages have to be fixed for two successive periods:
Xit = Wit = Wit+i , for t = 0, 2, 4... . Deriving the first-order conditions and
rearranging, we obtain
uc(i, t ) = RtOuc(j,t + 1)
	 (1.20)
UM/ PO t ) = ( 1 — lirt)uc(i, t)	 (1.21)
[ 	 uL(j, t) + OUL(j t + 1) I*
Xjt - - 1) [ UC
 t) + OUC (j t + 1 ) bti
(1.22)
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives and (j, t) is shorthand for the
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arguments of household j's utility in period t. (1.20) is a standard consump-
tion Euler equation for optimal intertemporal consumption choice. (1.21)
equates the marginal utility of real balances to the marginal consumption
opportunity cost of holding money.
Equation (1.22) characterises this model and deserves a few comments.
First, (1.22) provides us with the optimal wage charged by the monopoly
household-union. This is given by a fixed mark-up e/(e —1) over the quantity
in the square brackets. The latter is a ratio between weighted averages of
the marginal disutility of labour and the marginal utility of consumption
over the two periods, that is, a kind of average over the optimal flexible
wages of the two periods. These average values are weighted by the discount
factor 3 and by the coefficient K. Second, note that, since Xfi is received
by the household-union both in period t and t + 1, in period t the wage is
set looking at what will happen tomorrow, while in period t + 1 the wage,
already set, depends on what happened yesterday. This is the source of the
inertia in nominal variables induced by staggering. Third, Gray's (1976)
type of nominally rigid labour contract is set so as to clear the labour market
'in expectation' and therefore the assumption that employment is always on
the labour demand curve is inconsistent with optimisation. This is not true
in our model. Here, since the wage is above the competitive one, ex post
it is optimal for the household-union to satisfy an unexpected increase in
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labour demand.' Alternatively, in Fischer's (1977) or Taylor's (1979) types
of contract, the wage is set in order to achieve an ad hoc target wage level,
while, here, explicit optimising foundations for wage setting are provided.
To find an explicit solution of the model, in the following chapters we
need to assume an explicit form of the utility function. Before turning to
investigate the properties of the deterministic steady state of this model in
the next chapter, a few comments on the insurance scheme assumed are
needed. We have presented the model assuming no uncertainty. How-
ever, this could seem at odds with the intention to study the response of
the model to unexpected disinfiationary policies (i.e., Chapter 3) and/or
money shocks (i.e., Chapter 4). Nevertheless, since the model will be log-
linearised around the deterministic steady state, the expectation operator
could be straightforwardly incorporated in the model, without changing the
results presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The reason why we assume an in-
surance scheme between households is that we want to abstract from dis-
tributional complications.' To solve the model we need to solve an ag-
gregation problem. By definition of the output and consumption indices,
- At, -	 - Bt- Y BtEt = PtCAt/2 + Pt CBt/2 = P tY P /2. What is missing is a
relation between the aggregate nominal expenditure Et and the nominal ex-
penditure by a typical household of each sector, Em PtCAt, EBt-== PtCet•
8 Obviously this is true until the real wage is equal to the competitive one. In what
follows we suppose that this is never the case. That is, no shock occurs which is so big
that the real wage equals the competitive one, hence households never wish to ration an
unexpected increase in labour demand.
9 In a fully stochastic model, the assumption of complete markets plays the role of the
insurance scheme assumed here.
CHAPTER 1. A DGEM WITH STAGGERED WAGE SETTING 42
We know that expenditure by a household depends on its lifetime wealth.
In general this wealth could differ between the sectors, depending on the
past history of the economy. Moreover, since households are infinitely-lived
and have identical preferences, the long-run distribution of wealth between
sectors is not tied down by the steady-state conditions. Any change in the
distribution, following a shock (both permanent, i.e., disinflation, or tem-
porary, i.e., money shock), will persist indefinitely: that is, an individual
household or sector's wealth has a "unit root" property. One consequence
of this is that, in the absence of any redistribution mechanism, if households
start out with equal wealth and then an unanticipated shock occurs, a per-
manent asymmetry between the sectors will be introduced. This is because,
in the period in which it occurs, the shock hits the sectors in a different way:
some can negotiate the wage contract, some others can not. Households in
one sector therefore will suffer a disproportionate loss of income, which will
spill over into their lifetime wealth. From then on, the economy will evolve
in a lopsided way, because the permanent wealth difference will be reflected
in a permanent labour supply, and therefore output, difference between the
sectors. However interesting these distributional complications are, we shall
abstract from them in this thesis, both because they are a digression from
the main argument and because it is very difficult to deal with them. To do
this we assume that there exists an insurance scheme between the two sec-
tors. Suppose that a shock is a random event, with a known, but very small
probability of occurring. Then it will be rational for risk-averse households
to take out insurance (through a competitive insurance industry, which in
equilibrium will make zero profits). In other words, households will pool their
resources to shield themselves against the possibility of a shock. Given that
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all the households are identical (same preferences and same initial wealth), it
is known that the optimal insurance scheme is such that in every period the
marginal utility of consumption will be the same for each household. Hence,
uc (i, t) = uc (i, t) 	 Vi, j E [0.1] and Vt	 (1.23)
that is
uc(A,t) = uc(B,t)	 Vt	 (1.24)
This additional relation (1.24) will then allow us to close the model.'
We turn now to the description of the deterministic steady state of this
model.
l 'I thank Giuseppe Bertola for suggesting this argument.
Chapter 2
Superneutrality of Money in
Staggered Wage Setting Models
2.1 Introduction
Staggered wage/price setting models have been used widely in the literature
to investigate the dynamic response of the economy following a monetary
policy shock and/or to assess the impact of disinflationary policies (see Ball
(1994) and references therein). However, quite surprisingly, very little has
been said about the influence of the rate of growth of money on long-run
output and welfare. In this chapter, we address the issue of super-neutrality
of money in the steady state using the dynamic general equilibrium model
with staggered wage setting presented in the previous chapter.
Previous log-linear staggered wage/price models already acknowledged
that money could be non-superneutral. However, this issue was believed to
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be a minor one. The reason is that in naive log-linear staggering models,
money growth rates can affect steady state output only if the intertemporal
rate of discount is different from zero. Consider, for example, the model of
Calvo (1983a,b). The key equation is the wage/price setting rule:1
CO
x(t) = (p + r) f (p(s) + -yy ( s )) e - (P+r)(s-t)ds	 (2.1)
t
where 0 > 0 , p > 0 and x(t) = wage/price set on contracts renewed; p(t)
= average price level; y(t) = level of output; p = parameter governing the
Poisson process of wage/price changes; r = intertemporal rate of discount.
Under Calvo's (1983a,b) pricing structure, prices are reset at random times
which arrive with probability p. (2.1) gives the reset price as a weighted
average of future price and demand levels. We have introduced a positive
pure time preference rate, i.e., r, into this equation, by adding it to p to obtain
the discount factor of the future price-and-demand index. Calvo (1983a,b),
sets r to zero. According to Calvo (1983a, p. 238, footnote 5) the reason
for this is: "With a non zero real interest rate, [(2.1)] could also naturally
incorporate a factor to reflect it. This addition would, however, make steady
states (in the ensuing analyses) sensitive to permanent changes in the rate
of devaluation or expansion of money supply. Without denying the existence,
and maybe importance, of such effects, we will stick to form [(2.1)] for the
sake of simplicity." If r = 0, then, steady state output would not depend on
the rate of growth of money supply. However, in its standard text-book log-
linear presentation (e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989)), Calvo's (1983a,b)
model has been used to study the effects of a disinflation, but we are left with
1 The full Calvo's (1983a,b) model will be presented and analysed in the next chapter.
Here, the wage/price setting equation is sufficient for the argument.
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the question of why the policy-maker wants to disinflate given that money is
superneutral and that there are short-run costs of disinflating.
The same question becomes even more puzzling if r 0 (as usually
supposed in economic models). Even if the possibility of incorporating such
a parameter has been acknowledged (in footnotes) by Calvo, most commonly
it goes unmentioned2 , and even those authors who do mention it nevertheless
proceed to ignore it, arguing that it is close to zero in practice. We shall show
that, even though r may be small, it still plays an important role. In the case
r 0, in fact, steady state output is an ever increasing function of the rate of
growth of money. Romer (1990, p. 208, footnote 5) provides a clear intuitive
explanation for this result "[...] if the real interest rate is positive, higher
trend inflation increases mean output (given [p]). The source of this effect is
that trend inflation causes the expected profit-maximising price to be rising
over time and that a positive real interest rate causes firms to put relatively
greater weight on current rather than future optimal prices; thus they charge
less than the weighted average expected profit-maximising price. " 3 A positive
r, then, by decreasing x, lowers the average level of prices and hence raises the
level of output. However, it is evident that a level of output ever increasing in
the rate of money growth is not a very desirable feature of a model built with
2 As, for example, in Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Ball (1994).
3 Note that the same is true for a Taylor-type of model, with variables expressed in levels.
On one hand, the equivalent to the hypothesis r = 0 in Calvo's model is b = d -= 1/2
for Taylor's model. As stated in the previous chapter, in this case money would be
superneutral. On the other hand, the equivalent to r > 0 in Calvo's model, is b > d
for a Taylor-type of model in levels. Then the steady state level of output would be
ever-increasing in the steady state rate of growth of money in such a model.
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the purpose of studying disinflation. Given that, and also because the effect
of the intertemporal rate of discount is supposed empirically to be rather
small, the original simplifying, but unjustified, assumption r = 0 has become
an established and natural one in log-linear staggered wage/price models.
In contrast, in dynamic general equilibrium monetary models, there is
always a strong reason to disinflate, since a positive rate of inflation forces
agents to economise on real balances. Indeed, this is exactly what happens
in the more complete version of Calvo's model, i.e., Calvo (1983b), in which
the model is embedded in a utility-maximising framework. However, Calvo
(1983b) assumes the existence of a costless "price-regulation mechanism" to
ensure that each consumer pays the same whatever the firm at which she
realises her purchases. Although this hypothesis permits a very neat and
elegant analysis of the short-run dynamics, it deletes all of the interesting
effects due to the interrelation of different firms charging different prices.
However, as we will show in this chapter, these interrelations are precisely
the source of strong non-superneutrality effects. Once the "price-regulation
mechanism" hypothesis is made, from the point of view of the effects of the
rate of growth of money on the steady state, the model is exactly equivalent
to a flexible price one. Indeed, steady state output is independent of the
rate of growth of money and the Friedman rule turns out to be optimal,
since it satiates the demand for real money balances.' In Calvo (1983b), the
welfare costs of a positive rate of inflation, therefore, are just the cost of the
inflation tax on real money balances. An estimate of this cost is provided by
4 1t is probably worth recalling that in Calvo (1983b) leisure does not enter the utility
function and the labour supply is exogenous.
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Cooley and Hansen (1989). They build a general equilibrium cash-in-advance
monetary model with flexible prices and estimate the cost of the inflation tax
of a 10% rate of inflation to be around 0.4% of the GNP.
In a recent paper, Ireland (1995) analyses disinflationary monetary poli-
cies in a general equilibrium monetary model with staggered prices. His
model exhibits staggered price setting decisions and explicitly takes into ac-
count that different firms charge different prices. It turns out that the optimal
monetary policy requires a trade-off between the zero inflation tax and pro-
ductive efficiency. In fact, on one hand, the Friedman rule requires a negative
rate of growth of the money supply, whereas, on the other hand, productive
efficiency requires holding the money supply fixed. The optimal monetary
policy would balance these two effects, hence determining a negative rate of
inflation, but bigger than the one necessary for zero inflation tax. 5 How-
ever the model of Ireland (1995) implies only very mild effects of the rate of
growth of money on steady state output and welfare, the order of magnitude
being similar to the one of Cooley and Hansen (1989). As shown below, the
explanation of this result lies in the simplified structure of Ireland's (1995)
model in which the production function is linear in labour, as is the utility
function, and moreover the elasticity of substitution between consumption
5 Note that in a model with these features, the reason why the policy maker wants to
disinflate is immediately evident. However, the long-run gains have to be compared with
the short-run costs of disinflating, due to the staggered price setting structure. Therefore,
Ireland (1995) analyses the very interesting issue of the optimal disinflationary path, that
is, how monetary policy can disinflate optimally, balancing the short-run costs and the
long-run gains.
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goods equals one. In conclusion, neither Calvo's (1983b) model, with the
"price-regulation mechanism" hypothesis, nor Ireland's (1995) model is able
to catch the importance of non-superneutrality in a staggered wage/price
model.
We study the properties of the steady state of the model presented in
the previous chapter with respect to changes in the rate of growth of money.
The model is similar to that of Ireland (1995), but has three distinct features.
First, it enables us to explicitly demonstrate the role of the intertemporal dis-
count factor in the wage setting process and to show the same effect explained
above by Romer (1990). Second, the model is more articulated in that it
allows for more general utility and production functions. In particular, it in-
troduces the usual non-linearities in technology and preferences: decreasing
returns to labour, increasing marginal disutility of labour and an elasticity
of substitution among goods bigger than one. 6 These non-linearities prove
to be the channel through which the rate of growth of money strongly affects
the steady state output and welfare. Third, the model exhibits staggered
wages instead of prices, as advocated by Ireland (1995). 7 Hence, it provides
a rationale for the price stability-oriented policies observed in western coun-
tries. We do observe staggered wage setting behaviour, we do observe a
When we use the expression "usual non-linearities in utility and production functions",
we mean precisely the three points just mentioned.
7 "Cho and Cooley (1992) find that nominal wage setting models do a better job than
nominal price setting models in matching a variety of correlations that appear in the data.
While their work indicates that it would be useful to consider the nature of optimal mon-
etary policy in economies with wage rigidities as well as price rigidities, this is left as a
task for future research." (Ireland (1995), p. 1432)
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relatively low inflation rate in western countries, and, notwithstanding high
unemployment, the latter are still seeking price stability. We demonstrate
that, in the presence of staggered wage setting, an inflation rate of the mag-
nitude recently registered in developed economies (5%) can cause very high
costs both in output and in welfare, giving strong support to the pursuit of
price stability. The same argument would be much more difficult to sustain
in a model with nominal rigidities in the form of fixed staggered price, since
this feature, unlike fixed-staggered wages, is not observed in modern western
economies.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we describe the steady
state of the model showing why money is not superneutral in the steady
state. In section 3, some simple numerical examples suggest that varying the
steady state money growth rate could have a strong impact on steady state
output and welfare. Therefore, in the presence of staggered adjustment,
superneutrality of money turns out to be a very important, rather than a
minor, issue.
2.2 Steady State Analysis
To find an explicit solution of the model the following particular form of the
instantaneous utility function is assumed:8
A1/P, Lit) =-- 61nCit + (1 — 6) ln Mit/Pt — xL.;t	(2.2)uit(Git,
8 Rankin (1998) and many others in the literature (see references therein) use a similar
utility function.
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
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where e > 1. This is a partially logarithmic utility function that exhibits
increasing marginal disutility of labour. The first order conditions of the
model now are given by
Cit+1 ORtCjt
1 ) Mat
C3 t = 6: 6 7 1 — rt pt
1
[	 +X .t = (  E  ) Xe -Kf 
13K1'±E(.--1)
E — 1 6  Kt  + 8  Kt+i 
Pt Cit	 , Ptd-igit-Fi
First note that, as said previously, the optimal nominal wage is a ratio
between average values of the disutility from labour and of the utility from
consumption over the two periods, that is, a sort of average between the
optimal flexible wages of the two periods. Note further that this average
values are weighted by the discount factor and by the coefficient K and that,
since < 1, the variables of the second period are discounted. Hence, they
are given a lower weight in calculating the average value. This is exactly the
source of the Calvo-Romer effect, described in the introduction.
Secondly, since the marginal utility of consumption will be the same across
households in each period and given the separable specification of the utility
function, households will consume the same in each period. That is, the
consumption of sector A is the same as the consumption of sector B in every
period. Thus, imposing C At = CBt = Ct = EAt/ Pt = EBt/ Pt = Et/C , it is
straightforward to solve for the steady state.
Macroeconomic equilibrium
Let's firstly concentrate on the demand side of the economy. We can sum
(2.3) and (2.4) across all households j, and then use It = (P1+1/ P)Rt to
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eliminate It and R. This yields the following relationship between aggregate
money and consumption demands
Mt	 1 — 6	 Mt mt-F1	 1— S
+0 ,	 or	 Zt = 	 + 0 (13 t-Fi Zt+i (2.6)PtCt	 u	 1VJ4 Pt-FiCt+i
where Ct .TOC dj, M fO Mitdi. The alternative version of the equa-
tion follows from imposing money market equilibrium, and letting 4)t±i =
Mt/Mt+1 denote the rate of decrease of the money supply. This is a first-
order linear difference equation in Zt
 Mt/PCt = Mt/Et , the ratio between
real balances and real consumption, that is, the inverse of the consumption-
velocity of circulation of money, or the so-called 'Cambridge k'.
(2.6) is a key equation of the model and will be the focus of the next
chapter. Since /3 < 1, and (13 < 1 if there is positive monetary growth, it is
clearly unstable in the forward dynamics. However Zt is not a predetermined
variable, since neither Pt nor Ct are predetermined. Therefore instability
is, in this case, a welcome property because it allows us, by ruling out all
divergent paths, to select a unique solution (this is the usual "saddlepath"
argument). Here, this solution corresponds to the steady state. The steady
state value of Z is9
1 — 6Z =
	
	 (2.7)6(1 — 0(1))
Note that Z is a decreasing function of the steady state rate of growth of
money (i.e. of 1/4)). The higher the rate of money growth, the higher
"Note that we must have 4) < 1/0 otherwise Z is negative. In fact if (13 = 1/0 (which is
Friedman's well-known optimum quantity of money rule), the gross nominal interest rate
would be unity in the steady state. In this case individuals would be satiated with money
which implies, given that our utility function does not have a satiation point, infinite real
money balances and hence infinite Z.
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the inflation tax on real balances and the lower is the ratio between real
balances and consumption, since households choose to economise on their
money holdings.
Aggregating (2.4) and substituting into (2.6) for Zt and Zt+ i , yields the
corresponding dynamic equation for h
/t±i (1 + 04)) — 
h=
04)h+i	 •
(2.8) exhibits two stationary values for I: 1 and 1/04). The first one is locally
stable and the second one locally unstable. Since we obviously require It > 1,
again a unique path can be selected by ruling out divergent paths. Restricting
(I) to be less than 1, then the unique non-divergent path satisfying I> 1 for
all t is given by
h= 1/04)	 for all t .	 (2.9)
An increase in the rate of growth of the money supply, lowering (I), clearly
increases the steady state value of the nominal interest rate.
An important thing to note with regard to (2.6) and (2.8) is that these
dynamic equations are totally independent of the supply side of the economy.
In other words, they hold independently of whether wages are flexible, fixed,
or predetermined but time-varying, and of their synchronisation. (2.6) and
(2.8) derive just from the demand side of the economy and so the dynamics
of Zt are independent of the supply side. This point will be very important
in the analysis of the disinflation dynamics of the next chapter.
We can now look at the supply side of the model to solve for X. We are
now able to express all the variables of the model, i.e. sectors' outputs and
prices and aggregate price and output, as functions of A, Zt , Xt _ 1 and X.
(2.8)
[1 0,1_0
At ± -2- Bt
1 pl--01 1-0Pt= (2.11)
1\
1_, 
r amt/ztxt 
	 a
W a [1+ (Xt-i/Xt)i-E]YAt
(2.12)
(1 1-6 a [ 0-Mt/ ZtXt-1  icr
2)	 L(xt/xt_01-E+1_1YBt (2.13)
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Given the definition of Zt , substituting Et = Mt/Zt into (1.17), we get
—0 "
vd [PAti—°  A	 vd [PBt] (2.10)At =	 z t pt ,	 Bt = Pt	 Z t Pt •
Imposing the equilibrium conditions on the goods market in the two indus-
tries (i.e., Ylt
 =
	 and Yi = YEis t ) and using
allow us to express prices and outputs as functions of Mt , Zt , Xt_ 1 and Xt,
as follows (when t is an even number)
r
r)	 1 (Xt ) a [ 	 2Mt/Zt 
	11-cr
- —
a 0"	
-F (Xt_11,0 -6]
1 ( Xt_i a [ 	 2Mt/Zt 	11-a
PBt ) [(Xt I Xt-0 1-6 + 1
p	 1 ( Mt ) 1-6 (Xt) Gr [1- 1 (Xt_1)1-61
t- —Zt 	a	 2 2 Xt )
(2.14)
(2.15)
(2.16)
Given the definition of the aggregate price level, aggregate output is de-
fined, as in normal national income accounting, as
1 P4tYAt 1PRtYBt Et2	 - --	 2 --	 - 
Yt -	 = = CitPt	 Pt
Then
(2.17)
Yt = D 7	 (2.18)
tLit
E	 1)6	 Kt  ± 	 Kt±i
PtCAt	 Pt+I.CAt+1
xe 	 + 13K41 for t = 0, 2, 4, ...;
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In period t+1 the above expressions for sectors' prices and outputs are slightly
different, since t + 1 is an odd number, whence the expressions (1.16) for
supplies must be modified. In fact YAt+1 )
 Bt+17 PAt+11 PBt+1 can be obtained
by substituting Xt_ l by Xt+ i , Mt by Mt+, and 4 by Zt-Ei.
Moreover,
PAt
it
=
is immediate to
a
find
PAt+1
(2.19)
(2.20)
(2.21)
'+t9(1-a)
[Xt-1]
Xt
YAt
"t	 1°(a1—°)
°E
°
pBt y
YAt
==
PBt+1
YAt-Fi
Xt-Fli
YBt
t+1]
=	 „
[X
YBt+1
lut	 1+ (xxtti) l—E
YAt+1 Mt+1 1 ± txt_i
[
\ 1-E
Xt )
These equations show how relative sectors' behaviour is fully characterised
by the difference between the money wages in force. Trivially, if the two
sectors exhibit the same money wage they will exhibit also the same price
and hence the same level of output. Whenever the wages prevailing in the
sectors are different, instead the ratio between the wages determines the
ratio of sectors' prices and output. It is hence very easy to grasp what would
happen in a steady state when the money supply is growing at a given rate:10
X will be growing at the same rate over time and thus the sectoral output
will undergo a two-period cycle, as we will see below.
To solve for X, we can aggregate (2.5) as
(2.22)
N Note however, that the equations above also hold outside the steady state.
_L( Xt-1  )1-6
	
e
1
1 ± ( zZ: +Mi tm+lt ) e [ '1+' ?)(4.+Ixt
(2.23)
1+ /  
[i+(x;,-,1) 1-e ]
1-1-P11±-1-1—s
xt )
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while for t = 1, 3, 5, ..., the expression is the same but with CB replacing C A-
Recalling the insurance argument, we may now impose C At C Bt Ct = Yt
and substitute for Kt , Pt and Yt as respectively given by (1.15), (2.16) and
(2.18), to obtain
1—e
1	 ) 1—el e
Xt ( 	 6 Xe	 (2o- Mt [	(X1 +	 t-1
— 2S0- )	 Zt )
This highly non-linear equation gives the dynamics for Xt as a function
of the exogenous money supply path (recall that the dynamics of Zt depends
only on the exogenous money supply path). We shall now concentrate instead
on the steady state of the model, leaving the dynamics and the investigation
of (2.23) to the next chapters.
In a steady state, the money supply is growing at the constant rate of
((1/1) — 1), where (I) is defined as (Mt /Mt+i). Unsurprisingly, the money
wage Xt and the aggregate price level Pt are found to grow through time at
the same rate as the money supply. The steady state is characterised by the
following expressions'
Xt = 	 E Xe e (2n-  6  (1 O(I))Mt) [1 + 4)1] 1—e
— 1 26o-	 1 — 6
	
lly	 exe	 is the steady state output in the flexible wage/price version of
	
n	 [(6-1),Scr
{
1 + 04)—ee
±
(2.24)
this model.
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Period t Period t + 1 Period t + 2 Period t + 3
YAt
YAt+1 = YAI`D—cr'
lilt +1 = I'M > ''At
YAt-l-2 = lilt YAt+3 = YAt-1-1
YBI
Y/3t+1 = YBt4'
Y131+1 = YAt < Yl3t.
Yi3t-I-2 = YBE /3E+3 = Y. lit +1
PAt
PAt-4-1 = 43s( ' —1) PAt
At-1-1 >	 At
PAt-1-2 = '13'('-1)-2''1° PAH -1 PAt+3 = `I' 	 I) PAt+2
P /3 t put+i = 4,e(a-1)-2Err/Oput PI31-1-2 = `I' '(' —13 Pl3t-F1 pnt+3 = 4,e(cr —1)-2en /11 pi31+2
Table 2.1: Steady State Sectors' Output and Price Behaviour
/
YAt = Yn. (±)
	 ± (1)	 112	 1
YBt YAt (D—crE
6 
PAt = Yn-121-gj (	 (1 0.2D)Mt) [1 + 43 11 -
PBt = PAt (1)1—E(1-0r)
—eE
	 e
± 1843 (2.25)+ /3(1) 1-g j
(2.26)
{ 1 +1343	 E y1 + 040.-E
(2.27)
(2.28)
	
9	 a
	
Pt 
= n-12-	 ocm-t)	 40.-11110-1-: f 1 +13 1:13- eE 1y 1 —	 1. 1 + 13 (111—E f
(2.29)
Since Xt is growing over time, the sector that sets Xt will exhibit a higher
money wage than the sector that has already set the money wage, X t_ 1 , in
period t — 1. In every period, therefore, there will be two different money
wages in the economy, and so, two different prices. The symmetry between
sectors' behaviour is evident from Table 2.1.
If money grows at a positive rate, then < 1. The steady state behaviour
of each sector is characterised by a slump in the period the wage is set,
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followed by a boom in the next period, when the other sector fixes the wage.
More precisely, YAt YBt-1 = Ys/ump and YAt+1 = YBt = Yboom. Therefore,
each sector exhibits the boom in the period in which the other sector fixes
its money wage.
The ratio between the slump and the boom in each sector is given by
YAt/YAt-F i = YBt-1 37Bt = (I)" . Intuitively, two effects come into play. First,
since the money wage is fixed for two successive periods, it is a kind of
average of the optimal one. As a result, it is higher than the optimal one in
the first period and lower in the second period. This is a supply-side effect:
the wage is set higher than the optimal in the slump period. The same is also
true for prices determining a second demand-side effect which derives from
the interrelation between relative prices and demand. Because there are two
sectors charging different prices, the composition of demand would change
as the ratio of the prices in the two sectors changes. Thus, the amplitude of
the cycle depends not only on o-, but also on O. In fact, 6 is an increasing
function of 0: the bigger the elasticity of substitution, the larger the size
of the cycle. In the period in which sector A fixes the money wage, sector
B is still locked in the one fixed a period before. As a consequence, sector
A exhibits not only a higher money wage, but also a higher real wage (and
price) than sector B. This has two negative effects on the output of sector
A. The first one is for supply reasons since the real wage is higher than the
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optimal one. The second one acts through demand, given that the price of
sector B is lower and the goods are imperfect substitutes.' Note that these
effects, because of the assumption of the "price-regulation mechanism", are
ignored in Calvo's (1983b) model. Moreover, they are partially present in
Ireland's (1995) model, but their potential importance is simply choked off
at the very outset, by putting a priori a = e = 0 = 1 and thereby cancelling
the "non-linearities".
Sector prices are growing over time, but the rate of growth is different,
depending on whether the sector money wage has changed or not. Besides,
the aggregate price index Pt is growing at the same rate as the money supply.
Households are paid a higher wage, but they work less in a slump than in
a boom. They receive less income in a slump than in a boom. More precisely:
LAtXt/LBtXt-i (DE--1 < 1; therefore, the difference between income levels
also is an increasing function of 0. However, with regard to welfare, since
households of both sectors enjoy the same level of consumption and real
12 Imagine this economy without staggering, that is, household-unions fix the money
wage for two periods, but they all reset it in the same period. Then, its behaviour would
be characterised by a rather artificial oscillation in aggregate output between boom and
slump. In fact, given the complete symmetry of the economy, only this first supply-side
effect would be present, and the ratio of output between the boom and the slump would
be equal to (I)°". In the staggered model, the second effect enlarges the amplitude of the
cycle.
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money balances, it follows immediately that households are better off in a
slump simply because they work less (LAt/LBt = 4''')•
What about real aggregate output? Given the definition of real aggregate
output in (2.17), we have
Yss = Yn,2 4.14e [1 + (1) 1-E ]ig- { 1 +043-eTi1 ± o(pi-, (2.30)
Real aggregate output, therefore, is constant over time, but it depends on (14,
that is, money is not superneutral in steady state. If (I) = 1, then Y88 = Y.
In the case of a constant money supply, in fact, staggering has no effect in
steady state, because nominal wages and all of the nominal variables are
constant over time. Therefore, there would be complete symmetry between
the two sectors that would produce the same level of output and charge the
same price. In a steady state, the economy would behave as a flexible wage
one.
The derivative of Y58 with respect to (I) is equal to
aYss	 0	 o-	 1— E 	 /3o/3 (
	
1— c ce yl
Yss34) =	 [(o — 1	 e) (DE +43	 e	 43.E +043 (1)(43eE ± 13) )]
and the square bracket can be written as
ci(c — 1)
0)(DE- 1 +	 0)( 6- 1( 4) eE + 0)( 1 —	 ae ( 4)E-1 + — (D") •
(2.31)
(2.32)
e
Then, it follows that 3 -175,9/343 is non-positive for (I) = 1, and the condition
13 > (I)1+E(e-1) is sufficient for ayssla(D to be non-negative. This implies
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a 1-(1—o)0
that Ifs, reaches a maximum at a point (I)* E (0, 1) such that 0-+ 0 ( e- c ) <
(I)* < 1. Hence, to maximise the level of steady state output, the system
requires a positive level of inflation." This is, however, only due to a positive
intertemporal rate of discount. If the latter is equal to zero, i.e., 0 = 1, then
Ifs, is maximised for (I) = 1. The reason for this result is exactly the same as
explained by Romer (1990).
Nevertheless, unlike Calvo's model, Yss is not ever increasing in the rate
of growth of money and then it is obvious that there are other effects coming
into play. The intuition is straightforward given the zigzag behaviour of
sectors' output in steady state. Because of the non-linearities characterising
the production and utility functions, households generally would prefer to
produce the same amount of output in each period. A rate of inflation
different from zero and the staggered adjustment structure, however, impose
'This is quite a strong result by itself. There is a widespread belief that a little bit
of inflation is good for the economy, and if commentators look at GDP to judge what
is good and what is bad for the economy, then the model would justify this belief. To
our knowledge, only Dazinger (1988) gets a similar result in dynamic general equilibrium
models comparable to ours, but looking at welfare and not at output. Other models (e.g.
Cooley and Hansen (1989), Ireland (1995)) look at a cash-in-advance economy. In this case:
"When money is supplied according to a constant growth rate rule that implies positive
nominal interest rates, individuals substitute leisure for goods, output and investment fall"
(Cooley and Hansen (1989) p. 735). Therefore, if prices are flexible, output level is
maximised in correspondence with the Friedman rule.
Yss	 2(1 + 
( 1 + )(1 + ,3) (2.33)
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a cycle on sectors' output. The bigger the cycle, on average, the lower is the
output. These non-linearity effects add to the intertemporal rate of discount
effect and actually dominate it, making "K s
 decline as the rate of inflation
grows.
Suppose that 0 = 0 and e = a = 1, then
and only the intertemporal rate of discount effect is present here." As Figure
2.1 shows, Y. is ever increasing in the rate of growth of money (rgm in the
graphs) and the lower p, the bigger is this effect. Intuitively, if 0 -= 0, the
goods are no longer gross substitutes and each sector just receives half of
the real demand. The output of the sectors is just the same in every period.
This case corresponds to Calvo's (1983a) model. If 0 is close to 1, then,
as Figure 2.2 shows, the effect of p is still present, but there is also a weak
effect resulting from the substitution among different goods. The latter effect
eventually would overtake the former one as the rate of money growth rises.
This case corresponds to Ireland's (1995) model.
Figure 2.3 shows the behaviour of Ifs , for what can be considered plausible
values of the parameters.' As easily can be seen, the non-linearity effects
14 b'y- hypothesis, 0 should be bigger than one; otherwise, as is well known in this Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) kind of framework, the model is not well defined. However, this extreme
case is considered as an aid to intuition.
15 1n this base case, the value of 0 is set to 6 as in Hairault and Portier (1993). More
13=0.9
13 = 0.95
13 = 1
rgm
-0.04	 -0.02 0.02	 0.04
Y„/Yr,
1.001
1.0005
0.999
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Figure 2.1: Steady State Output: 0 = 0, e = a = 1
make the curve bend. The maximum still occurs at a positive (0.2%) rate of
growth of money (because /3 < 1), but then the curve bends very quickly as
the money growth rate increases. Moreover, note that our model reproduces
the empirical negative correlation between inflation rates and employment
rates reported by Cooley and Hansen (1989, section HIC).
The welfare level in the aggregate is a function of 43 . 16 In particular,
problematic is to find a sensible value for e. Following Macurdy (1981), e should be set
equal to 4.3. However, most Pencavel (1986) estimations place e between 3.2 and infinity.
As a conclusion, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in labour supply should be
low. Therefore, in the base case, e is set equal to 4.5, but there are virtually no reasons
for not choosing a higher value of e. Then, cr = 1 and = 0.95. In the next section,
some numerical examples are shown for different values of these parameters. (Moreover,
x = 0.01, 6 = 0.99 and a = 1, but these three parameters are not important for next
section results).
16 The welfare is defined as the weighted sum of the welfare level of the households
=0.9
0.95
rgm
p = 0.1
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Y„/Y„
Figure 2.2: Steady State Output: 9 = 1.0000001, e = a = 1
welfare tends to infinity as (I) tends to 1M. As a result, in this model the
optimal money rule also corresponds to the Friedman rule. In this case,
real money balances, and thus welfare, tend to infinity and the model is
undetermined.
Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show the behaviour of welfare in Ireland's (1995) case
(i.e., e = a = 1, 0 close to 1) and in the base case, respectively. In the
first case, welfare is decreasing in the money growth rate simply because real
balances are decreasing as the latter rises. Since output does not change very
much, because the intertemporal rate of discount is small, then the real bal-
ances effect dominates. In the second case, instead, the non-linearity effects
of the two sectors with weights equal to (1/2) which is the size of the sectors. Hence:
W UA /2 UB/2.
rgm
0.04
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Figure 2.3: Steady State Output: 0 = 6, e = 4.5,o = 1, /3 = 0.95
clearly dominate. Further to the left in Figure 2.5, welfare starts to increase
and tends to infinity as rgm approaches /3 — 1 = —0.05 (off the graph). Our
utility function, chosen for tractability and simplicity reasons, does not im-
ply a satiation point for real balances. However, this is highly unrealistic.
We can suppose the existence of a satiation point, simply assuming that for
all M/ P > some (MIP)*, the second term in the utility function (i.e., ln
(M/ P)) will be replaced by a constant k. 17 If k is not unrealistically high,
then the effects on the real part of the utility function would dominate. 18 In
17 This hypothesis would not change the results presented here for (M/P)* sufficiently
large.
18 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) and King and Wolman (1996) for a similar
argument.
w-32.24
-32.25
-32.26
-32.27
-32.28
-3
rgm
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CHAPTER 2. STAGGERED WAGES AND SUPERNEUTRALITY 66
Figure 2.4: Steady State Welfare: 0 = 1.0000001, e = a = 1
Figure 2.5, then welfare would be maximised at rgm = -0.45%.19
As the graphs show, staggered wage setting calls for price stability because
it gives rise to high cost of inflation.
19 Moreover, note that if the intertemporal rate of discount is relatively high, then wel-
fare could be maximised in correspondence to a positive rgm (e.g. if 0 = 0.9, then
argmax{W(rgm)} =0.1%).
rgm
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W
Figure 2.5: Steady State Welfare: 6' = 6,e = 4.5, a = 1,8 = 0.95
2.3 How Big Are the Effects of a Change in
Money Growth ?
In this section some numerical examples are presented to give an insight into
how big the effects due to non-linearities can be. 2° What has been computed
is how the steady state of the system changes, when the steady state rate of
money growth goes from 5% to zero. The results are summarised in Table
2.2. AY gives the percentage change in aggregate output; AW gives the
change in welfare. This is measured in "consumption equivalent" gain, that
is, how much consumption must be given to the households (holding other
2() Even if similar to Cooley and Hansen (1989, section MB), this is not a calibration
exercise. The exercise remains theoretical and close to the spirit of the exercise of, e.g.,
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
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arguments of their utility function constant) to make them enjoy the same
level of welfare as in the case of zero money growth.21
Just from a quick look at the table, it is immediately evident that a wide
range of possibilities arises. In particular, the results depend heavily on the
values of the non-linearity parameters 0, a, and e. Since the amplitude of
the sectors' relative outputs is 
	1-Frgin , the bigger 0 and a, the bigger
is the amplitude of the cycle and the more the curve bends. In the base
case in which a = 1, e -= 4.5, and 0 = 6, then a change from 5% to 0
in the rate of money growth leads to a change in steady state output of
3.41%. The change in welfare is equal to 8.44% increase in consumption.
The variation in welfare due only to the changes in consumption and labour
levels is equivalent to 6.96% gain in consumption, while the rest of the gain is
due to the change in real balances. These numbers are somewhat impressive,
given that 5% money growth is very moderate inflation consistent with the
experience of most western countries. In the absence of non-linearities, as
in Ireland's (1995) model, there is actually a loss in output, since only the
intertemporal rate of discount effect is present. This is, however, somewhat
21 It is straightforward to show that the equivalent consumption variation as a percentage
of initial consumption level is given by
AW = [exp W(0)—SW(5%) ) 1] 100
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a = 1 0 = 1 0 = 6 0 = 10 0 = 20
e = 1
AY = -0.03
AW = 1.24
AY = 0.12
AW = 1.56
AY = 0.23
AW = 1.84
AY = 0.48
AW = 2.35
AY = 0.071 AY = 3.41 AY = 8.70 AY = 25.13
e = 4.5
LW = 1.46 AW ---= 8.44 AW = 19.94 AW = 59.40
AY = 0.23 AY = 7.40 AY = 15.82 AY = 36.05
e = 10
AW = 1.79 AW = 17.02 LW = 36.29 AW = 88.70
a = 0.8 0 = 1 0 = 6 0 = 10 0 = 20
AY = -0.026 AY = 0.0213 AY = -0.035 AY = -0.049
e = 1
AW = 1.26 AW = 1.38 AW = 1.41 LW = 1.44
AY = 0.057 AY = 0.683 AY = 0.977 AY = 1.33
e = 4.5
LW = 1.43 AW = 2.71 AW = 3.32 LW = 4.06
AY = 0.187 AY = 1.73 AY = 2.39 AY = 3.16
e = 10
AW = 1.69 AW = 4.86 LW = 6.27 AW = 7.89
a = 0.5 0 = 1 0 = 6 0 = 10 0 = 20
AY = -0.016 AY = -0.006 AY = -0.004 AY = -0.003
e = 1
AW = 1.28 AW = 1.30 LW = 1.31 AW = 1.32
AY = 0.036 AY = 0.13 AY = 0.147 AY = 0.163
e = 4.5
AW = 1.38 LW = 1.58 AW = 1.61 AW = 1.64
AY = 0.117 AY = 0.359 AY = 0.404 AY = 0.444
e = 10
AW = 1.55 LW = 2.05 AW = 2.14 AW = 2.21
Table 2.2: Output and Welfare Steady State Changes from 5% to 0 Money
Growth
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negligible (- 0.032). Nonetheless, the gain in welfare is equal to 1.24% of
consumption, but this is entirely due to the rise in real balances. In fact, the
variation in welfare due only to a change in output and labour levels is equal
to a loss of -0.066%.
In the extreme case in which 0=-- 20, e = 10, and a = 1, the change
in output amounts to 36.05% and the one in welfare to 88.70% equivalent
variation in consumption. 22 The equivalent variation in consumption due
only to the variation of output and labour levels amounts to 85.1% of the
initial consumption level. In this case, the effects are therefore of enormous
magnitude.
The results are very sensitive to all of the non-linearity parameters and
especially to a. If a is low then, the effects are reduced greatly, though still
of some importance. Intuitively, a = 1 corresponds to the maximum degree
of nominal rigidity. In this case, in fact, each sector can afford to satisfy all
of the received demand without changing its price. If instead a <1, then
the higher the output produced by the sector, the higher is the price to be
charged because of the diminishing returns to labour. This fact obviously
reduces the gap between the prices of the two sectors and therefore their
22 Given what has been discussed in footnote 15 about the intertemporal elasticity of
labour supply and given that 9 = 20 has been used in the literature for this kind of
numerical examples (e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)), this case is actually not as
extreme as it might seem.
Yss/Yn
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output gap in each period.
Figures 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 show very neatly how the curve bends more as the
non-linearity parameters increase.23
CT	 0.04
Figure 2.6: Steady State Output: e = 6, e = 4.5, 0 = 0.95
2.4 Conclusions
The numerical results suggest that, in staggered adjustment models, su-
perneutrality is far from being the minor issue that has been thought so
23 What is actually plotted on the vertical axis is the ratio 1 788 /Y„, which is the ratio
between the aggregate output in the staggering model and the one in the flexible wage
version of the same model. That is why the Figure 2.6 is decreasing in sigma. The
aggregate output Ys3 is actually increnAing in sigma (as Yn), but the higher sigma, the
higher is the effect described in the paper and the lower is the ratio between 1788 and
Ys
1
0.975
0.95
0.925
0.9
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Figure 2.7: Steady State Output: 0 = 6, cr = 1, /3 = 0.95
far. This chapter actually demonstrates that it very well can be the case
that a mild permanent change in the rate of growth of money could have
substantial effects on aggregate output and welfare. Previous models with
staggered wage/price behaviour fail to acknowledge this fact. In the steady
state, Calvo's (1983b) model behaves as a flexible price one, because of the
peculiar hypothesis of a price-regulation mechanism. Ireland's (1995) model
is too simple in its structure to detect strong effects of the rate of growth of
money on the steady state output and welfare. In particular, because of the
linearity in the production and utility functions in labour and the elasticity
of substitution among goods equal to one, Ireland's (1995) model does not
capture the effects due to the usual . non-linearities in technology and pref-
CHAPTER 2. STAGGERED WAGES AND SUPERNEUTRALITY 73
Figure 2.8: Steady State Output: e = 4.5, c = 1, 0 = 0.95
erences: decreasing return to scale to labour, increasing marginal disutility
of labour and elasticity of substitution among goods bigger than one. Once
these effects are taken into account, it turns out that staggered wage setting
behaviour induces strong non-superneutrality properties and high costs of in-
flation. Hence, given that staggered wages are observed in western countries,
we can easily explain high costs of inflation and provide a rationale for the
pursuit of price stability in western countries.
Chapter 3
Staggered Wages and
Disinflation Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
Ever since the work of Gray (1976), Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979), stag-
gered, preset wages or prices have been the mainstream Keynesian explana-
tion of why monetary policy is able to have significant and persistent effects
on real output in the presence of rational expectations. For example, Blan-
chard and Summers (1988, p. 182) argued: "On the alternative "Keynesian
view", even credible disinflation is likely to increase unemployment for some
time, because of the inflationary momentum caused by overlapping price and
wage decisions." However, Ball (1994) challenged this common view. In par-
ticular, he argued that, while staggered preset pricing is the most likely source
74
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of persistent negative output effects of a permanent reduction in the level of
the money supply (a "deflation"), the same effects do not follow a permanent
reduction in the money supply's rate of growth (a "disinflation" ). 1 We call
this the "disinflation puzzle". This puzzle is most starkly expressed by Ball
(1994), though it was noted before this by others, e.g. Blanchard (1983),
Buiter and Miller (1985). Ball presents a model with the surprising result
that "with credible policy and a realistic specification of staggering, quick dis-
inflations cause booms". For this reason, Ball and others (e.g. Miller and
Sutherland (1993), Driffil and Miller (1993)) have gone on to conclude that
essential to the explanation of why disinflations cause prolonged recessions
in practice is that policy lacks "credibility".
Ball and the other authors who arrive at the same conclusion, however,
use macromodels which are directly postulated rather than explicitly derived
from microfoundations. In this chapter we use our model of staggered wages
to address the disinflation puzzle. The question we then ask is whether
introducing such microfoundations still leads to Ball's and others' conclusion,
or whether, on the other hand, it could help to resolve the disinflation puzzle
without needing to appeal to lack of credibility.
The advantages of the more microfounded approach are that it leads to
an internally consistent model. Directly postulated models tend to be well
1 111 this chapter we are concerned with the second part of Ball's claim. The analysis of
the effects of money shocks will be the focus of the next chapters.
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developed in certain sectors and sketchily developed in others, implying in-
consistency between different aspects of the same agents' behaviour. In the
models used so far in the disinflation puzzle literature, such an inconsistency
commonly exists between the forward-looking behaviour in the pricing sector
and the myopic behaviour in the consumption and money demand sectors.
Moreover these models do not allow for dynamic optimising behaviour even
in the pricing sector. Such limitations may turn out to be justifiable simpli-
fications, but we can only know this by first building a more microfounded
model and making a comparison. The analysis contained in this chapter will
suggest that the direct postulation approach may have led earlier researchers
to dismiss certain features as unimportant too readily, and to overlook cer-
tain key parameter restrictions which the microfounded model implies ought
to hold in directly postulated models.
An important insight which underlies our investigation is that Ball's
(1994) paradoxical result is due to an element of preannouncement in the pol-
icy experiment he considers. Disinflation in his analysis consists of putting a
linear time trend into the rate of monetary growth, to bring it down contin-
uously from its initial level to zero by a known date. A similar but simpler
policy experiment would be to preannounce that at some future date the
monetary growth rate will be discontinuously reduced from its current level
to zero. In general we may note that such a preannounced disinflation has
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two conflicting effects on short-run output. First, anticipation of lower fu-
ture inflation raises the demand for current real balances. Since the path
of the money supply has not yet changed, and since the current price level
is sticky, the money market can then only clear if current output falls, to
push the demand for real balances back down. This is the contractionary
effect of the announcement: it stems from a fall in the desired velocity of
circulation of money. Second, anticipation of lower future inflation induces
price-setters to begin lowering their prices in advance of the policy change.
The price reduction boosts the supply of real balances, which stimulates the
demand for goods and thus output. This is the expansionary effect of the
announcement. Ball, like many other authors, assumes away the first effect
by postulating a very simple aggregate demand equation based on a constant
velocity of circulation, and as a result the second effect prevails: this is the
hidden source of his "disinflationary boom".
With an immediate and unanticipated cut in monetary growth, on the
other hand, price reductions cannot precede the implementation of the policy,
so that the second, expansionary, effect just mentioned is absent. Moreover,
it would seem reasonable to suppose that, since some fraction of prices are
predetermined when the policy begins, the fact that the money supply soon
takes a lower growth path would reduce real balances, causing a slump. How-
ever, as other authors have shown, this is not necessarily the case. It depends
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on the staggering structure: if prices are set for a fixed period, as in Taylor's
(1979) structure, then the argument is correct; but if the period is of random
length (determined by a Poisson process), as in Calvo's (1983a,b) structure,
then the argument turns out to be false. Here we have another variant of the
"disinflation puzzle": although a sudden, discontinuous slowdown in mon-
etary growth does not produce a boom, with Calvo-type staggering it may
nevertheless not produce a slump either, so that immediate and costless dis-
inflation appears to be possible. This, indeed, was the variant of the puzzle
noticed by Buiter and Miller (1985). However, here also, costless disinflation
only results if the simple aggregate demand equation is assumed; if instead
we allow money demand to respond to anticipated inflation then the velocity
effect mentioned above will still be present, and the expected slump will be
obtained.
The use by these earlier authors of the simple form of aggregate demand
was not because they were unaware that a more general form could explain a
slump, but because they believed that this effect was likely to be weak, so that
to omit it was a reasonable simplification. One of our key findings from the
microfounded model is that this is not a reasonable simplification. Not only
does our model in general imply that the aggregate demand simplification
used by these earlier authors is an extreme case, but it shows that there
is a connection between this property of the model and another property
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about which simplifying assumptions are typically made. The latter is the
long-run effect of disinflation on output, which is assumed to be zero in
directly-postulated models. We show that the condition for this to be zero
in our log-linearised model is that agents' time preference rate be zero; but if
this is assumed, the effect of anticipated inflation on aggregate demand tends
to infinity, which is the opposite of the simple aggregate demand property
which earlier authors have imposed. More microfoundations thus reveal a
contradiction between two of the simplifying assumptions found in earlier
models.
Perhaps our most notable finding, however, is that preannounced disin-
flation cannot cause a boom, in opposition to Ball's (1994) result. We show
that, in response to the announcement of a future disinflation, output falls,
and along its subsequent time path it never exceeds its original level prior
to the announcement. By contrast the same policy experiment in a stan-
dard directly postulated model containing Ball's simplifications, implies that
following the announcement output gradually rises, reaching a peak at the
date the disinflation is implemented, and then gradually falling back again
to its original level. The microfounded model thus banishes the apparently
crazy behaviour found in the basic directly-postulated model. The reason for
this difference in behaviour is closely linked to the contradiction between the
two common simplifying assumptions referred to above. The directly postu-
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lated model can be made to deliver a similar time path to the microfounded
model, but only if a particular parameter restriction is respected, and this
condition is in fact violated by the common simplifying assumptions. Rea-
soning without microfoundations is thus likely to lead us to unnecessarily
puzzling conclusions.
Other authors, who have also recently look at staggered prices or wages
in a dynamic general equilibrium framework (e.g., Cho and Cooley (1995),
Kimball (1995), Woodford (1996), Sutherland (1996), Yun (1996), Chari et al.
(1996)) have not been concerned with the disinflation question, however;
mostly they have been concerned with numerical simulations in order to find
a good quantitative match with business cycle stylised facts as represented
by statistical co-movements, in the tradition started by the real business
cycle literature. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, one dynamic
general equilibrium paper which does look at disinflation is by Ireland (1995).
Ireland looks at the question of optimal disinflation, and is again especially
focused on calibration. In this chapter we take an analytical rather than a
numerical approach, seeking to understand more about the basic mechanics
of the disinflation process. We also wish to maintain a link to the literature
based on directly postulated models, and so devote significant space to a
comparison with such models.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 presents the log-
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linearised version of our model on which the subsequent analysis is based.
Section 3.3 uses it to examine the effects of a disinflation, both unanticipated
and anticipated. Section 3.4 provides a comparison with Ball's and others'
results, based on directly-postulated models, using Calvo's model. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Log-linearised Model
To study the dynamics of the model following a disinflationary policy, we now
take a log-linear approximation to the model about the zero-inflation steady
state. Lower-case letters are used to denote log-deviations of variables from
their steady state values: for example, y t -_- ln Yt — ln Y* (where * indicates
the zero-inflation steady-state value), while Ot In (I)t (since 43* . 1) .-
mt-i — mt.
It should be born in mind that the type of disinflation with which we
are henceforth concerned is therefore one relevant to moderate rates of in-
flation, i.e. in which inflation remains in the appropriate neighbourhood of
zero. Given the complexity of the model, it turns out that this is the only
analytically tractable case. That is, the log-linearised model around a steady
state in which .13 1 is not analytically tractable and we need to resort to
simulations. Since we want to take an analytical rather than a numerical
approach, seeking to understand more about the mechanisms of the disin-
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flation process, and comparing it to the ad hoc postulated models, we are
forced to confine ourselves to this particular case. However, in the Appendix
3.7.3 some simulation results are provided to check the robustness of our
analytical findings. These simulations are performed with the package for
non-linear models DYNARE, elaborated by Michel Juillard at CEPREMAP
(see Juillard (1996)).
Demand Side
The dynamics of the demand side of the economy are described by the
following two equations
Yt -=- mt - pt - zt	 (3.1)
zt = zt-F i + (mt — mt+i) •
	
(3.2)
(3.1) follows from the definition of the 'Cambridge k', i.e., Zt =- Mt/PtCt
and from the goods market equilibrium condition Ct = Y. (3.2) from the
dynamic equation for Zt , i.e. (2.6). It is important to stress again that
these dynamic equations are totally independent of the supply side of the
economy. In other words, (3.1) and (3.2) derive just from the demand side of
the economy and so the dynamics of Zt are independent of the supply side
and of whether wages are flexible, fixed, or predetermined but time-varying,
and of their synchronisation.
The interpretation is straightforward. Log-linearising the first-order con-
(3.5)
(3.6)
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dition (2.4) yields
Yt = mt — Pt + kit	 (3.3)
where K 0 1 (1 — 0) = 11 (I* — 1) > 0. Then, given (3.1), we have
Zt = —Kit •	 (3.4)
Therefore zt represents the effect of the nominal interest rate on aggre-
gate demand. (3.3) (or equivalently (3.4)) looks very familiar. It describes
a Cagan-type demand-for-money effect: the higher the inflation rate, the
higher the nominal interest rate; hence the higher the opportunity cost of
holding money and the larger the velocity of circulation of money (or the
lower 'Cambridge k', i.e. zt ). Given mt and pt , this means the higher is
aggregate demand. Equation (3.4) states explicitly that velocity is an in-
creasing function of the nominal interest rate. Though similar to a static
LM or aggregate demand equation, such as is commonly used in directly
postulated models, here (3.1) is paired with equation (3.2), which gives us
the forward-looking dynamics deriving from intertemporal optimisation.
Supply Side
The dynamics of the supply side of the economy are given by
1 i , 
	0 
x t = 	
1 + 0 Pt + -YYt1 1- 1 + O Pt+i + 7Yt-Fil
1 — a	 1,
Pt = 	 Yt + -. xt -I- xt-i)
a	 2
where 7 =- [e+ (1 — a) (19 — 1)] 1[19e — o-(0 — 1)]. (3.5) derives from the log-
linearisation of the first order condition for the optimal wage, i.e., (2.5), while
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(3.6) is obtained by log-linearising the aggregate price level equation, i.e.,
(2.16). There is a striking similarity between this model and Taylor's (1979)
model. However, here: (i) the equations are derived from an optimisation
process; (ii) the Taylor parameters are no longer ad hoc, but depend on
preferences and technology; (iii) the dynamics of demand, obtained from
intertemporal optimisation, are taken into account.2
Substituting (3.1) and (3.6) into (3.5) we obtain
—bx t _ i
 + (h + 1)x t
 — dxt+i = h[b(mt — zt) + d(mt+1 — zt+1)]
	
(3.7)
where d 1 — b:-..-- 0/(1± 0) and h.7,- 2e/(e — 1)(E — 1). (3.2) and (3.7)
constitute a third-order dynamical system. However, since the dynamics in
(3.2) do not depend on the supply side, the system has a recursive structure.
Following a change in monetary policy, the forward-looking variable z t is
governed only by (3.2), and its path then feeds into (3.7). Therefore we can
treat the right-hand side of (3.7) as an exogenous forcing variable and solve
for the dynamic response of the x variable as a function of the right-hand
side terms.
The Effects of a Deflation
Although our interest is in the effects of a disinflation (a reduction in
monetary growth), it is useful for comparison, and to illustrate the basic
dynamics of the system, first to describe briefly the effects of a deflation (a
2 A full comparison with Taylor's model is provided in the next chapter.
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reduction in the level of the money supply). A key point is that a deflation
(provided it is unanticipated) has no effect on velocity, —z t . This is apparent
from (3.2), since the expected rate of monetary growth, mt±i — m t , on the
right-hand side, is always zero in a deflation. Therefore zt remains constant
at its initial value of zero. The dynamic response of the economy hence
depends only on the wage-setting dynamics given by (3.7). This makes the
dynamics of a deflation the same as Taylor's (1979) dynamics. The second-
order equation (3.7) has one stable eigenvalue A, between 0 and 1, and one
unstable eigenvalue Au greater than 1 (this is shown in the Appendix 3.7.1).
The system hence satisfies the normal `saddlepath' requirement for a unique
perfect foresight solution, since (3.7) has precisely one naturally given initial
value (namely the lagged value of the reset wage, xt-i)• As in Taylor (1979),
we can then show that the deflation causes output to fall on impact. Over
time it returns monotonically to its original level, according to y t = As yt- i . In
the case of a deflation, there is hence no doubt that the outcome is a persistent
slump: this is true both in the microfounded model and in directly-postulated
models. The only room for debate is over the degree of persistence, i.e. the
size of A,. This issue will be the focus of the next chapters.
(3.8)
(3.9)
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3.3 Disinflation Dynamics
In this section, we use the microfounded model to look at, first, an unan-
ticipated disinflation; and, second, a preannounced disinflation. In the next
section we compare our results with those from directly postulated models.
3.3.1 Unanticipated Disinflation
The complete linearised model, we recall, consists of equations (3.2) and
(3.7). Since nominal variables such as x t are ever-growing in steady states
with positive inflation, it is now helpful to rewrite (3.7) using x t normalised
by the money supply, i.e., vt -- xt — mt . Further, we can convert the second-
order equation to two first-order equations by defining w t vt_ i , which will
enable us to depict the dynamics on a phase diagram. The system thus
transformed becomes
vt+i =
zt = 0 zt+i + 00t+i
bh + 1	 b
d	
[ hb
vt dwt + 2—d zt + Ot+i — —d Ot1
wt+i	 vt	 (3.10)
The sub-system (3.9)-(3.10) yields the phase diagram drawn in Figure 3.1
below. We can show that this sub-system has the same eigenvalues (As, Au)
as (3.7). The slope of the saddlepath is thus given by As (<1), and of the
unstable separatrix by A u (>1).
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Figure 3.1: Phase Diagram for the Microfounded Model
Now consider the effect of a permanent, unanticipated disinflation. We
suppose that 0 is initially zero, and then undergoes a permanent increase3.
Unlike in the case of a deflation discussed above, the policy change here does
affect zt . From the purely 'forward-looking' equation (3.8), we see that zt
must jump up from zero to its new steady-state value of 00/(1-13). This cor-
responds to a jump down in the nominal interest rate from zero to —0, and is
the effect of lower inflation in lowering velocity, as noted earlier. Turning at-
3 Although this means we are actually looking at a shift from zero to negative monetary
growth, this is just a normalisation: the effects would be the same for any decrease in
monetary growth in the linearised model.
(1 - 13) 2 - 213h
v =
(1 + 0)(1 - /3) 17, • (3.11)
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tention from (3.8) to (3.9)-(3.10), we can then see that the composite forcing
variable of the system (the term in square brackets) undergoes a once-and-
for-all change. This implies a once-and-for-all shift in the Av t+ i = 0 locus
in Figure 3.1. To determine the sign of the shift, consider the expression for
the steady-state value of v
The numerator of this expression is positive for /3 sufficiently close to zero,
and negative for /3 sufficiently close to one. Hence, whether v rises or falls in
the long run is ambiguous, but since it is generally believed that /3 is close
to one, a fall seen-is the most likely. In the diagram, this corresponds to a
downward shift in the Avt±i = 0 locus. The time path of v in Figure 3.1 is
thus a jump down from 0 to A at time t, followed by a further gradual fall
as the economy converges along the saddlepath AS.
The dynamic behaviour of v is not very interesting in itself, but it helps to
reveal the behaviour of the main variable of interest, output. The relationship
of output to v is given by (combining (3.1) and (3.6) and the definition of v)
1 ,
Yt = - 0" [-2 Oh + vt-i ± Ot) ± zt] (3.12)
In the case of ,3 close to zero (i.e., converse to that illustrated), where
v jumps upwards on impact and then continues rising over time, we see
unambiguously from (3.12) that output falls on impact, and then falls further
2 + h
—0-(1 0) 2(1 + 0)h 9b • (3.13)
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as time progresses. In the case of /3 close to one, there at first appears to be
ambiguity, so it is helpful to refer in addition to the solution for steady-state
output, readily computed as
This shows that output still falls in the long run when 13 is close to 1,
provided that /3 does not actually equal 1. 4 Since v is in this case decreasing
along the adjustment path, we may deduce from (3.12) that output is rising,
and hence that it must overshoot its long-run value in the short run. To
reinforce this, consider the following explicit solution for short-run output
(which is derived from (3.12), using the facts that v t
 — = A, (v t _ i — v) along
the saddlepath, and vt _ i = 0 initially)
2 + (1-As)h(1'3)2	 20A3
Yt =	
	  •2(1 + 0)(1 — /3) (3.14)
As /3 tends to one, yt as given by (3.14) tends to minus infinity', while the
steady-state solution (3.13) tends to zero: hence there must be overshooting
4 Recall from the previous chapter that if /3 < 1, then rgm = 0 is always on the left of
the maximum level of steady state output in Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 (i.e., steady state output
is increasing in rgm (decreasing in (I. ) in that point). If instead = 1, then, rgm = 0 (i.e.,
(I) = 1) coincides with the maximum steady state output.
5 Although As is also a function of 0, which must be taken into account when considering
the limit of (3.14), in the Appendix 3.7.1 we show that as varies between 0 and 1, AB
remains within a strict subinterval of [0,1].
i(1-13)2 < 2I3h
Y,
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for 0 sufficiently large. In fact, it is clear from (3.11) that the condition for
overshooting is (1 — 3) 2 < 2bh.
We may summarise these findings by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. In the microfounded model with a strictly positive time
preference rate (i.e. /3 < 1), an unanticipated disinflation always produces a
slump (a level of output lower than the original level) in the short, medium
and long run. As the time preference rate tends to zero (i.e. 13 —> 1), the
size of the long-run slump tends to zero and the size of the short-run slump
tends to infinity. Output overshoots its long-run level in the short run if
(1 — 0) 2 < 2bh.
The possible dynamic responses may thus be sketched as follows:
0	 t	 0
	 t
rA
(113)2 > 2I3h
Figure 3.2: Unanticipated Disinflation: Possible Dynamic Responses
What are the forces causing the slump? In the short run there are two:
first, prices are sluggish to adjust, so that the lower path for the money supply
lowers real balances and thus goods demand; and, second, the reduction in
the nominal interest rate raises the demand for real balances, i.e. lowers
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the velocity of circulation, which further depresses goods demand. These
effects can be seen in (3.12), where they correspond to a fall in m t and a
rise in zt , respectively. In the long run, the reduced output is caused by
a strictly positive time preference rate, as we know from the CaIvo-Romer
effect, analysed in the previous chapter.
3.3.2 Preannounced Disinflation
Now let us consider an increase in 0 which is announced in period T and
implemented in period T > T. The relevant model is still (3.8)-(3.10) with
output determined by (3.12).
First, it is a simple matter to solve (3.8) forwards to show that
f or t =7- 7 T +1,...,T — 1 . (3.15)
This tells us that when the policy is announced, money demand per unit
consumed, zt , rises (and correspondingly the velocity, -zt , and the nominal
interest rate falls, recalling (3.4)), and it continues to rise over time as the
implementation date approaches. By T — 1, zt has reached its new steady
state level, 13q51(1 - 0), where it remains thereafter.
The rise in zt ahead of the implementation of the policy is the source
of the short-run contractionary effect of an anticipated disinflation which
we referred to in the Introduction. We can see this contractionary effect
easily from (3.12): for given (xt , x t_ i ), the higher zt implies a lower yt . The
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forward-looking nature of portfolio behaviour, as represented by (3.8), is
clearly crucial in causing this. However, we cannot yet be sure that the overall
short-run effect is a slump, because x t jumps downwards in anticipation of
its lower long-run value. (3.12) shows that this has the opposite effect on Yt.
This lowering of the wage is the cause of the short-run expansionary effect
of an anticipated disinflation which we referred to in the Introduction. The
next task is therefore to solve for the path of x t (or vt) and so to evaluate
the relative strengths of these two conflicting forces.
The path of vt is governed by the system (3.9)-(3.10), and having deter-
mined the path of z t , we can now work out the path of the composite forcing
variable of this system, given by the term in square brackets. For t > T,
this variable is constant at the same value as in the case of unanticipated
disinflation; but for t < T it is time-varying, since zt is time-varying. This
means that it is not feasible to draw a phase diagram for this case, since the
locus Avt+i = 0 would be continually shifting. In the Appendix 3.7.2 we
show how to solve the system algebraically. Once a solution for v t has been
obtained, this and (3.15) may be substituted into (3.12) to yield a solution
for yt . Doing this, we obtain the following expressions for yt
1
YT = 
a 1 — 0 { 2h(1 ± As) 13T-r+1 ± (17, ± 1— As) H T T } 0 for t = r2h1 ± /3	 (1 —13)2
(3.16)
a 1 — 13 i 20h(1 + A ,9) 0T-7- At_, ± h + 1 — AS
Yt= gil+13 1 (1-13) 2
	Au — A.9
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[(1 +Au )At.,:r — ( 1 + As )A1ts- A:-T 1 cb	 for t = T ± 1, ..., T — 1 (3.17)
)T-7-
CI 1 - 0 {[  2 	 7, 0h  0 _, h + 1 — A, ( 1
Yt ---= 2h 1 + 0
	 (1 — 0) 2 	 Au — A,	 Au
h+ 	
0
1 — Au ( 1 )T-T]
+	 (1 + As )Ats-T + (2 + h) .75	 for t --= T,T +1, ....
Au — A,	 n—.9
(3.18)
(3.16)-(3.18) encapsulate the main results of this chapter. As far as the
impact effect is concerned, we see straight away from (3.16) that y, is nega-
tive. The impact effect is hence unambiguously a slump: the contractionary
effect of higher z t turns out to outweigh the expansionary effect of the lower
Vt . To see whether a boom might nevertheless develop as time progresses,
consider next (3.17). (3.17) is clearly negative, since the term in square
brackets is positive (recalling that ), < 1 < Au and t > T ± 1). This tells
us that there cannot be a boom during the pre-implementation phase, how-
ever long it is. This is our most significant finding, since it is during this
phase that a boom may develop in the directly postulated model, as we will
see below. Finally, consider the post-implementation phase. Since output
converges monotonically on its new, negative, steady state value during this
phase, it will always be negative here if it is negative at t = T. Now, we
can show that (3.17) evaluated at t = T (i.e., one period after the date at
Figure 3.3: Preannounced Disinflation: Possible Dynamic Responses
yl
0
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which it is in principle last valid) equals (3.18) evaluated at t = T, indicat-
ing that the two segments of the time path exactly match up at the switch
point. Since (3.17) was seen to be negative for all t > T, it then follows
that output is negative at t = T. Thus there can be no boom during the
post-implementation phase, either. We may summarise these findings as:
Proposition 3.2. In the microfounded model, a preannounced disinfla-
tion causes a slump (a level of output lower than the original level) when the
announcement is made, and in no period thereafter does output exceed its
original level. This is true no matter how far in advance the announcement
is made.
Sketches of two possible time paths are given in Figure 3.3.
The main point to note is that yt never rises above its original level at
any point along the path. Nevertheless, if the prearmouncement period is
long enough, after the initial slump there will be a 'recovery' phase during
which output rises for a time, before sinking back down again: this is the case
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illustrated on the left. On the other hand, if the preannouncement period is
short, we could observe overshooting of the long-run level, as illustrated on
the right.
3.4 Comparison with Directly Postulated
Models
Our microfounded model has suggested that the effects of disinflation on
output under staggered pricing are not particularly puzzling: when it is
unanticipated, disinflation has a potentially large output cost in the short
run, and also a small output cost in the long-run; while when it is prean-
nounced, the short-run output cost is likely to be smaller but still not zero,
and certainly not negative. As we noted in the Introduction, this contrasts
with the impression obtained from other authors' analyses based on directly
postulated models. In this section we want to illustrate this contrast by re-
ferring to a very commonly used version of a directly postulated staggered
pricing model. Specifically, we shall take the version of Calvo's (1983b) stag-
gered pricing model presented in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Chapter 10).
We first briefly recap how this model delivers apparently paradoxical results
under the simplifications commonly imposed on it; and then show how re-
specting a particular parameter condition - which is violated by the common
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simplifications - restores its behaviour to something more like that of the
microfounded model. The microfounded model thus suggests that if we are
going to continue to use the standard directly postulated model, we should
revise our view of what are acceptable simplifications of it.
The directly postulated model is described by the equations6
00
x(t) = (p + r) f (p(s)+ -y y(s))e—( p+ r)(8—ods (3.19)
p(t) = p f x(s)e—P(t—s)ds (3.20)
y(t)	 a[m(t) — p(t)] + 1c71- (3.21)
(3.19) has been already introduced in the Introduction of the previous
chapter. Note that it is clearly similar to (3.5) in the microfounded model.
As before, we generalise the usual text-book presentation by introducing a
positive pure time preference rate, r, into this equation, and by adding it
to p to obtain the discount factor of the future price-and-demand index.
We have already shown its importance analysing the superneutrality issue,
but we shall show that again r plays an important role in the disinflation
dynamics (as correspondingly 0 plays a fundamental role in the disinflation
dynamics of the microfounded model, as we have just seen). Equation (3.20)
6 Apart from the generalisation already introduced in the previous chapter (a positive
time preference rate), this is exactly the model from Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapter
10, pp. 548-551.
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gives the current price level as an average of firms' outstanding prices: it
is the counterpart of (3.6) in the microfounded model. Lastly, (3.21) is the
aggregate demand equation. This postulates that goods demand depends
positively on real balances and on the inflation rate. Such a relationship
could be derived from standard IS and LM equations, provided that it is the
real interest rate which enters the IS and the nominal interest rate which
enters the LM. (3.21) is similar to (3.3) in the microfounded model. A very
common simplification of (3.21) is to set k = 0, thus imposing a constant
velocity of circulation of money. 7 However, this is a strongly 'monetarist'
assumption for which no very good justification exists, and we shall see that
it has a lot to do with the "disinflation puzzle".
Some manipulation reduces (3.19)-(3.21) to the following differential equa-
tion pair
ir = r7r — p(p + r)-yy	 (3.22)
= a0 — (a — kr)71 — kp(p + r)7y .	 (3.23)
These may be used to plot a phase diagram in (y, 70-space as in Figures
3.4 and 3.5. Although p is a predetermined variable in this model, 7r is not,
and nor is y. Hence when an unexpected shock occurs, (y, 71) both jump.
The locus along which they jump is given by (3.21) (in which we note m and
p are both predetermined). This locus has the slope 11k, and is depicted as
7 See, for example, Taylor (1979), Ball (1994), Miller and Sutherland (1993).
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Figure 3.4: Calvo's Model with Common Simplifications: k = r --= 0
First consider the model under the two common simplifications k = r = 0
(see Figure 3.4). The stationary loci --= 0 and ir = 0 are then respectively
vertical and horizontal, and 00 is also vertical. Suppose the economy is
in an initial steady state at 0, and there is an unanticipated disinflation,
i.e. cb is raised above zero. This shifts the i = 0 locus down, moving the
steady state vertically down to S. Since 00 is also vertical, the economy is
in this case able to jump straight to the new steady state, with no change
in output. This is the form of the "disinflation puzzle" noted by Buiter and
Miller (1985): disinflation can be instantaneous and costless despite staggered
prices. Now suppose the fall in monetary growth is preannounced: in this
case, the economy jumps down to A upon announcement; it then travels
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along AI, reaching I upon implementation, and thereafter converges along
the saddlepath to S. In this case we get a version of Ball's (1994) stronger
form of the disinflation puzzle: disinflation causes a boom.
One way out of the first puzzle, as has been acknowledged by these au-
thors, is to let k > 0: 00 then passes through 0 with a positive slope and
intersects the saddlepath 'south-west' of S, so that output drops on impact
and then recovers gradually. 8 k > 0 also helps us with the second puzzle,
inasmuch as there will now be a slump upon announcement. However, it does
not rule out the possibility of a boom farther along the adjustment path. In-
deed, for a sufficiently long preannouncement, the model still implies that
a boom is inevitable. This follows from the fact that as the preannounce-
ment period tends to infinity, the path of the economy during this period
tends closer and closer to the segment of the unstable separatrix OP. For
long preannouncements, k > 0 hence does not help very much with Ball's
(1994) puzzle. To deal with this it is necessary to relax in addition the second
simplifying assumption, i.e. to let r > 0.
Let us then turn to the general case where both k and r are non-zero.
r > 0 implies that the ir = 0 locus now has a positive slope. It also implies
that the = 0 locus becomes ambiguous in slope. There are two possibilities,
depending on the sign of a — kr. . When a — kr is positive, = 0 is downward
8 This case is illustrated in Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
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Figure 3.5: Calvo's Model: a — kr < 0
sloping, and the unstable separatrix remains downward-sloping. Sketching
the phase diagram for this case, it is readily shown that a sufficiently pre-
announced disinflation continues to cause a boom. When a — kr is nega-
tive, however, i = 0 is upward-sloping, and the unstable separatrix becomes
upward-sloping. This is the situation illustrated in Figure 3.5. Repeating the
earlier reasoning, a typical time path for a preannounced disinflation is AIS.
We see that output is never higher than its original level along this path.
Moreover, as the preannouncement period tends to infinity so that the path
tends to 0I'S, it remains true that no boom emerges.
We therefore see that, even in the basic directly postulated model, it is
possible to avoid the puzzle of disinflationary booms. To do this we need to
abandon both of the common simplifying assumptions k = 0 and r = 0, and
moreover to abandon them by a sufficient margin, such that kr > a. It does
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not appear to have occurred to earlier authors to look at this case, owing
to their prior beliefs that k and r were small. However our investigation of
microfoundations suggests that this case is, indeed, the relevant one. In the
microfounded model, we saw that /3, which is the counterpart of 1/(1 + r)
here, also determines the sensitivity of aggregate demand to the nominal
interest rate n (see again 3.3), i.e. the counterpart of k here; and that as [3
tends to unity, lc tends to infinity. This gave rise to our finding that as 0
tends to unity, the short-run slump caused by an unanticipated disinflation
becomes arbitrarily large. The microfoundations therefore suggest that in the
directly postulated model k and r should not be regarded as independent:
k should be seen as a decreasing function of r. They moreover suggest that
it is inconsistent to set both k and r to zero: k and r should be jointly
bounded away from zero. From what we have just seen of the macroeconomic
behaviour, we can now suggest that the appropriate joint bound is, in fact,
kr > a.
3.5 Non-Linear Simulations
As said above, given the complexity of the model, it turns out that the case
43. = 1 is the only analytically tractable. Since we wanted to take an analytical
rather than a numerical approach, we were forced to confine ourselves to this
particular case in the main text. In fact, when the model is log-linearised
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around a steady state in which 1 . 1, we need to resort to simulations.
That is what we do in the Appendix 3.7.3. We thus provide some simulation
results to check the robustness of our analytical findings. These simulations
are performed with the package for non-linear models DYNARE, written by
Michel Juillard at CEPREMAP (see Juillard (1996)). 9 This package solves
discrete, deterministic, dynamic systems with forward-looking variables using
an algorithm described in Laffargue (1990) and Boucekkine (1995), and using
GAUSS as the main software. The algorithm rests upon Newton-Raphson
iterations and the triangulation of a large matrix by Gauss's elimination. The
advantage is that it does not log-linearise the model, but it simulates its non-
linear dynamics. The algorithm is thus very appropriate for our purposes.
In fact a disinflationary policy involves a transitional dynamics that move
from one steady state to another one. Hence, unless the two steady state are
'infinitesimally' close, approximating the model dynamics by log-linearisation
could turn out to be misleading. Furthermore, the fact that the algorithm
works only for deterministic model does not create any problems, given the
particular policy experiment we are concerned with: a one—and-for-all change
in policy (i.e., permanent change in the rate of growth of money, anticipated
and not).
In the Appendix 3.7.3 we tackle two issues. First, we will check the accu-
9 1 would like to thank Michel Juillard for the time he devoted to me to help me with
these simulations, while I was visiting Paris I-M.A.D..
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racy of the log-linear approximation. Second, we will check the robustness of
the main results in propositions 3.1 and 3.2 with respect to a starting point
different from (I) = 1. With respect to the first issue, we conclude that all
the results stated in the two propositions for the log-linearised model holds
also for the non-linear dynamics and for relevant size of disinflations. Hence,
the approximation implied by the log-linearisation is pretty accurate. With
respect to the second issue, we were able to find counterexamples to proposi-
tion 3.1.and 3.2. Indeed, as we know from the previous chapter, if the initial
inflation rate is positive, the output long-run gains of a disinflation can be
positive. That is, in the long run output will be above its initial value, hence
a boom. In the case of an unanticipated disinflation, the simulation results
show the following: (i) after an unanticipated disinflation from positive in-
flation, the short-run dynamics induce a slump which will be offset by the
long-run gains; (ii) an unanticipated disinflation will never cause 'overshoot-
ing' in the sense of output levels bigger than the final one (i.e., the new steady
state). Nevertheless, this could be the case for preannounced disinflations,
if the anticipation period is sufficiently long. In the two cases shown in the
Appendix (i.e., from 5% to 3% and from 10% to 5%), for example, we need at
least 8 periods preannouncement to get such behaviour. However, these pre-
announcement periods are rather long. Indeed, if we suppose that nominal
wages are fixed for one year, then one period in the model would correspond
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to six months. Hence, 8 periods are 4 years. Moreover, since preannounce-
ment smoothes the transitional dynamics the size of the overshooting is really
marginal.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have used the dynamic general equilibrium model with
staggered wages presented in the first two chapters to study analytically the
effects of a reduction in the rate of monetary growth (a disinflation). We
find that the result of disinflation is a recession in the short and medium run,
and that output will be slightly lower in the long run, too. This is true both
when the disinflation is unanticipated and when it is announced in advance.
Our particular motivation was the puzzling finding of Ball (1994), in a
directly postulated model, that disinflations cause booms. We first noted
that this finding is associated with the element of preannouncement in the
policy assumed by Ball. More microfoundations tell us that Ball's paradox
is mainly due to simplifying assumptions regarding the time preference rate
and the formulation of the aggregate demand equation. These simplifications
are inconsistent with microfoundations - at least, with the particular rather
standard set of microfoundations introduced here. The microfounded model
produces a reaction to a disinflation (a reduction in monetary growth) which
is not, after all, sharply different from the standard reaction to a deflation (a
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reduction in the level of the money supply) found in Taylor's (1979) model.
Hence, in contrast to what several authors have recently concluded, it does
not appear necessary to appeal to lack of policy credibility in order to explain
why disinflations cause slumps.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Properties of A, Au
The characteristic equation of the difference equation (3.7) may be written
as (recalling b =--- 1 — d = 1/(1 — ,3))
A2 = (h + 1)(1 +13) A 1
0	 0
We plot the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS) of this below.
(3.24)
Figure 3.6: Properties of the Eigenvalues
The LHS is a parabola, while the RHS is a line with positive slope and
and zt ..=-
where
0	 for t < T — 1
Ot = {
0 > 0 for t > T
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negative intercept. The RHS passes through the point (1/[h + 1], 1), which
lies unambiguously above the parabola. As 0 goes from 0 to 1 the line pivots
clockwise around the point, going from vertical to a slope of 2(h ± 1). From
this we can immediately see that:
(i) The smaller eigenvalue, A s , lies strictly between 0 and 1, for all values
of /3 and h.
(ii) The larger eigenvalue, Au , is strictly greater than 1, for all values of
0 and h.
Further, since A,Au = 1/0 (from the characteristic equation), it follows
from (i) that At, > 1/13.
3.7.2 The Time Path under Anticipated Disinflation
Our aim is to find the time path of V t . The general form of the difference
equation for vt is (combining (3.9) and (3.10))
—bvt_i + (h + 1)vt — dv t+i = — 2hbzt — dOt+i + bOt
	
(3.25)
for t < T — 1
7L-Lt
1-0 
0 for t = 7-, ...,T — 2
--2-- cp-k for t > T — 11.--p
Substituting Ot , zt out, we have three versions of the difference equation
CHAPTER 3. STAGGERED WAGES AND DISINFLATION 	 107
in vt
2hbi3T
-bvt-i+(h+l)vt- dvt+i =	 OW 13)t1 - 0 for t = 7-, ...,T - 2
(3.26)
-bvt--1+(h+1)vt-dvt+i = 2hb0  gh+(b-d)0
- 	
for t > T (3.27)
1 	 )3
-bvT-2+(h+1)vT-i-dvT - 2hb,(3 01 - 0 dO	 for t = T-1 (3.28)
The indefinite solutions to (3.26) and (3.27) are
t	 20T 
vt = Ai Ats ± A2A„ 1 _ 020l1/0)t	 for t = y - 1, ..., T - 1	 (3.29)
vt = Bi Ats + B2 At,,, ± v	 for t > T- 1	 (3.30)
where the eigenvalues A s , Au are determined as in 3.7.1 above. (3.26) has
a time-varying 'constant' term: its solution hence involves a time-varying
particular integral: see, e.g., Chiang (1974). A 1 , A2, B1, B2 are constants of
integration, to be determined below. Note the ranges of t for which these
equations hold: this is because they must be satisfied by all instances of vt
to which (3.26) and (3.27) apply.
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We now seek to solve for A 1 , A2, B1 , B2 using the known boundary con-
ditions on the time path. First, since Au > 1, convergence from date T
onwards clearly requires B2 = 0: this is the usual saddlepath condition.
Next, u7-1 = 0 in the initial steady state, so (3.29) must satisfy this
2/3T 0 = vi-1 = A 1 A:-1 + A2AT-1 	 0(1/0)T-1
u	 1 — 02
(3.31)
Further, writing out (3.29) for the last two periods in which it holds, and
(3.30) for the first two periods in which it holds, we have
T20
AiATs —2 A2A2uT— (3.32)VT-2 =	 ±	 20(1/0)T- 21 — 0
T20
A2
1
ATu—= AlAT9 -1VT-1	 +	 0(11R)T-1 (3.33)1 — 02	 1 l''
VT-1 = B1 A' + V (3.34)
VT = Bl AT., + v (3.35)
(3.31)-(3.35) together with (3.28) provide us with six equations in the six
unknowns (A 1 , A2 ) B1, VT-2 ) VT-1, VT). Since they are linear in the unknowns,
we can solve them explicitly. For A 1 , A2, B1 we get, after some work
T-71
	 11 - 0[  
(1 
213h 
	 T-7 h + 1 — As ( 1	 Als-T 
h 1 + 0 0	 (3.36)A i =	
— 0) 2/3 Au — As	 Au J
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h+l—A,Al-T 1 1-0
A2 =	 --oAu — A s	 h1+ ,3
(3.37)
[  20h  T	 h + 1 — A s ( 1 T-7
=	
—7(1 0)2	 Az, — As
	 Au)
	
±h+1 	 ( 1	 A1,1 1-00
	
—	 A,․)S h1+ (3.38)
(Here, some simplification has been achieved by making use of the char-
acteristic equation, and also of the relations, i.e., ) s Au
 = 1/0, As + =
(h + 1)(1 + 0)10, which it implies.) Substituting these values back into
(3.29) and (3.30) then completes the solution for Vt.
3.7.3 Some Numerical Simulations
Accuracy of the log-linear approximation
We now check if the results obtained for the log-linear model still hold
when the full non-linear dynamics is taken into account. First, with respect to
unanticipated disinflations, proposition 3.1 states that: (i) output is always
lower than the original level; (ii) as 13 —> 1, the size of the long-run slump
tends to zero and the size of the short-run slump tends to infinity. We
simulate the non-linear dynamics of the model for a disinflation from 0 to
-2%. b0 The parameter values we used correspond to the 'base case' described
m This change is sufficiently big to question the validity of a log-linear approximation.
>••.
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in Chapter 2, see footnote 15 therein.' In Figure 3.7 0 is set equal to 0.9,
in Figure 3.9 0 = 0.6 and in Figure 3.8 0 = 0.3.
6 2
	 4	 a	 10	 1 2
periods
Figure 3.7: Disinflation from 0 to -2%, = 0.9
6 0
	
2
	 4	 a	 10	 12
periods
Figure 3.8: Disinflation from 0 to -2%, 3 = 0.6
Moreover, the simulation results do not change qualitatively for disinflation of even bigger
size.
11 The only exeption is the parameter a which is set such that the starting steady state
output level is normalised to 1 in all the simulations presented in this appendix.
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c”.
C1-1
cyt
di 0	 4	 6	 8	 10	 1 2
periods
Figure 3.9: Disinflation from 0 to -2%, 13 -= 0.3
Both the results in proposition 3.1 are confirmed. As we know from
Chapter 2, if the time preference rate is positive (i.e., /3 < 1), then the
long-run effect of a disinflation from 0 to -2% is negative. Moreover, all
along the path of the transitional dynamics between the two steady states,
output never exceeds its original level. Besides, the smaller 13, the smaller
the size of the short-run effect and the larger the size of the long-run effect.
Furthermore, Figures 3.7 and 3.9 correspond to the left picture of Figure 3.2
in the main text, while Figure 3.8 to right one, since (1 — 0) 2 > 2,311 in this
latter case.12
Second, with respect to preannounced disinflations, proposition 3.2 states
that: (i) the announcement causes a slump on impact; (ii) output is always
lower than the original level all along the transitional path. Figure 3.10
corresponds to the left picture of Figure 3.3. The next two Figures show
2e2*4512 Given our parameter values h — (e-1)(e-1) = 15,6	 0.514.
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that even for very long preannouncement output never exceeds its starting
level. Moreover, they visualise the effect of the preannouncement: antici-
pation unsurprisingly smooths the transitional dynamics, in the sense that
it diminishes both the negative impact effect and the subsequent recovery.
Indeed, the transitional dynamics in Figure 3.12 is basically flat in compari-
son with the others, as can readily be checked by looking at the scale of the
vertical axis.
= 0 	 2	 4	 6	 8	 10	 12	 14
periods
Figure 3.10: From 0 to -2%, 2 Periods Preannouncement, 3 = 0.9
In conclusion, all the results stated in the two propositions for the log-
linearised model holds also for the non-linear dynamics and for relevant size
of disinflations. Hence, the approximation implied by the log-linearisation is
pretty accurate.
Robustness of the main results
What happens if the starting level of steady state inflation is different
from 0? Can we find any counterexamples in the transitional dynamics?
o	 6	 8	 10	 12	 14
periods
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Figure 3.11: From 0 to -2%, 8 Periods Preannouncement, 3= 0.9
12	 16	 20	 24	 28	 32	 36
periods
Figure 3.12: From 0 to -2%, 24 Periods Preannouncement, j3 = 0.9
Analytically we cannot answer this question, but simulations can. Obviously,
one can perform all sorts of simulations for all of the possible combination
of admissible parameter values. Hence, we need guidance and again we stick
with the parameter values of footnote 15 in Chapter 2. We have seen that
if the starting level of inflation, from which disinflation starts, is zero, then
disinflation will induce a slump in the short, medium and long-term. Would
these features still hold if a disinflation starts from a positive inflation rate,
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as after all happens in the real world? The short answer is only in the
short-run. The intuition is very simple and actually we would not need any
simulation at all. From Chapter 2, we know already that the long-run effect
is likely to be positive, for positive level of inflation, as Figure 2.3 showed.
If we are at the right of the maximum Y88 in Figure 2.3, then a disinflation
would have a positive long-run effect on output. Moreover, in the previous
chapter we also showed that these effects (the non-superneutrality effects)
are likely to be big, and the bigger, the higher the starting level of inflation.
Output will hence rise in the long-run, and the bigger these long-run gains,
the faster the output level will recover from the slump on impact, as Figures
3.13 and 3.14 show. 13 Summing up, following an unanticipated disinflation
from positive inflation, the short-run dynamics induce a slump which will
be offset by the long-run gains. However, an unanticipated disinflation will
never cause 'overshooting' in the sense of output levels bigger than the final
one (i.e., the new steady state).
Nevertheless, this could be the case for preannounced disinflations, if the
anticipation period is sufficiently long. In the two cases above (i.e., from
5% to 3% and from 10% to 5%), for example, we need at least 8 periods
preannouncement to get such behaviour (see Figures below). However, these
13 The velocity of adjustment of the transitional dynamics depends on the root of the
dynamic equations. The next chapter will deal with the issue of the dependence of the
velocity of adjustment (i.e., persistence) on the starting level of steady state inflation.
2	 4	 6	 10	 12
periods
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ccg
ci 0	 2	 4	 6	 10	 12
periods
Figure 3.13: From 5% to 3%, Base Case, No Anticipation
Figure 3.14: From 10% to 5%, Base Case, No Anticipation
preannouncement periods are rather long. Indeed, if we suppose that nominal
wages are fixed for one year, then one period in the model would correspond
to six months. Hence, 8 periods are 4 years. Moreover, since preannounce-
ment smoothes the transitional dynamics the size of the overshooting is really
marginal.
2	 4	 5	 8	 10	 12	 14
periods
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0	 2	 4	 610	 12	 14	 15
periods
Figure 3.15: From 5% to 3%, .4 Periods Preannouncement
cr!
0?
c' 0	 2	 4	 6	 8	 10	 12	 14	 18
periods
Figure 3.16: From 5% to 3%, 8 Periods Preannouncement
Figure 3.17: From 10% to 5%, 4 Periods Preannouncement
-88
periods
10	 12	 14
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Figure 3.18: From 10% to 5%, 8 Periods Preannouncement
Chapter 4
Staggered Wages and
Persistence in the Real Effects
of Money Shocks
4.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters we have used the dynamic general equilibrium
model described in Chapter 1 to look at the effects of changes in the rate
of money growth, both in the long-run (Chapter 2) and in the short-run
(Chapter 3). In this chapter, instead, we turn to look at the effects of changes
in the level of the money supply. This brings about the very important issue
of the persistence of the real effects of money shocks, which will be the focus
118
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of the remaining three chapters of the thesis.
The evidence that the GDP process contains a unit root has been inter-
preted as rejecting traditional theories of economic fluctuations which assume
the business cycle to be mainly driven by temporary nominal disturbances.
In their seminal article, Nelson and Plosser (1982) claim that their finding
"gives an important role to real factors in output fluctuations and places lim-
its on the importance of monetary theories of the business cycle." (Nelson
and Plosser (1982), p. 161) The same conclusion was supported by the analy-
sis of Campbell and Mankiw (1987), even if these authors were more cautious
in drawing any definite conclusion.' However, following the interpretation of
Nelson and Plosser (1982), numerous researchers started to develop what is
already a massive branch of the literature: the real business cycle literature.
Recent papers by West (1988) and Phaneuf (1990) try to challenge this
view. They both use Taylor's (1979, 1980a) staggered wage model with a
feedback monetary policy rule and with monetary shocks only. They show
that, for plausible values of the parameters, the model is able to generate
high persistence of money shocks. It seems that staggered wage models could
induce a near-random walk behaviour in GDP, that is, an autoregressive root
of about 0.8, statistically indistinguishable from a unit root in finite sample.
However, we already stressed in Chapter 1 that Taylor's (1979, 1980a)
1 "A conclusion as extreme as that of Nelson and Plosser is of course not necessary."
(Campbell and Mankiw (1987), pp. 876-877)
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model is an ad hoc log-linear structural model. Wage setting rules are ex-
ogenously specified at the outset and the parameters are likely not to be
policy-invariant (see Taylor (1980b)). Taylor (1979) openly acknowledges
the need for microfoundations. In the first two chapters, we developed a
dynamic general equilibrium model on which we imposed exactly Taylor's
(1979) staggered wage structure. In this chapter, the aim is to use this
model in order to open the "black box" of the structural ad hoc parameters
of the famous Taylor wage setting equation. We can then ask whether the
microfounded model confirms previous findings by West (1988) and Phaneuf
(1990). Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of Taylor's model (1979), it
turns out that a log-linearised version of our model exactly coincides with it.
We are therefore able to show how the parameters of Taylor's wage setting
equation depend upon the microeconomic fundamentals and the conduct of
monetary policy.
Our main finding is that high persistence of the real effects of money
shocks in staggered wage models is an unlikely outcome. Consequently, our
result refutes the earlier view of West (1988) and Phaneuf (1990) for almost
any reasonable values of the microeconomic parameters and of the underlying
rate of inflation.
In more detail: first, the model log-linearised around a zero inflation
steady state illuminates the role of the microeconomic parameters in gen-
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erating persistence. Blanchard (1990) stressed that a low responsiveness of
nominal wages to the business cycle conditions was a key factor to generate
high persistence of money shocks in staggered wage models. We provide new
findings for staggered wage models regarding the interrelation among the
responsiveness of nominal wages to the business cycle, the income effect on
labour supply and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour. In
particular, it is shown that a staggered wage model can generate significant
persistence, even if far from near-random walk behaviour in GDP, in a zero
steady- state inflation economy for some values of the underlying parameters.
However, in accordance with previous findings (see Blanchard and Fischer
(1989) and Chari et al. (1996)), we show that a high degree of persistence,
in the sense of near-random walk behaviour in GDP, can only arise from
a low income effect on labour supply and a high intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of labour.
Second, and most importantly, our intertemporal microfounded model re-
veals that the conduct of monetary policy affects the structural parameters
of Taylor's wage setting equation, providing a clear example of the Lucas cri-
tique. Specifically, it is shown that non-zero steady state inflation modifies
the degree of forward and backward looking in Taylor's wage setting equa-
tion, hence altering the degree of persistence implied by the model. As a
consequence, even in the cases where the microfounded parameters are such
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that they could generate persistence in a zero inflation economy, a positive,
but still low, steady state rate of inflation diminishes persistence sharply.
Moreover, as a consequence: (i) the model is highly non-linear; (ii) the in-
ertia of the system and the short-run output-inflation trade-off is inversely
related to the level of average inflation as found by Ball et al. (1988).
We conclude that either sensible values of the microeconomic parameters,
or a moderate rate of underlying inflation as observed in western economies,
or both, cut down persistence far below near random-walk behaviour.
Some of our results confirm those already suggested by Blanchard and
Fischer (1989) and Romer (1996). Indeed in section 4.3, we will develop as
an example a comparison between our model and Blanchard and Fischer's
(1989) one. However, these text-book models are a hybrid between ad hoc
and microfounded models. For example, the Blanchard and Fischer (1989)
model derives from a simplified version of Blanchard and Kiyotaki's (1987)
static model. On this simplified version they superimpose ad hoc dynamics
due to Taylor's staggered structure of price decisions. Thus, while in their
models the dynamics are superimposed on a static model in a somewhat ad
hoc way, the present model is truly intrinsically dynamic, since it is derived
from an explicit intertemporal optimisation process. Consequently, while
our model is somewhat similar to the Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and
Romer (1996) models when log-linearised around a zero inflation economy,
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similarities stop when a more realistic positive rate of underlying inflation is
considered. In other words, by construction, the Lucas critique point cannot
be addressed by the hybrid models of Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and
Romer (1996).
Our analysis is also very related to a recent contemporaneous and inde-
pendent contribution by Chari et al. (1996) with whom we share the same
main result.' However, despite the similarities between the two analyses,
the two studies have distinct features. (i) While Chari et at (1996) build a
dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered price setting, the model
presented in this chapter is closer in spirit to Taylor's original (1979) model
in that it explicitly considers the labour market and the optimal wage set-
ting rule. As we will see, this actually makes a difference in a zero inflation
economy. (ii) Our analysis is analytically oriented and tries to find explicit
solutions and comparisons with previous results to explain the mechanism
at work. On the other hand, Chari et al. (1996) rely heavily on calibration
and simulation techniques. This enables them to simulate quite a number of
different versions of their basic model, providing robustness checks of their
main finding. (iii) Our analysis focuses on the important issue of the relation
2 1t is maybe important to note that this main finding seems to have already generated
a debate in the literature where most try to oppose to it (e.g., Andersen (1998a,b), Erceg
(1997), Jeanne (1998), Kiley (1997)), while others reinforce it (e.g., Ellison and Scott
(1998)).
(4.1)
(4.2)
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between the policy behaviour and agents' response, while Chari et al. (1996)
do not mention this point. Thus, the two works seem to be complementary.
We also develop later a brief comparison with the recent Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) intertemporal model of staggered prices, explaining some
features (and casting some doubts on the robustness) of their results.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section compares the model
presented here with Taylor's (1979) one and briefly with the ones in Chari
et al. (1996) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Section 4.3 compares
the model with the one in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapter 8. This
seems useful to fully understand the relation between the level of persistence
and the microeconomic fundamentals. Section 4.4 studies how the degree of
persistence varies as the microeconomic fundamentals vary, shows the im-
portance of non-linearity and how the Lucas critique applies very much to
Taylor's model. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The Optimal Wage Setting Rule
Taylor's (1979) model and related literature
First we need to recall very briefly Taylor's model, as presented in the first
section of Chapter 1. Taylor's model consists of the following three equations
xt
 = b x t_ i + d Et_ i x t± i
 + 7 ( b Et-iYt + d Et-iYt-H.)
1 ,
Pt = -
2 
lxt-i + xt)
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Yt -= 'int -Pt	 (4.3)
where, as explained in Chapter 1, p = price level, x = 'new' nominal wage;
y = output; m = money supply and all the variables are expressed in terms
of log-deviation from trend. E t_ 1
 represents the conditional expectation of a
variable based on the information available at the beginning of period t (or
end of period t — 1).
For the argument in this and above all in the next chapter, it is worth re-
calling also that in Taylor's words: "the behavioral equations reflect a relative
wage concern on the part of the workers". However, substituting equation
(4.2) into (4.1), it yields
	
xt = b pt + d Et-1Pt+1 + -7i (b Et-iYt ± d Et-iYt+i) •	 (4.4)
As already noted by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and Blanchard (1990), this
means that in setting the wage, workers care only about their absolute real
wage. In other words, workers care about the wages in the other sectors only
through the effect these wages have on the price level. In contrast to Taylor's
words, there is no actual real wage concern per se on the part of the workers.
This point is explicitly demonstrated in a dynamic general equilibrium setting
in this chapter. Indeed, our workers, who are "neoclassically" concerned only
about their absolute real wage, give rise to the same equations as in Taylor's
model. We want to stress this point because the next chapter will investigate
the possible role that relative wage considerations can play in explaining
(4.7)
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persistence in staggered wage models.
For a given expected path of the money supply, the model exhibits the
following saddle path solution
Xt = Asxt-J. + °°(co - 1)A, ( 1 yb	 Au	 [bEt_ i (mt+i) + dEt-i(Trit+i+i)]	 (4.5)i=o
where
yo - Vco2 - 4d(1 - d)	
=
.	 co ± Vco2 - 4d(1 - d) .	 1+ i
As =	 Az,	 (P =2d	 , 2d	 1 - 2 •2
(4.6)
A, and Au are respectively the stable and the unstable root of the saddle
equilibrium. If d b = 1/2, then A s reduces to As 	- -0p 2 1 -
Now suppose m t follows a random walk. Then, (4.5) becomes
x t = A s x t_ i
 + (1 - As)mt_i
and the dynamics of output are given by
1
Yt = AsYt-i (Int - mt_i) ± -2 (1 — A 3 ) (mt_i — mt-2)	 (4.8)
The model therefore exhibits persistence in the real effects of money
shocks. Persistence of money shocks then basically depends on two para-
meters: the degree of forward looking behaviour (i.e., d) and the degree of
sensitivity of the money wage to business cycle conditions (i.e., 7). The
higher d, the lower the inertia of the aggregate wages. However, d is thought
to be relatively uninteresting and it is often put equal to in the literature,
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which focused the attention on 7 as the crucial parameter to determine the
degree of persistence. 3 The intuition of the key importance of -y is the fol-
lowing: given (4.3), money shocks can have significant and prolonged effects
on output only if the price level adjusts slowly and, given (4.1) and (4.2), the
higher 7, the higher the sensitivity of the nominal variables to movements in
output, the faster the adjustment of prices. It is easy to show, in fact, that
As is a decreasing function of 7. For the US, Taylor (1980b) estimated -y to
be between 0.05 and 0.1, while Sachs (1980) estimated 7 to be between 0.07
and 0.1.
Another implication of this model is that it exhibits a Phillips-curve-type
output-inflation trade-off. Following a positive monetary shock, prices adjust
sluggishly and output is temporarily above its natural level. This trade-off
would depend on A s (and hence on d and 7): the higher A s , the flatter the
Phillips curve.
West (1988) and Phaneuf (1990) investigate whether this model could
generate near random-walk behaviour in output. Phaneuf (1990) closed the
model with the following equation, representing a feedback policy rule4
mt = apt + vYt	 (4.9)
3 See, for instance, Driskill and Sheffrin (1986), DeLong and Summers (1986), Ambler
and Phaneuf (1989, 1992).
4 Taylor (1979, 1980a,b) sets v = 0.
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Incorporating this equation, the solution of the system changes slightly,
17/2
since now cp = (+0-0 1- ( 1-c ) /2 ) ' where c = (a— v)/(1—v). The parameter c is a7
policy parameter which indicates the degree of accommodation of monetary
policy to price changes: the higher c, the more accommodative is monetary
policy. Analytically, the role of c parallels the one of -y and a lower value
of c causes, ceteris paribus, a lower degree of persistence (as c approaches
one, co approaches unity). In other words, introducing (4.9) in the model
is analytically equivalent to multiplying 7 by 1 — c. Phaneuf (1990) took
estimated values of 7 and c for Canada, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom
and US from some previous studies in the literature. He found 7 to lie be-
tween 0 and 0.32 and c to lie between 0.71 and 0.91. Despite the fact that -y
was on average found to be bigger than Taylor's (1980b) and Sachs' (1980)
estimates, Phaneuf (1990) found that countries associated with higher values
of 7 exhibited also higher values of c. This observation led him to determine
As to be between 0.65 and 1 and to conclude : "...the evidence of a unit root
in the real GNP process of many countries is not necessarily inconsistent
with a contract-based approach to the business cycle. [...] the asynchroniza-
tion of wage contracts can potentially play the role of an important dynamic
propagation mechanism and can contribute substantially to the persistence of
output fluctuations." (Phaneuf (1990), p. 590) Moreover, he acknowledged
the potential role of d in generating persistence: the lower d, the higher
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the backward looking bias in Taylor's wage setting rule and the higher the
persistence. However: "Given that no evidence is currently available on the
direction of this bias, if any, it would seem that one important item on the
agenda of future research should be to determine empirically the value [of d]."
(Phaneuf (1990), pp. 590- 591)
West (1988) considered two different monetary policy rules: one targeted
the interest rate and the other targeted the money supply. Then he simulated
Taylor's model in these two different cases, choosing values of -y between
0.01 and 0.1. He concluded that in an economy characterised by overlapping
nominal contracts money shocks could induce near random-walk behaviour
in output.
In what follows we will use the log-linearised version of our model to
investigate the same issue of Phaneuf (1990) and West (1988). With respect
to Phaneuf (1990), we can detect the micro determinants of d and hence of
the forward vs. backward looking bias. With respect to West (1988), we
demonstrate that the parameters of Taylor's wage setting equation are likely
to depend heavily on the monetary policy rule. Moreover, by the same token,
we also provide an explanation of Phaneuf (1990) finding that countries in
which the monetary policy is more loose exhibit a higher value of 'y.
The optimal wage setting rule
Let us recall the first order condition of our model for a general utility
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function, that is
uc(t) -= RtOuc(t + 1)	 (4.10)
um/p(t)=-(1-111-t )uc(t)	 (4.11)
ULM OUL(t 1)1÷;(-±
Xt =
	
KtPt+1
	
(4.12)
— 1 ) ILc(t)i 131Lc(t +	 -(t±-L-Fi
au(Ctn( aMs/P)t,Lt) where u8(t), for s = C, M/P, L. We have already com-
mented on these equations in Chapter one. However, even at the cost of
repeating ourselves, a further comment on the optimal wage setting rule is
useful. Contrary to the hybrid textbook models of Blanchard and Fischer
(1989) and Romer (1996), the wage setting rule (4.12) results from intertem-
poral optimisation. As a consequence, it is not simply given by the average
(with weights equal to 1/2) of the optimal wages (derived from a static model)
in the two periods. In (4.12), the weight on 2nd-period values is the compos-
ite term Kt+i /Kt
 and the discount factor 0. Moreover, Kt+ i /Kt
 evaluated
in an inflationary steady state is equal to (1 + rgm) e . Hence, once the wage
setting rule is explicitly derived from intertemporal optimisation: (i) the en-
dogenous weights determine the degree of backward versus forward looking
behaviour; (ii) the parameters of the log-linearised version of (4.12) are not
structural, but depend on policy. The analysis of this third first-order con-
dition and the comparison between it and Taylor's wage setting equation is
the focus of the present chapter.
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Log-linearising (4.12), around a steady state we get the following expres-
sion
xt
 = bipt
 + diPt+i + bat + d2yt±i + bgrit + d3rnt±i	 (4.13)
where again lower case letters are used for variables as log-deviations from
steady state. bi and di , for i 1, 2, 3, depend upon technology and prefer-
ences parameters and upon the steady state rate of money growth, as shown
in the Appendix 4.6.
(4.13) corresponds to (4.4). Therefore, as we stressed above, while Taylor
justifies his wage setting rule by arguing that there is a "Keynesian" relative
wage concern on the part of the workers, equation (4.4) shows his model
to be analytically equivalent to one in which workers are "neoclassically"
concerned about their real wage, as in the model illustrated here.
Log-linearising the aggregate price level equation, i.e., (2.16) we obtain
the following expression
7 1—	 1 	)
Pt = (—) Yt + qxt + (1 — q)xt-i	 ( 1+1-E) (4.14)
The parallel between equation (4.14) and equation (4.2) is obvious. Expres-
sion (4.14) is just more general since it allows both the returns to scale to be
lower than one and the parameters to depend upon the steady state rate of
growth of the money supply (i.e., IP).
Substituting (4.14) in (4.13), we get
xt
 b4xt_ 1 + d4xt+1 + b5 yt + d5Yt+i + b6rnt + ds'int+i 	 (4.15)
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which corresponds to the Taylor's wage setting rule. The comparison is then
between:5
TAYLOR (19, '80)	 MICROFOUNDED MODEL
x t -= bx t -1 dxt+1 'Y(bYt dYt+i) x t = b4 x 1 + d4xt± i + b5 yt + d5 yt+ i + b6mt + dsmt+i
Pt -=	 xt-1)
	
Pt = ( r a ) lit qxt + (1 - q)xt-i
xt bpt + dPt+i + (7/2 ) ( bY t dYt+i)
	
Xt = blPt diPt+1 ± bat + d2Yt±i b3 int dvnt+i
Simply adding to the system (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15) above the static ag-
gregate demand equation supposed by Taylor: yt = mt Pt ,we can reproduce
Taylor's result about the persistence of money shocks. We are ready now to
compare the model with Taylor's and we can derive some results which are
proved in the Appendix 4.6.6
Proposition 4.1. If the utility function is additively separable in real
money balances, that is, if UL,m1p - aLtaa2(uLt)p)t = 0 and uc,m / p = 0c,a2(M/	 p) , =
5 For simplicity we drop the expectation operator in Taylor's model. Note that the
expectation operator can straightforwardly be incorporated in the model of this paper,
without affecting the results we are concerned with.
6 It is probably worth noting that, despite being analytically equivalent, the numerical
order of the equation reflects the different interpretation of the wage setting rule in the two
models. In Taylor's, workers directly care about relative wages (see (4.1)) and indirectly
about real wages through (4.2) (see (4.4)). In the microfounded model, instead, workers
care directly about real wages (see (4.13)) and indirectly about relative wages through
(4.14) (see (4.15)).
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0, then nominal balances do not appear in (4.13) and (4.15).
Therefore, Taylor's wage setting rule could be justified only if the under-
lying utility function is additively separable in real money balances or if one is
inclined to think that the above cross derivatives are of negligible magnitude.
Otherwise, both (4.1) and (4.4) should include real money balances.
71c-(E/0)(71L L-71cr,)Proposition 4.2. The sums b2
 + d2 = = r, r1r,r,+ 	 and1+6(r7LL 1CL)
b3 d3 = 711L+' ME (71P1,77; CMG/ 1') are both independent of (I) (i.e., independent of the
policy rule). Moreover, the "no-money-illusion" constraint b+d -= 1, imposed
ad hoc by Taylor, naturally holds in the microfounded model, since both b4+
d4 = 1 and b 1 + d1 = 1.
We define 77„ = 11r-L-ur s which represents the elasticity of the marginal utility
of r with respect to s, for r, s =C,MIP, L. Both in (4.13) and in (4.15) the
coefficient of the nominal variables, respectively prices and wages, sum to
1, as supposed by Taylor. This would suggest that those parameters could
be interpreted as d and b in Taylor's model, that is, the degree of backward
and forward looking behaviour. However, since the expressions (4.13) and
(4.15) cannot be factorised as can the corresponding Taylor's equations (4.4)
and (4.1), we are not able to identify the crucial parameter 7 in this general
formulation.
Proposition 4.3. All the parameters in (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15) depend
upon the policy rule. In particular, as the rate of growth of money tends to
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infinity then bi 's , for i	 1, .., 6, tend to zero and di 's , for i = 1, .., 6, tend
to finite values, and viceversa as the rate of growth of money tends to -100%.
It is immediately evident what the last two propositions imply for the
wage setting rule (4.13). As the monetary trend increases, more weight is
put on the future variables and less on the present one. In fact, we know
from proposition 4.2 that the sum of a coefficient of a variable in t (k) plus
the coefficient of the same variable in t +1 (di ) is constant. Then, as the rate
of money growth increases, 6, decreases while di increases. In other words,
as the monetary trend increases, more weight is put on the future variables
and less on present ones. As a matter of fact, the higher the inflation trend,
the more forward-looking is the wage setting equation and thus the lower is
persistence. Recall the comment on equation (4.12). The future variables in
the optimal wage setting rule are weighted by Kt+ 1 /Kt which, when evaluated
in steady state, is equal to (1 + rgm) E . The weight is hence increasing in
the steady state rate of growth of money. As advocated by Phaneuf (1990),
we are therefore able to provide an explanation of the magnitude of the
backward versus forward looking bias. This very important issue, concerning
the dependence of ad hoc Taylor's parameters on average inflation, will be
thoroughly discussed in section 4.4.
Proposition 4.4. If the utility function is additively separable in real
money balances and if money supply is constant in steady state, then the
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microfounded model exactly coincides with Taylor's model, where b = 1 — d =
( 1.---0) and -y = 2 (g +	 .
As a result, Taylor's wage setting rule (4.1) can be interpreted as the log-
linear approximation of a monopolistic household-union optimal wage setting
rule around a steady state with constant money supply. In fact, if .1, = 1 in
steady state and rh, , mip = ric , m/p = 0, (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15) respectively
become
X	 (1 Hit l0) Pt + gYt i + ( 1  
1
_3p 0) Pt-El+gyt+11
Pt = ( 1	 a ) Yt + 1 (xt xt-i)0-	 2
(4.16)
(4.17)
1	 ,
xt = (-
1 + 0 ) ix t—i	 ± (-1 + 0 ) gt +i	 (4.18)
which precisely matches equations (4.4), (4.2) and (4.1),7
The striking feature of those three equations is not only that they per-
fectly parallel Taylor's assumptions, but they above all provide an extremely
7 Actually, despite the successive approximations used to get here, the model of this
paper is still a little bit more general than Taylor's in that it allows a to be different from
1. Thus, the mark-up equation (4.14) incorporates a decreasing returns to scale effect. As
a consequence, the persistence root of the model is given by A s — 	
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natural interpretation of Taylor's ad hoc structural parameters. 8 The back-
ward and forward-looking parameters, respectively d and b in Taylor's model,
very simply depends only on the rate of time preferences. If the intertempo-
ral rate of discount is zero then 0 = 1 and b = d = 1 and "contract decisions
are unbiased". If agents naturally discount the future, then they are biased
backward, in the sense that present variables have higher weight than future
variables. Given that 0 < 1, then follows that d < b. 9 Recall that the degree
of persistence is a decreasing function of the forward-looking parameter d.
Then, the degree of persistence in Taylor's model is an increasing function
of the intertemporal rate of discount.
The elasticity of the money wage to the business cycle conditions is given
by 7 = 2 (g +	 where, as in proposition 4.2, g = nLc ,-nrc+(E/0)(nr,r,-77ci,) 
a	 1-1-6(71LL-7)cL)
. Now suppose additive separability between consumption and labour then
71Lc = 71cL, = 0 and g becomes: g = -71(7c±(E/6)71"; . It is standard to assume1.4-E71LL
8 We now do some comparative statics, investigating the effects of the various technology
and preferences parameters on persistence. In doing so, we assume that 7/cc and T ILL are
constant parameters (as in most utility functions employed in macroeconomic studies). If
this was not the case, then a change in a parameter (i.e., 0, 0, a) would change the steady
state of the model changing noc and TILL . I thank Antoine d'Autume for drawing my
attention to this. Besides, if the utility function is additively separable, 71cc represents
the income effect on labour supply.
9 Proposition 5 should however have already warned the reader that the degree of back-
ward and forward looking depends also on the steady state monetary policy.
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both an increasing marginal disutility of labour and a decreasing marginal
utility of consumption, hence g is always positive.
First, -y is a decreasing function of 0, that is, the bigger 0, the bigger
the persistence. Following a positive money shock, the new money wage will
be set higher than the one already fixed in the previous period by the other
sector. However, the bigger 0, the bigger the loss in demand a sector will
face fixing the new level of money wage, and hence of price, bigger than the
one of the other sector. Therefore, the unions will tend to fix the new wage
close to the existing one inducing more price level inertia.10
Second, while both g and 7 are decreasing functions of a, persistence
increases with a if and only if g < 1. Simple intuition would suggest that
a =-- 1 corresponds to the maximum degree of nominal rigidities an thus
that persistence would be increasing in a. As it is immediately evident from
equation (4.14), for example, if a positive money shock raises output, then,
firms could satisfy the excess demand without changing their prices only if
1() This result appears to be counterintuitive, since we might have expected a more com-
petitive economy to exhibit a lower degree of price inertia. Note that the model presented
in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapter 8, which will be analysed in the next section,
exhibits the same kind of effect, sharing the same feature.The result is mainly due to the
institutional assumption about the fixed length of the contract. Presumably the more
competitive the economy, the lower is the length of the contracts and the more flexible are
the prices.
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o- = 1. However, this is true only if g < 1, that is if the cost (i.e., wage) does
not increase too much as more output has to be produced. 11 Moreover:
Proposition 4.5. (i) The persistence is increasing (decreasing) in the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour, (-11TILL ), if and only if the
intertemporal elasticity of consumption, (— 1/j), is bigger (lower) than the
elasticity of substitution in consumption goods, 0; (ii) A low income effect
together with a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour causes
a low value of 7 and hence a high degree of persistence.
The second result is actually very intuitive and already present in Blan-
chard and Fischer (1989), Chapter 8. Note that is an increasing function of
ITicc I. The higher the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, the more
the marginal utility of consumption is going to fall for a given increase in out-
put (= consumption, in equilibrium), the more wages are pushed up since
households would prefer to exchange consumption for more leisure at the mar-
gin. In other words, the lower the intertemporal elasticity of consumption
(that is just the inverse of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption),
the more households would like to substitute an increase in consumption
with an increase in leisure within the period, leading to a raise in the wages.
11 Therefore, since in the ad hoc Taylor's model g is usually supposed to be very low,
Taylor's hypothesis of constant returns to scale, implicitly embedded into (4.2), actually
favours persistence.
(4.19):g 0
(-' 77LL, <
\ <1( —m) -- 7)-
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Note that if the utility over consumption is linear, then this income effect on
labour supply is absent. With a zero income effect, wages are not responsive
to changes in the marginal utility of consumption. Hence the real wage just
depends on the marginal utility of labour. Then, the less elastic is the latter
(i.e., the lower is TILL ) the lower is the pressure on the wages for a given
increase in the labour demand. If utility over consumption and labour is
linear (i.e., 77cc = 'TILL = 0) then g = 0. However, -y is still different from
zero unless a = 1.
The first result of proposition 4.5 is a novelty and fairly general as our
analysis suggests. It follows from simple algebra that
Therefore the direction of the effect of a higher elasticity of marginal util-
ity of labour critically depends on the relative values of ncc and 0. Straight-
forward intuition would lead to presume a positive relation between 7 and
77 LL : the higher the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour (i.e., the
lower 7/LL ), the lower the sensitivity of wages to output, i.e., 7, as found in
Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and in Chari et al. (1996). Instead, this result
shows that this is true only if the intertemporal substitution of consumption
is bigger than 0. However, the intertemporal substitution of consumption is
usually assumed to be low and generally around one, while 0 is, by hypothesis
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bigger than one.' Therefore, the relation between -y and the intertemporal
elasticity in labour is the opposite of what intuition would suggest, unless we
are willing to assume unrealistically low income effects. Figure 4.1 graphi-
cally shows the result summarised in the last proposition.
Figure 4.1: Persistence as a Function of the Microeconomic Parameters
Proposition 4.5 has important implications with respect to other recent
works on microfounded models with staggering. Considering the case a =
= 1, Chari et al. (1996) shows that in their price staggering model the
12 Blanchard and Fischer (1989), p. 44, wrote : "Substantial empirical work has been de-
voted to estimating [(-71 cc)] under the assumption that is indeed constant [...] Estimates
of i(- 77cc)] vary substantially but usually lie around or below unity".
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sensitivity of the real wage to output is: g = 7ILL - ncv•" Thus, they
conclude that, since the empirical evidence on labour supply surveyed by
Pencavel (1986) suggests that 7/LL should be at least 1, g > 1 (see Chari et
al. (1996), p. 15). That is, even assuming zero income effects, g is too high
to generate persistence. On the contrary, this is not the case in our model.
-71re+71r rAssuming a = 0 = 1, then g = 	 ' • ' •1+07ILL . If 77cc = 0, g is always lower than
1/0. Besides, unless one assumes unbelievably high income effect, g < 1.
This would suggest that staggered wage models are more likely to deliver
persistence than staggered price models." Next, note that when a = 1
our model coincides with a yeoman-farmer model where now •riLL should be
interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal disutility of production. The
model hence encompasses the Blanchard and Fischer (1989) yeoman-farmer
model. However, as said before proposition 4.5, Blanchard and Fischer (1989)
obtain the same result as Chari et al. (1996), i.e., a positive relation between
TILL and g. This is only due to the fact they use a particular utility function
with zero income effects, hence placing their model in the lower part of Figure
4.1, as we will show in the next section. Finally, our model relates closely
"Under the assumption a = [3 = 1, apart from the different expression for g, the two
models coincide and the solution is given by A s -= (1 — .‘,/)/(1+\/T) = (1— N/72)/(1+
1-7).
14 However, this is not true. See Chapter 6 which is devoted to the analysis of the
different implications of wages vs. price staggering on persistence.
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to the Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) yeoman-farmer model, in the sense
that the sensitivity of the staggered variable with respect to output is given
by the same formula for g. 15 Their benchmark calibration is the following:
0.16, 7/LL( -77CC) -=- = 0.47 and 0 --- 7.88, which delivers a low value of
g = 0.134. 16 They acknowledge the fact that such a low value of TILL is
difficult to believe.' However, they stress that their results do not rely on
high labour supply elasticity. We can show that the reason for this is the
15 This is quite a strong claim but it should be thought as limited to the issue we are
concerned with here (i.e., the sensitivity of the real wage with respect to output and
persistence). In reality, apart from this point the two models are very much different.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997): (i) have a Calvo-type of structure in price staggering;
(ii) have other rigidities to help the model match the impulse response function of an unre-
stricted VAR; (iii) are mainly concerned with another issue: computing optimal monetary
policy in an optimising framework. In order to match the data, however, the model should
generate some persistence. As far as persistence is concerned, a key parameter in their
model is K which formula (see p. 316) exactly coincides with our g, if one abstracts from
the terms due to the particular definition of the staggered variable and to the Calvo-type
of structure (respectively (1 — a)/a and 1 — ce0 in their notation at p. 316).
"Which given footnote 13, yields A., =- 0.46 in our model. However, given what said in
the previous footnote, we cannot directly compare the implied value of persistence in our
model and in theirs.
17 It must be stressed again that in a yeoman-farmer model ?ILL is no more simply the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply (see Chapter 6). In their benchmark
calibration the elasticity of labour supply is equal to 9.5 (again too high to be believed).
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calibration of the income effects parameter which is extremely low. 18 Indeed
with a value of 0 around 7.7, then 1/0 = 0.13. Then we are in the upper
part of Figure 4.1, but the vertical distance between (—ncc) and 1/0 is
squeezed and equal to 0.03, making the value of TILL basically unimportant.
Virtually any value of TILL is compatible with g = 0.134, just changing 0
marginally. 19 All this analysis holds when the model is log-linearised around a
particular steady state: zero money growth. This is exactly what Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) do. Indeed, when the model is log-linearised around a
steady state for a general (I) results are quite substantially affected. Although
not acknowledged by the literature, this point is crucial as section 4.4 will
show.
In this section we have carried out a thorough comparison between our
microfounded model and Taylor's model and other models in the recent lit-
erature. 'While some of the result are in line with the intuition and previous
findings, some others are not, showing that previous findings do not hold in
general. We reckon that to understand fully where these results come from,
'They acknowledge this (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), pp. 321-322) and hence
it seems that their model remains subject to the critique of Chari et al. (1996) and
the present model: empirical persistence of output responses to monetary shocks can be
reproduce only for implausible parameter values.
'For example, if ?ILL = 4.77 (i.e., labour supply elasticity = 0.3) and 0 = 7.51, then
g = 0.134.
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the example of the next section would help.
4.3 A Useful Comparison
In this section we briefly compare our model and the one in Blanchard and
Fischer (1989), (B/F in what follows), Chapter 8, to provide a better un-
derstanding of the above results. The B/F model derives from a simplified
version of Blanchard and Kiyotaki's (1987) static model. In particular, the
B/F analysis removes the labour market assuming that each household is at
the same time producer and consumer (i.e., yeoman-farmer assumption). On
this simplified version they superimpose dynamics due to Taylor's staggered
structure of price decisions. There are two basic differences between the set-
ting of their model and of the one presented here: (i) staggering in wages
vs. staggering in prices; (ii) while in their model the dynamic is somewhat
ad hoc overimposed to a static model, the presented model is truly intrinsi-
cally dynamic, since it is derived from an explicit intertemporal optimisation
process. However, we want here to focus on another crucial difference be-
tween the two: the utility function specification. B/F's utility function of
agent i is the following: ui = (Ci /f) f [(Mi /P)/(1 — f)P- 1 — (x/e)Yie , where
e > 1. This specification implies no income effect on labour supply. 2() Then,
2() The utility function is borrowed from Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). In footnote
7 at p.650, Blanchard and Kiyotaki wrote: "The assumption that utility is homogenous
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the degree of persistence of money shocks is given by
e+ 0(e - 1) - 2-1[(e - 1)(1 + 0(e - 1)]
As -= 1 + (e -	 - 1) (4.20)
where 6' is again the elasticity of substitution among goods. The degree of
persistence is a decreasing function of e - 1, that is, an increasing function
of the intertemporal substitution in effort in production (which corresponds
to the one in labour supply if constant returns to labour are assumed). 21 If
e = 1, then A s = 1 and money shocks have permanent effects on production.
It is easy to see why. The price setting rule in B/F is
1	 1
x t = -
2
Oxt _ i + (1- h)E[mt lt]l -{hE[xt+	 + (1- h)E[Tri t± i NI (4.21)2
where h = 1-F(0-1)(e-1) Using the log-linear static aggregate demand equa-1±(0+1)(e-1) •
tion yt = mt -pt to substitute out mt and m t+i in (4.21) we can get Taylor's
price setting rule
1	 1 - h	 1
xt =	 + 2 (
	 ) E LYtI tn- + 2 {E[xt+ i lt] + 2 (
1 - h E[yt±iltil1 + h 1 + h
(4.22)
of degree one in consumption and real money balances, as well as additively separable in
consumption and real money balances on the one hand, and leisure, on the other, eliminates
income effects on labor supply. Under these assumptions, competitive labor supply would
just be a function of the real wage..."
21 As anticipated, note that the effect of 9 on A s is the same as in our model.
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e-
where 7B/F, = 2 (-1-h ) = 2 1+0( 1e-1) has the same role as 7 in Taylor's mode1.22l+h
Given that there are no income effects on labour supply (77c.c. = 0), then we
are in the bottom part of Figure 4.1. In fact, the bigger the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of labour supply (i.e., 1/77LL = 1I(e— 1)), the lower
7B/F, then the bigger the stable root and the persistence.
In order to make our model more similar to the one in Blanchard and
Fischer (1989), we use the utility function employed in Chapter 2, that is
uit (Cit , MitIPt, Ljt) = 61n Cit + (1— 6) ln Mit/Pt — X-qt	 (4.23a)
and we further suppose c = = 1. In this case, As 	
 and g = -y/2 =1+.‘/
e	  . The simple comparison between g and 'Y B/P can be summarised in1+0(e-1)
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. Comparing our model with the one in B/F we can
conclude:
(i) while in our model the degree of inertia of nominal variables is a de-
creasing function of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour, the
22 In fact the stable root A, = 1-V1-h2	 1h h 117 1 which delivers equation (4.20)
(see B/F, p. 395). Then 1/h corresponds to cp in (4.5), since B/F suppose b = d = 1/2
(that is, 0 = 1 in our model). Given the definition of cp -- 2L1 ±7/ , then putting (p, =11h
we get exactly -y = 2. Alternatively, putting (p= 11h, the stable root in (4.5) can be
written as:
1 _ \11-h 1 — V-yB/F/2l+h A, —
1+ VM, 1+ V-YBIFI2
There is therefore perfect correspondence between Taylor's model and B/F's one.
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contrary is true in B/F's one;
(ii) the elasticity of nominal wages to fluctuations in output, i.e., 7, is how-
ever always lower in B/F and hence the degree of inertia of nominal variables
is always bigger in B/F's model, with respect to the one here presented.
Proposition 4.6 just basically restates proposition 4.5 applying it to the
two proposed examples. Let's develop the intuition. Recall that the optimal
wage setting rule of the model, given by (4.12), is strictly linked to the
optimal rule in the flexible wage case
Xt	[ 	E 	 [uL(t)1
Pt	 E - 1 _I [uc(t)]	
(constant)V (4.24)
where g is exactly the elasticity of the optimal wage with respect to output.
In fact, as we saw above, the simplifying assumptions (1 . = 13 = 1, basically
remove any asymmetry among the weights of the log-linearised version of
(4.12) and not surprisingly g appears as the elasticity of the nominal wage
in (4.13) with respect to both yt
 and Yt+1 . (4.24) can be rewritten as
[pti-i-o(e-,_i 
21
v--0(e-i)
Xt = (constant) 	 2 t	 t 
1 1 Yt
(4.25)
An increase in Yt has two effects: (i) Kt increases shifting the demand
for labour curve upwards; (ii) the marginal utility of wealth (that, given
(4.23a) is equal to the one of consumption) decreases since an increase in
consumption is expected. Both these effects go in the same direction and the
money wage has to rise. Then, there is a third effect: the union realises that
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an increase in the money wages causes the demand for labour, and hence the
marginal disutility of labour, to decrease proportionally to the parameter
0 (which equals 6 if a = 1). How much should the money wage increase?
Taking into account the three effects then the elasticity of Xt with respect to
Yt is exactly g. In B/F's case the second effect is absent, since the marginal
utility of wealth is constant. Therefore the elasticity of Xt with respect to Yt
is exactly -yB/F /2. The absence of the second effect makes-yB/F/2 lower than
9.
Alternatively, we can reason in the following way. The optimal price
choice in B/F can be thought as the optimal decision of a monopolist which
maximises profits given the demand curve. The profits are given by the
following indirect utility function
= (Pi/ P) Y, — (X/ e ) Yae (Mi/ 13)
	 (4.26)
where the last term is given for the agent. The demand function is
Yi (Pi / P) — (M/P)	 where	 (M/P) = (constant)Y	 (4.27)
The optimal rule is then simply found by equating the marginal cost and
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the marginal revenue of the monopolist, that is'
— 
—BeMRBIF = (constant)1319po-iy = wry = (constant) pi I peye
(4.28)
In our model the monopolist union equals
1tyteMR = (constant)Xt-9Pt8-1 = MC = (constant)X -0et-	 pOe	 (4.29)
Comparing (4.28) with (4.29) again the above argument is reproduced.
While the marginal cost is exactly the same, the marginal revenue is differ-
ent. One unit of income spent in consumption and real balances produce a
constant level of utility in B/F. In our model, instead, the utility produced
by one unit of income decreases with the level of consumption (or income,
since in equilibrium C Y). Hence, MR= MRB/F/Y, where 1/Y is just
the marginal utility of wealth.
What happens when output rises? Look at Figure 4.2. Both MC and
MR are increasing function of P, and MC is steeper than MR. Moreover,
the higher e, the steeper MC. In Figure 4.2 we have drawn two marginal
cost curves: MC corresponds to a high value of e, while MC to a low one.
Firstly note the difference between the two models. Suppose we are at point
A. If Y increases then in B/F both MC and MR shifts to the right, while in
23 Note that MR and MC are negative since they do not correspond to the usual text-
book definitons. In fact, MR and MC are the partial derivatives of revenues and costs
respectively, with respect to price rather than quantity.
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MR, MC A	 Pi
Figure 4.2: Comparison between our model and the one in Blanchard and
Fischer (1989)
the model presented here only MC shifts. Therefore, for a given increase in
Y, /37; is bigger in our model than in B/F's one (compare B with C, and/or
B with C). That is, the elasticity of Pi with respect to Y is always lower in
B/F's model. Moreover, the flatter MC, the bigger the difference between
the level of the new price/wage in the two models (compare the difference
between B and C, with the one between B and C). In other words, the lower
e, the bigger the difference between the elasticity of Pi with respect to Y in
the two models, exactly as in Figure 4.1. Secondly, consider the effect of e
on this elasticity in the two models. In B/F, the lower e, the flatter the MC
curve, the lower the elasticity of Pi with respect to Y (compare C with C).
In our model, the opposite is true (compare B with B).
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To conclude, in this section we presented a comparison between the dy-
namic general equilibrium model with staggered wages of the previous chap-
ters and the one in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapter 8, in order to
illustrate the relation between income effects, intertemporal substitution of
labour and persistence of money shocks. This enabled us to explain in a very
plain and intuitive way the apparent puzzle of point (i) in proposition 4.5,
summarised in Figure 4.1.24
4.4 Persistence, Non-linearity and the Effects
of Average Inflation
So far we have explored the analytical mechanism of the model comparing it
with Taylor's and B/F's models. We are then ready to numerically evaluate
the degree of persistence of money shocks implied by the model. Let's slightly
modify the utility function in (4.23a). In order to allow the intertemporal
elasticity of consumption to be different from one, we simply substitute [in Ct]
.	 IAWALL	 in vf.hoa) , then ricc = —a.
In Table 4.1 we report three cases for a zero money growth policy rule.
24 Moreover note that the results of this section about the elasticity of price/wage to
output are generally valid, in the sense that they do not depend on the assumption of
staggered wages/prices. Figure 4.1 has been in fact drawn looking at the optimal flexible
price/wage rule.
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In the first case both consumption and labour enter linearly in the utility
function, whence 77cc = LL = 0.25 Then the money wage is completely
inelastic with respect to output changes and money shocks have permanent
effects on the level of output. The second case is our "base case", given the
estimate of microeconomic parameters used in the calibration literature. 26 7
is found to lie just outside the range of estimates in Phaneuf (1990) and to
be much higher both than the estimates of Taylor (1980b) for the US and
of the values used by West (1988). 27 The value of the stable root is in this
case far from inducing a near-random walk behaviour in output following a
monetary shock. However, even in the case of non-negligible income effects,
the degree of persistence could be increased by raising the value of 0 and
e. The third case in Table 4.1 shows that for (not completely implausible)
values of the parameters the model is able to generate a substantial degree of
persistence (A s
 = 0.6). Nonetheless, only for extreme and unrealistic values
25-rr 
rlcc = 77LL = 0 the model actually breaks down, since the labour demand and
supply curves are both horizontal and they do not intersect. This case must then be
interpreted as a limiting one.
26 A.s discussed in Chapter 2, footnote 15 the following values are used as indicative:
= 6, e= 4.5 , a =1, 3 = 0.95, x = 0.01, 6 = 0.99 and a = 1 (for the latter see footnote
12).
27 Chari et al. (1996) calibrate to be well above one. However, it should be stressed that
ours is not a calibration exercise. We are more interested in a kind of robustness exercise
to assess whether persistence can be a likely outcome and, if so, under which conditions.
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"-Y As
0 = 6;cr= 1;e= 1;a= 0 0 1
0 = 6; o- = 1; e = 4.5; a = 1 0.409 0.3868
0 = 15; o- = 1; e = 15; a = 1 0.1422 0.5936
Table 4.1: Value of 7 and A ., as microeconomic parameters vary: 3 cases
of these parameters (e.g., 0 = 42, e = 20) can we obtain Taylor's estimate
of 7 (= 0.05) and consequently a near-random walk degree of persistence
(-= 0.745).
In conclusion, it seems that the results of West (1988) and Phaneuf (1990)
can only be supported by extreme values of the microeconomic fundamentals.
In particular, we need either a zero income effect and virtually infinite elas-
ticity of substitution of labour supply', or, for more realistic values of iicc,
implausibly high values of 0 and e. Note that a high degree of persistence
could nevertheless occur in the ad hoc model because of a very accommodat-
ing feedback monetary policy rule (i.e., high value of c).However, we can get a
substantial degree of persistence for fairly plausible values of the parameters,
even if far from near-random walk behaviour.
Nevertheless, it remains to carefully consider the important issue of the
relation between the structural parameters of Taylor's wage setting rule and
28 Note that in the case a = 0 and e -= 1.03, we get exactly = 0.05, as Taylor. However,
a slight increase of e above one has a dramatic effect on persistence. Only for value of e
lower than 1.05, we can still get a degree of persistence bigger than 0.7. This suggests a
higly non-linear relation between e and persistence in this case.
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rgm -.
parameters 1
-4% 0 +5% +10%
A., = 1 A, = 1 A, = 0.822 A, = 0.6343
64 -= 0.575 64 = 0.513 1,4 = 0.439 64 = 0.3614
0 = 6; a = 1
d4 = 0.425 d4 = 0.487 d4 = 0.561 d4 = 0.639
e = 1; a = 0
65 = 0.0205 b5 = 0 65 = -0.025 65 = -0.051
dr, - -0.0205 d5 = 0 d5 - 0.025 d5 = 0.051
A, = 0.5476 A„ = 0.3868 A„ = 0.1291 A., = -0.0167
64 = 0.771 64 = 0.513 64 = 0.204 64 = 0.002
0 = 6; a =. 1
d4 = 0.229 d4 = 0.487 d4 = 0.796 d4 = 0.998
e = 4.5; a = 1
65 = 0.332 65 = 0.210 65 = 0.098 65 = 0.040
d5 = 0.105 d5 = 0.199 d5 = 0.347 d5 = 0.494
A, = 0.8335 A., = 0.5936 A., = -0.0394 A, = -0.043
b4 = 1.042 64 = 0.513 64 = -0.047 64 = -0.0570 = 15; a = 1
d4 = -0.042 d4 = 0.487 d4 = 1.047 d4 = 1.057
C = 15; a = 1
b5 = 0.201 65 = 0.073 65 = 3.9 • 10 -6 1,5 = 1.82 • 10-10
dr, = 1.9 • 10 -5 d5 = 0.069 d5 = 0.217 d5 = 0.356
Table 4.2: Value of persistence and of the parameters of Taylor's wage setting
rule as microeconomic fundamentals and rate of growth of money vary: 3
cases
the steady state rate of money growth. Looking at Table 4.2 29 it is evident
that the conclusions in the previous paragraph are not robust when monetary
policies other than a constant money supply are considered.
Firstly, look at the value of the stable root. In every case, the degree of
persistence is the higher, the lower the rate of growth of money (i.e., rgm).
Besides, the sensitivity of A s with respect to changes in rgm is the higher,
the bigger the microeconomic parameters. If money decreases at the rate of
4% in steady state, then, with respect to the case of zero money growth, the
persistence rises from 0.3868 to 0.5476 in the "base case" and from 0.5936 to
0.8335 in the third case. On the other hand, if money grows at a 10% rate,
in both cases the persistence is virtually nil. The degree of sensitivity of As
29 1f rgm 0 there is no single measure for 7 and that is why we report all the parameters
of the wage setting rule in Table 4.2.
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on rgm is indeed somewhat impressive. Also in the first case, the persistence
strongly diminishes as the rate of growth of money arises and at a 10% rgm,
As is far from a near-random walk behaviour. Figure 4.3 visualises these
effects.
persistence
Figure 4.3: Persistence as a Function of the Steady State Rate of Money
Growth
To understand this result now look at the other parameters of Taylor's
wage setting rule (4.15). bi refers to the backward-looking variables, while
d, to the forward-looking ones; the subscripts 4 and 5 respectively refer to
the nominal wage and to output. As the rgm increases, the b's decrease
and the d's increase: the higher the rgm, the higher the weights on the
forward-looking variables, and the lower the persistence. In other words, a
high rate of underlying inflation causes Taylor's wage rule to collapse into a
pure forward-looking equation where only the future variables are taken into
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account: the inertia due to the backward-looking behaviour in Taylor's rule
vanishes, and so does persistence.
This striking finding raises a number of interesting points.
(i) It demonstrates that, once microfoundations are taken into account,
the importance of non-linearity becomes evident and can no longer be ne-
glected. The response of the system to a money shock heavily depends on
the starting point, that is on the underlying rate of inflation, in a non-linear
manner. The ad hoc log-linear models are therefore quite misleading.3°
(ii) The previous point is very much related to the famous Lucas critique.
As Sargent puts it: "Robert E. Lucas (1976) criticised a range of econometric
policy evaluation procedures because they used models that assumed private
agents' decision rules to be invariant with respect to the laws of motion that
they faced. Those models took as structural [....1 private agents' decision
[...and] violated the principle that an optimal decision rule h(x) is a function
of the law of motion g(x t , u t , E t)." (Sargent (1987), pp. 40-41) Once the
model is microfounded and the fully optimising decision process of the agents
is explicitly taken into account, the policy behaviour enters the ad hoc struc-
tural parameters. And that occurs in a clear and intuitive way in this model.
A high underlying rate of inflation would demolish the inertia in the system,
3°This is particularly important when transitional dynamics between two different steady
states are analysed, as in the previous chapter. Note however, that a log-linear approxi-
mation seemed to be quite accurate as we concluded in Appendix 3.7.3.
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making of Taylor's wage setting equation a pure forward looking one. Quite
a large number of researchers have suggested that fixed staggered contracts
represent a good approximation of reality only in economies displaying fairly
stable prices. On the basis of the Lucas critique, they observed that contracts
would not survive in an environment without stable prices simply because
agents would take that into account and adjust their behaviour. This is ex-
actly what the present analysis suggests. Parameters are policy-dependent
such that a high rate of underlying inflation would actually make the con-
tracts irrelevant, dramatically changing the way they are set and reducing
Taylor's wage setting equation to a purely forward looking one.
(iii) Following further the Lucas critique argument, one would expect that
a higher level of average inflation would shorten the length of the contracts.
Since the latter is fixed by hypothesis, this is not possible in the model.
However intuition strongly suggests it would happen if the model allowed for
that. This is in line with the intuition of Ball et al. (1988). Ball et al. (1988)
suggested that high inflation lubricates the frictions in price adjustment.
The higher is the inflation rate, the more often firms adjust their prices to
keep up with the price level, so the faster the adjustment in the aggregate
price level and the smaller the real effects following an aggregate demand
disturbance. This would imply a negative relation between the real effects of
aggregate demand disturbances and the average level of inflation. Ball et al.
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(1988) tested this implication and they concluded: "A robust finding is that
this trade-off is affected by the average rate of inflation. In countries with
low inflation, the short-run Phillips curve is relatively flat - fluctuations in
nominal aggregate demand have large effects on output. In countries with high
inflation, the Phillips curve is steep". (Ball et al. (1988), p. 59) Our model
has the same empirical implication and, as explained above, the intuition
is somewhat similar. Recall that Taylor's model implies that the slope of
the Phillips curve is inversely related to X. Then, the higher is the rate
of average inflation, the more forward looking is Taylor's wage setting rule,
the lower As and the steeper the Phillips curve. "Traditional Keynesian
models, such as textbook models of price adjustment or the staggered contracts
models of Fischer and Taylor, do not share the key predictions of our model.
These older theories treat the degree of nominal rigidity (for example, the
length of labor contracts or the adjustment speed of the price level) as fixed
parameters; thus they rule out the channel through which average inflation
affects the output-inflation trade-off." (Ball et al. (1988), p. 29) Instead,
we were able to show that, once microfoundations are explicitly considered,
the adjustment speed of labour contracts do depend upon average inflation.
Thus, the Lucas critique goes through even if the length of the contracts is
fixed by hypothesis. We are however aware that a more satisfactory model
should allow for changes in the length of the contracts.
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(iv) West (1988) simulates Taylor's model under different monetary policy
rule for given values of the structural parameters of the wage equation. Given
the above results, one may question the theoretical validity of analyses such
as those carried out in West (1988). The structural parameters are not policy
invariant. It would be very interesting to study how these parameters and
persistence vary as different feedback monetary policy rules are implemented.
(v) By the same token, the model suggests an explanation for Phaneuf's
(1990) empirical finding that, across countries, higher values of are asso-
ciated with a higher degree of monetary accommodation. This is because
it is probably reasonable to think that countries more prone to accommo-
date monetary shocks are also those more likely to display relatively higher
underlying inflation.
(vi) Moreover, this suggests a further interpretation. There is a widely
confirmed positive relationship between average inflation and the variance of
nominal output. It seems that countries exhibiting low inflation rates are
strictly controlling their monetary policy and will seldom be affected by sub-
stantial monetary shocks. Therefore, staggered contracts could potentially
induce a fairly high degree of persistence only when a monetary shock is
unlikely to occur. In other words, staggered contracts could generate high
persistence of monetary shocks only when the staggering structure does not
matter, since monetary policy is tightly controlled.
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Before concluding a final remark follows. From proposition 4.4, we know
that, when rgm ,---- 0, -y = 2 (g + 1- =°A. The hypothesis a = 1, implicit
in Taylor's analysis, actually induces, ceteris paribus, the maximum degree
of persistence in our model since g < 1. Is this hypothesis the best one?
Probably not. In fact, the analysis is concerned with short-run adjustment.
Labour is the only input in the production function. It is therefore sensible
to interpret the production function as a reduced form of a short-run Cobb-
Douglas one, in which capital is simply fixed and embodied in the constant
term. Following this interpretation, then calibrated studies would suggest
the labour's share of national income, i.e., 0.7, to be a good approximation
for a. But as the formula at the beginning of the paragraph shows, 7 and
hence As tends to be particularly sensitive to a. In fact, with constant steady
state money supply (i.e., Table 4.1), if a = 0.7, in the "base case" -y jumps to
1.37 and persistence falls to 0.19, while, in the case a = 0 and e = 1, -y rises
to 0.86 and persistence drops to 0.3. Moreover, the lower a, the lower the
sensitivity of the structural parameters of Taylor's equation to the underlying
rate of inflation (see Figure 4.4 and 4.5). If someone was puzzled about the
excessive sensitivity of these parameters to average inflation, then he will be
inclined to think a = 0.7 to be the relevant case.
To conclude, whatever sensible values one assigns to the parameters, ei-
ther a moderate rate of underlying inflation such as is observed in western
CHAPTER 4. STAGGERED WAGES AND PERSISTENCE	 161
persistence
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Figure 4.4: Persistence as a Function of the Steady State Rate of Money
Growth when o- = 0.7
economies, or a value of a equal to the share of labour in output, or both,
cut down persistence not only far below near random-walk behaviour, but
also below any level notably different from zero.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we used the dynamic general equilibrium model with opti-
mising agents and staggered wages a la Taylor (1979) developed in previous
chapters to look at the persistence of the real effects of money shocks. If, as
were West (1988) and Phaneuf (1990), we had been looking for results to cor-
roborate the view that staggered wage models could induce a high degree of
persistence of money shocks, the microfounded model does not seem to pro-
persistence
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Figure 4.5: Persistence as a Function of the Steady State Rate of Money
Growth and of °-
vide them. On the contrary, it confutes that view. The model demonstrates
that for a large range of reasonable parameter values a notable degree of per-
sistence is an unlikely outcome. Moreover, even for parameter values such
that the model generates persistence, a moderate rate of underlying inflation
cuts down persistence sharply. In conclusion, sensible values of the microeco-
nomic parameters and/or a moderate rate of underlying inflation such as we
observe in western economies cut down persistence not only far below near
random-walk behaviour, but also below any level notably different from zero.
Moreover,n through investigating the microeconomic fundamentals of the ad
hoc Taylor wage rule, the model emphasises the role of non-linearity and of
the Lucas critique. In brief, the model shows that staggered wages alone are
(
ni,c+ 5 
	
) (  ncr + 5  )
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not able to explain a significant degree of persistence of the real effects of
money shocks.
4.6 Appendix
Substitute in (4.12) Kt , as given by (1.15) and impose the equilibrium con-
dition Yt =- C. Then, log-linearising (4.12) around a steady state we obtain
xt 
-= alYt + aat+i + a3it + a4 /t+i + a5mt + a6m t±i + a7pt + a8pt±1 (4.30)
where now the variables are expressed as log-deviations from steady state
and where:
nw + e  )
a2 =- 0 { (  uL(t) ,(13 6 + 0
uL(t4-1)
a4 = 0 { ( 	 7ILL 	)p UL(t)	 E j_ 0
	
/L i, (t+1) -r	 1
(
77cc -1- fl  ) }
43,e-1 +/
(1)E-1 + 0
(  ncL  ) }
TILL 	 ( 	 71cl, 	 )
a3 = ( 1 ± outiv) 43,-E
	 1 +13(131-E
(4.32)
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Note that a l + a2 , a3 + a4 , a5 + a6 , a7 + a8 do not depend on (D.
Then from (1.15) we know that the amount of labour in each of the two
periods of the contract is given by: L it = KtXit E and L, t+ 1 = Kt+iXITE •
Substitute for K and express the variables as log-deviations, to obtain
lt 	 (E19)yt+E(pt— xt )	 and
	
lt+i = (6/ 19)Yt+i E(Pt+i — xt) (4.39)
Use these two expressions to substitute out labour in (4.30) and get
(4.40)x t = biPt + diPt+i b2yt + d2yt±1 + b3mt + d3rat±i
which is equation (4.13) in the main text and where
a7 + a3E
1 + s(a3 + a4)
b2 =
1 + E(a3 + a4)
a2 +
d2= 	
1 + E(a3 + a4)
a8 + a4E
di	 	1 + E(a3 + a4)
+ a35
(4.41)
a5b3 = 	
1 + e(a3 + a4) (4.45)
asd3 =
1 + E(a3
 + a4) (4.46)
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Proof of Proposition 4.1.
-_, 0 and ac,m/P = actaa2ZP)ta2u(t) If uL,m/P --=--- aLta(m/P), 0, then ric, mip =
ihol/p = 0 and then a5 = a6 == b3 = d3 = 0 and real balances do not appear
in (4.13) and (4.15).
Proof of proposition 4.2.
Since al + a2 , a3 + al , as + as , a7 ± as do not depend on 43, then it
follows immediately that the same holds for b 1 + d1 , b2 + d2 , b3 + d3 . Thus
ni,c--ncc-1-(E/0)(nr,r,-,-/cL) simple algebra shows that b 1 + di. = 1 , b2 + d2 = g 1-1-6(7LL-ncL)
ni„mip-iic,mip b3 + d3 =- i+E(nLL-ricL) '
Proof of proposition 4.3.
Recall the definition of cI3 t : 4:1> t -= Mt _ i /Mt , that is the rate of decrease
of money supply in t. The parameters of the log-linearised equations must
be evaluated in a steady state, that is, (I3 t is constant for all t. Supposing
the ratio uLuL(7-01)  remain limited as (I.
 goes to zero or infinity. Then the result
follows.
Proof of proposition 4.4.
If money supply is constant in steady state, then (I) is equal to one. As we
know from Chapter 2, all of the nominal variables are constant in steady state,
too. The level of output is therefore the same in each sectors and constant
and
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over time, in steady state. Hence also the amount of labour supplied by the
households of the two sectors is the same and constant over time. Then,
uL (t+i) = 1 Given that, substitute (I) =UL(t)
	 •
and the result follows.
uL(t+i) 
= 1 in the above expressionsUL(t)
Chapter 5
Relative Wage Concern: The
Missing Piece in the Contract
Multiplier?
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have cast serious doubts on the explanatory power
of staggered wage setting in accounting for output persistence. Chari et al.
(1996) (CKM henceforth) have done the same for a price staggering model. In
other words, it seems that, once embedded in a dynamic general equilibrium
framework, staggered wage/price model cannot generate what Taylor called
167
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the "contract multiplier" .1
However, this is a fundamental issue for any monetary DGE macromodel:
any theoretical interpretation of the business cycle assigning a serious role
to monetary disturbances must allow for substantial persistence of the real
effects of money shocks to mimick actual data. Persistence of the real effects
of money shocks requires endogenous stickiness in the sense that price-setting
agents choose not to change their prices/wages by a large amount when they
reset them.
This chapter reconsiders the existence of a contract multiplier. We we
will argue that the wage setting process is better represented as the result
of the combination of small nominal and real rigidities, in contrast with the
simpler approach of the previous chapter or of Chari et al. (1996).
Some contributions have already highlighted that the combination of
small nominal rigidities and real rigidities has the potential to generate
endogenous stickiness (Ball and Romer (1990), Blanchard (1990), Romer
(1996), Jeanne (1998)), and consequently output persistence. Here we in-
vestigate that conjecture. Our source of real rigidity in the labour market
arises from an explicit account of relative real wage concern in the bargaining
process. We review below some strong empirical evidence pointing at relative
'In Taylor's (1980a, p.2) words: "In effect, each contract is written relative to other
contracts, and it causes shocks to be passed on from one contract to another — a sort of
"contract multiplier".
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wages as a fundamental factor in the wage setting process. As we stressed
several times in this thesis, Taylor's model was thought to incorporate a
"Keynesian" component of relative wage concern on the part of the workers.
However, his model is analytically equivalent to one in which workers are
("neoclassically"), only concerned about the level of their own real wages
(see Buiter and Jewitt (1981), Blanchard (1990) and Chapter 4). Relative
wage concern considerations have been therefore left out of the analysis so
far. That omission seems to be a serious weakness of the contracting speci-
fication assumed in Taylor's model, as Buiter and Jewitt (1981) suggest. In
a recent contribution very related to ours, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) (FM
henceforth) have also pointed to the lack of inflation persistence generated
by Taylor's staggering wage model as a major empirical failure arising from
the contracting scheme assumed in the model.
Our analytical framework is based on the model of the previous chapters.
It is thus kept as close as possible to those of the previous studies which have
highlighted the weaknesses of the Taylor contracting specification, namely
CKM, FM and Chapter 4. By incorporating relative wage concern we aim at
enriching the analysis of wage-setting with respect to those studies. More-
over, we try to capture the spirit of the original work by Taylor since it was
(arguably) aimed at considering relative wage considerations. We then as-
sess the analytical and quantitative importance of staggered wage setting on
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output and inflation persistence in our model.
The quantitative version of the model provides strong support for the
existence of a substantial contract multiplier. Two features of the model
strengthen the importance of our result. First, the wage contracting specifi-
cation is the only mechanism through which the effects of nominal shocks are
propagated in our model. We refrain from introducing capital accumulation,
adjustment costs, endogenous mark-ups, or any other possible factor which
enhances the nominal propagation mechanism derived here. Second, as in
previous analyses of staggered wage setting, our results also highlight the po-
tential role of high intertemporal elasticities of substitution of consumption
and labour supply in favoring persistence, but by no means rely on them to
generate a substantial degree of persistence. This latter point is evident from
our "conservative" parameter choices in the calibration exercise. Notwith-
standing these features of the model, we find that output persistence is a
likely outcome.
We also provide analytical results that highlight the intuition behind the
sharp contrast between our results and those of the recent literature. We
log-linearise our wage setting equation around the steady state and compare
it to those of CKM and Chapter 4. The key difference is the elasticity of
wages with respect to business cycle conditions. In our model, relative wage
concern on the part of workers lowers that sensitivity. A sensible calibration
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of the parameters governing relative wage considerations generates a power-
ful contract multiplier and thus substantial persistence in both inflation and
output.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2 we
present some empirical evidence and our formalisation of relative wage con-
cern on the part of wage-setters. Our benchmark economy is presented in
section 5.3. We study the analytical implications of relative wage concern
in section 5.4, and compare our findings to previous studies of staggered
wage/price models. We then proceed to analyse the quantitative implica-
tions. Section 5.5 describes the calibration of the model and reports our
simulation results. Those results are complemented by the sensitivity analy-
sis carried out in Section 5.6. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 The Case for Relative Wage Concern
The existence of relative wage concern on the part of workers/ relative com-
parisons has a long tradition in economics, starting from Adam Smith (1976).
However, the most influential account of relative wage concern and its impli-
cations came undoubtedly from John Maynard Keynes (1936) (p.14):
Though the struggle over money-wages between individuals and
groups is often believed to determine the general level of real wages, it
is, in fact, concerned with a different object. Since there is imperfect
mobility of labour, and wages do not tend to an exact equality of net
advantage in different occupations, any individual or group of individ-
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uals, who consent to a reduction of money-wages relatively to others,
will suffer a relative reduction in real wages, which is sufficient jus-
tification for them to resist it. [..] In other words, the struggle about
money-wages primarily affects the distribution of the aggregate real
wage between different labour groups, and not its average amount per
unit of employment, [...] . The effect of combination on the part of a
group of workers is to protect their relative real wage.2
Relative wage concern is not a new topic for more recent economic lit-
erature either. Relative wage considerations have recently been introduced
with reference to fair wage determination and the impact on effort and un-
employment (Frank (1984), Summers (1988), Akerlof and Yellen (1990)). In
this chapter, we instead focus on the implications of relative wage concern
for the wage setting process and the contract multiplier.
5.2.1 Some Empirical Evidence
Labour economists long ago pointed out the interdependence between trade
union's wage claims as a stylized fact in the bargaining process. Union "rival-
ry" and inter-union "jealousy" have been studied in Oswald (1979), Gylfason
and Lindbeck (1984), Risager (1992), among many others. Furthermore, in
recent years a new source of empirical evidence has received considerable
attention by economists: surveys on self-reported levels of satisfaction of
workers, which already form the fundamental material of study for a large
empirical literature in social psychology. Such data has been used as proxy
for utility data. 3 Capelli and Sherer (1988) use data from a major U.S. airline;
2 Emphasis is as in the original.
3 As pointed out by Clark and Oswald (1996a), footnote 4: "It might be argued, in the
extreme, that these are random numbers merely made up by survey respondents. Psycholo-
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Clark and Oswald (1996a) from the British Household Panel Survey. Both
studies report measures of the importance of relative wages for individual
workers. Their results:
(i) point to "market" relative wages as the fundamental factor (and sta-
tistically strongly significant on regressions of job satisfaction) for individual
workers
(ii) more surprisingly, the level of the own real wage/income plays a minor
role, if any at all. Moreover, its coefficient is found statistically insignificant.
This finding provides strong support for utility functions that allow for rela-
tivities in wage setting.
Risager (1992) found also strong evidence in his investigation of the wage
rivalry hypothesis using Danish data for skilled and unskilled workers. His
analysis of wage setting behaviour:
(ii) identifies a very strong "following" behaviour in wage setting;4
(iii) finds the level of unemployment/business cycle conditions statisti-
cally insignificant.'
gists, who are at least as aware of this possibility as economists, have long since abandoned
such a view."
4 "There is a high degree of wage interdependence, even in the short term. The reaction
function for skilled men shows that the wage for skilled men increases by 5.8% in response
to a 10% wage increase for unskilled men. Unskilled men's reaction function shows a
124% wage increase in response to a 10% wage increase for skilled men" (Risager (1992),
p. 550-551).
5 ". . . has the persistently high unemployment exerted a direct downward pressure on real
wages? The answer is negative since both the current and lagged unemployment rates are
highly insignificant in the two wage equations. To ,find out whether unemployment has a
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Moreover, Campbell and Kamlani (1997) (Table II) report results from
other studies which suggest that relative wage concern is very significant in
heavily unionized firms (Age11 and Lundborg (1995)). Individual survey data
reported above also provide a strong justification for the behaviour of unions
from the personal preferences of their potential members.
5.2.2 Relative Real Wage Concern and Staggered Wage
Setting
The structure of wage setting in the model is defined by two features: (i)
staggered wage setting; (ii) relative real wage concern.
(i) Staggered Wage Setting'
Wage contracts, denoted by X, are negotiated in nominal terms. The
economy is divided into N distinct sectors. Each sector is composed of 1/N
industries (indexed by i) and their corresponding unions (indexed by j).
Contracts specify the nominal wages that will be held fixed for N periods.
That is, for a union setting the nominal wage in period t, Xjt+k = Xit
for k = 0, ...N — 1. Furthermore, unions indexed j E [0,1/N] set their wages
in periods 0, N, 2N, unions indexed j E [1/N, 2/N] do so in periods 1, N+ 1,
2N+1, etc. Note that complete symmetry among households is broken by the
fact that in each of the sectors the wage is set in a staggered and overlapping
fashion. However, unions belonging to the same sector will set the same
temporary effect, we included the current and lagged rate of change in unemployment
but both variables are highly insignificant." (Risager (1992), p. 553)
6 This is just a generalisation of the staggering structure of the model in previous
chapters.
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wage. 7 Crucial to the interpretation of the model is the idea that in any
period t there are N different contracts in effect. The existing contracts can
be indexed by "j", because each sector sets its wage in a specific period.
(ii) Relative Real Wage Concern
Taylor's model was originally thought to incorporate a "Keynesian" com-
ponent of relative wage concern on the part of the workers. However, as
demonstrated in the previous chapter, his model is analytically equivalent to
a model in which workers are "neoclassically" concerned only about the level
of their real wages. Instead, relative wage considerations seem to be a fun-
damental part of the story in the wage setting process. Then, two questions
are of primary interest: (i) how to introduce relative wage concern on the
part of workers in the model; (ii) the definition of what actually households
compare.
With respect to the first question, we model relative wage concern by
including an additional argument in the utility function of the representa-
tive household. This approach runs against the deeply-rooted resistence to
modifying the structure of preferences of agents. 8 Similar kind of preferences
7 Let us call the new wage set in period t in industries i E [0, 1IN] , X. Then, unions
indexed j E [1/N, 2/N] will set their new nominal wage in period t + 1, unions indexed
j E [2/N, 3/N] will set their new nominal wage in period t + 2, and so on. There-
fore Xt ,Xt-i-N,Xt+2N ...are the wages fixed by the sector which comprises industries i
E [0, lin Xt+i , Xt±i±N, Xt+ 1 +2N ...the wages fixed by the sector that comprises indus-
tries i e [1/N, 2/N] and so on.
8 As Akerlof (1997, p. 1005) puts it: "Traditional economics has been based on method-
ological individualism. Until quite recently, with some rare exceptions, it has not been
appreciated that this method can be, or perhaps I should say, should be, extended in de-
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have been recently proposed as an explanation for some puzzles in asset pric-
ing (Abel (1990), Gali (1994), Campbell and Cochrane (1995)), consumption
(Carrol and Weil (1994)), and growth (Carrol et al. (1997)). 9 More gener-
ally, in recent years a growing literature has emerged encompassing economic
and social elements, and in particular status concern (see Frank (1984, 1985)
and references therein, Baxter (1988), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Clark and
Oswald (1996a,b) or Akerlof (1997)). Nevertheless, despite the available
empirical evidence on unions' behaviour, and sociological and psychological
considerations, it can be seen as an ad hoc unjustifiable short-cut. However,
the purpose of this chapter is to consider the implications of relative wage
concern for output and inflation persistence in a DGE framework. By intro-
ducing relative wage considerations explicitly we aim at: (i) an unambiguous
identification of the analytical implications; (ii) establishing whether sensi-
ble values of the key parameters governing relative wage concern can explain
output and inflation persistence.
Second, with respect to the definition of the reference wage, we denote the
relative wage argument in the utility function of the representative household-
union j, RWt i . Following FM', we define the contract price in period s, C ,
scribing social decisions to include dependence of individuals' utility on the utility or the
actions of others. Except under rare circumstances, such interactions produce externali-
ties." (Emphasis is as in the original.)
9 Depending on the particular specification they are referred to as "interdependent
preferences", "external habit formation", "Keeping up (or catching up) with the Joneses"
or "relative income hypothesis".
"'In what follows we keep the notation as close as possible to that of FM. Our definition
of the cases B and C below also follows theirs. We present a brief comparison of our model
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as the value of the contract signed by the union j in period s. To clarify the
definitions note that in this subsection we use the index t to refer to the
period in which the comparison takes place. s instead refers to the period
in which the contract is signed. Recall that for a union setting the nominal
wage in period s, Xs-Fk = Xs for k = 0, ...N — 1. Workers compare the value
of the contract they sign in period s, that is C Ps , to the index of contract
prices, V. Crucial to the modelling of the relative wage concern is the choice
of the reference wage index for comparison purposes. We define Vt as the
average of the contract prices of the workers in the other sectors in effect in
period t, that is, the average of the contracts negotiated by the other unions.
We believe that "outward comparison" specification to be the most relevant
in the real world.' Thus, RWt 3 is defined as the ratio between the value of
the contract signed by union j and still valid in t to the index of contract
prices in the relevant period t.
Because of staggering, at any period t there are N different contracts in
effect, therefore N different CP, and N different RWii , one for each repre-
sentative sectorial union. To highlight the mechanism through which relative
real wage concern will influence wage setting, consider the problem faced by a
union that sets the nominal wage in period t. Assume that the contract lasts
for four periods (N = 4). The decision of the union then takes into account
with FM's one in Section 5.4.3.
"The term "outward comparison" follows a recent work by Carrol et al. (1997), and
it is employed to highlight the absence of the representative individual's variables in the
definition of the reference stock for comparison purposes. Specifically, in our setting "our
contract price" does not enter the index of contract prices to which it is compared in the
bargaining process.
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that by setting X,, it also fixes CP, for the next four periods (hence, we have
indexed it by s). The optimal X, is thus set by comparing the current price
contract the union is negotiating (that is CPS ) to the indexes of real contract
prices V for periods t to t + 3. The RW the workers will face in period t and
in the following three periods as a result of the wage they are negotiating are
then given by
RW =	 (1/3)(CP.--a 
CP
+CP8 ,-2+CP1) ; 	1t+1(VG:P±i = 1/3 (CP„_2+CCE.P.„_id-CP,+i)
T,vj	 (CPs) = 
	
CP,	 CP, D
i+2
	 V,-1-2
	 1/3 (CP,—i+CP.-Fid-CP,±2),• RW4-3	 (eL+3 = 1/3 (CP,H-H-CP„±2-FCP,.+3) •
Note that, because of the "outward comparison" specification, the Vt
terms are not just updated symmetrically in the four periods of duration of
the contract.12
To fully explore the implications of relative wage concern, we consider
three different definitions of the value of a contract and hence of RW. We
also drop the distinction between the indexes s and t introduced before for
explanatory purposes. We highlight the differences on the RWti faced by the
union j arising from the three cases so we also drop the superscript j.
Case A: Current Value Relative Real Wage Concern
12 Future variables are replaced by their expected values. We drop the expectation
operator for convenience. Note also that the RW terms are different for each household-
union in different cohorts, depending on the period in which they set their wage.
Xt
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In this case agents compare the real wage they earn in period t with the
average of the real wages earned by the other workers in period t. Thus
all the nominal wages are deflated by the same price index Pt . It follows
that the price level cancels out in the definition of RWt and we are left only
with nominal wages. Hence, in every period the wage-setters behave as if
comparing their "money wage" with the average "money wage" of the other
sectors. Therefore,
CPt =- Xt ; RWt = (1/3)(X_3
 + Xt-2 Xt-1) •
Case B: Simplified Relative Real Wage Concern
Workers care about the relative real wage unions manage to attain in the
negotiation period. CP is therefore defined as the money wage deflated only
by the aggregate price level in the period the wage was negotiated, that is13
Xt 	 Xt/Pt CPt = — • RWt =
Pt '
	 (1/3)	 xt_2	 xt-1)I Pt-3	 Pt-2	 Pt-1
13 Suppose a union negotiates in period t and succeeds to get a real wage Xt IPt in period
t. Then, in the next period, i.e., t+1, another union will negotiate a new wage. This union
does not want to leave the negotiation table with a real wage for that period lower than the
one negotiated last period by the previous union. In other words, the real wage the unions
obtain in the negotiation is seen by the members as a sign of their bargaining power. This
approach to the wage bargaining process implies a degree of myopic behaviour from the
union since the wage contract lasts four periods. Even if theoretically unsatisfactory, this
behavioural hypothesis: (i) could be interpreted as a simplified case of the one considered
below; (ii) it is probably not far from actual unions' behaviour.
CHAPTER 5. RELATIVE WAGE CONCERN AND PERSISTENCE 180
Case C: Theoretically Preferable Relative Real Wage Concern
In this case we suppose that the workers are concerned with their average
real wage over the life of the contract. Accordingly C P is defined as the
money wage deflated by a weighted average of the price level in the four
periods in which the contract lasts. Hence: CPt = Xt/Pt , where Pt =
Pt-FRPt + +02 Pt+2 +03 Pt . Agents therefore calculate the average Pt discounting1+0+02+03
the future price levels by the preference discount factor 0. They then compare
the value of their contract, i.e. CPt , with an average of the ones that overlap
with it.
Xt 	 Xt/Pt 
Xt-1
CPt
 = ; RWt =
Pt (1/3)	 -3 + _Xt-2 
Pt-3	 Pt-2	 Pt-1
To sum up, in Case A workers are comparing their real wage period by
period, in Case B they compare the real wage they manage to attain at the
time they negotiated it and in Case C they compare their real wage over the
whole life of the contract.
5.3 The Benchmark Economy
The model is based on the framework of the previous chapters. There are
three types of agents in the economy: firms, households and the government.
The economy consists of a continuum of industries indexed by i E [0,1], and
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a continuum of industry specific unions." Every industry produces a perish-
able product and comprises a continuum of firms. Hence the goods market
in every industry is competitive. All households have the same preferences.
Household j consumes a composite good, defined by a CES index over con-
9
1	 61-1
sumption goods of each industry, i.e. Cit = [fo C34 di	 . The elasticity
of substitution among goods, 0, is assumed strictly greater than one. This
specification gives rise to the following demand function
Pit] °Ejt
C =jit  [—Pt 	 Pt
where E3 t is household's total nominal expenditure on goods, and Pt is the
i-.aggregate price index defined as Pt = [fo Pi ot di] 1_0
5.3.1 Firms
All firms have the same technology, given by Ytt = aLcL, where labour is
the only factor of production. We refrain from introducing capital into the
model, because we want to focus on the degree of persistence of the real
effects of money shocks induced by our relative-wage-concern contracting
scheme. 15 Firms within each industry are price takers both in the goods
14 Since there is a continuum of industries, no union is 'large' relative to the economy as
a whole.
"Capital  accumulation alone, however, has been shown to be a very weak propagation
mechanism (see Cogley and Nason (1995)). On the other hand, a recent contribution by
(5.1)
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and in the labour market. Hence firms maximise profits period by period
given the nominal wage Xit , set by the industry-specific union. The labour
demand and output of firm i are given by
1
Lit =
1 Xit[ g-1
7	 Yit (5.2)G7 Pit
1 Xit]
au -rit
Imposing the equilibrium condition in the goods market, given by
Cit = f Cdj = Yit	 Vi E [0,1], (5.3)
yields the following relation between the labour demand and the nominal
wage
[  Et  ]7'9.Lit = Kt XiT E where E = 	  and Kt
 = gE
+ (1 + C7)9	 1901-0rt
(5.4)
This is the constant money-wage elasticity labor demand function faced by
the monopolistic household-union in industry i. The elasticity is equal to E
which depends on technology and preference parameters. K t is parametric
to the union which takes aggregate variables as given, since industry i is of
measure zero in the economy as a whole.
Andersen (1998b) suggests that the combination of staggered nominal wage contracts and
real propagation mechanisms such as capital accumulation could substantially enhance
persistence.
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5.3.2 Households
The two fundamental features of the households' behaviour are: first, their
monopoly power in nominal wage setting, and second, their relative wage
concern.
The industry-specific household-unions enjoy monopoly power because
labour is not allowed to move across industries. In period t the household
maximises a utility function of the form
00
Ok Et [U (Ct+k (Mt+I c Pt+k) 7 Lt+k, RWt+01
	
(5.5)
k=o
The arguments in the utility function Ct+k,
	
Pt+k and Lt+k, are respec-
tively the consumption of the composite good, the end-of-period real money
balances and the labour supply of the households. The utility function sat-
isfies the standard conditions ue( . ) > 0, Um/ p( • ) > 0, ud . ) < 0, u) < 0,
um/p,m/P(•) < 0, uLL (•) < 0, where 74(0 denotes the first partial deriva-
tive of the instantaneous utility function and u„( . ) the second, with respect
the argument r. The specification of the relative wage argument RWt±k has
been discussed in Section 5.2.2. The utility function satisfies u Rw > 0,
uRwRw (•) < 0. The purpose of the chapter is to study the effects of the
introduction of relative wage concern in the utility function, on inflation and
above all output persistence.
The choice variables for the household are the level of consumption, the
quantities of money and bonds it will transfer to next period and the level of
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the nominal wage that must be fixed for N periods. The household's budget
constraint evolves according to
PiCit + Mit+
	 Q(st+i s t )Bi(s t+i ) < m-jt_1 + Bit + witLit + Hit + Tit
st+i
(5.6)
where Q (st+1 S t ) is the stochastic discount factor equal to the money value of
a contingent claim in state s t
 to one dollar in state st+1.16 M3 t denotes money
holdings at the end of period t, Bit the quantity of bonds in period t, Tit the
nominal lump-sum transfer received by the household from the government,
Hjt the profits distributed by firms and Li t Wit the labour income. Each
household maximises its expected lifetime utility subject to the sequence of
budget constraints (5.6), the sequence of labour demand curves (5.4), and
the additional constraint that the nominal wage will be fixed for N periods.
The first order conditions for this problem can be expressed as follows (the
index j is dropped to lighten notation),
UM/p(t)	 Rt —1
uc,(t)	 Rt
16 Following CKM, let s t denote the state of the world in period t. Denote with pr(st+1
s t ) the probability that in the next period the state of the world will be s t+1 , conditional to
the state st in period t. To lighten notation and avoid indexing each variable with respect
the state of the world, we use the expectation operator and the dating of the variables.
Then, e t --= 0(8 t ) and E t (6 k ) Es, Pr (skst )e(8k ), where e is whatever variable ort
function of variables, s k is the state in period k > t and the sum is calculated on all the
possible future states sk.
(5. 7)
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u,c(t) = ORtEt (UC(t " 
Pt-I-1	 )
E Q(St+1 I st) OEt(At+1)	
(
=E CC 't 1)Pt	 1
st±i	 At	 uc(t)Pt±i	 Rt
(5.8)
(5.9)
Xt -
E  )1 Et-1[E,=,
-1 HuL(t+r)Kt+,1N r [-luRw (t r) aRwg+1
or(uc(t+r)Ke+, Et-1 [2_ar Pt+r
(5.10)
—	 Et-1 [Lar=ovnN-1 (uc(t+r)Kt+r)]Pt+,E 1
where A t is the multiplier attached to the budget constraint in period t.
The first three equations are standard: (5.7) represents the optimal choice
between consumption and money; (5.8) is the Euler equation for consumption
and (5.9) gives the gross nominal interest rate Rt.17
Equation (5.10) gives the optimal nominal wage set by the monopolistic
household-union for N periods. Firstly, note that we assume the wage to be
set before the realisation of period t shock, hence based on t — 1 information
set. The optimal wage is given by a fixed mark-up — 1) over the quantity
in the curly brackets. That expression is composed of two terms. The first
term represents a ratio between expected weighted averages of the marginal
disutility of labour and the marginal utility of consumption over N periods.
17 Note that Est+, Q(st+i I so) is the current value of a nominal bond that gives one
unit of money for sure in the next period. On the other hand, Q( st+i st) =. /3 pr(s t-1-1 I
ur L4-, )is the current price of a claim of one unit of money contingent on thest i (uc ( (OsP ( 1s'+)P' )
realisation of state st+1 in the next period.
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In other words, the first component is a weighted average of the optimal
flexible wages of the N periods, exactly as in the model of the previous
chapter Oust generalised for N periods, instead of only two). The second term
is an expected weighted average of the relative wage concern components over
the N periods. In other words, now we have this extra term in the optimal
wage rule with respect to the model in the previous chapters. This latter
term is positive; hence, a relative wage concern on the part of the workers
tends to increase their wage. 18 In both terms the weights are defined by
Kt+„ Pt+, and E."
18 Indeed, it will turn out that the steady state money (real) wage of this model is higher
that the steady state money (real) wage of the same model, but without a relative-wage
term in the utility function (that is, the model of the previous chapters).
"It is probably worth noting again that, given (5.10), it is ex-post optimal for the unions
to satisfy an unexpected increase in labour demand. Unions are obviously ex-post willing
to satisfy extra demand for labour until the real wage is equal to the competitive one. In
what follows we suppose that never to be the case. The fact that employment is always
on the labour demand curve is hence consistent with optimisation in this case, in contrast
to the old style Gray-Fischer-Taylor models in which the wage was set in accordance with
a target level that cleared the labour market in expectation.
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5.3.3 Government
The role of the government is limited to providing lump-sum transfers through
which money is introduced in the economy. These transfers satisfy
Tt = Mt - Mt-1
	
(5.11)
and the nominal money supply process is described by
Mt =	 (5.12)
where /i t follows a stochastic process (to be specified below).
The resource constraint for this economy is obtained by aggregating (5.6)
over all households and imposing equilibrium conditions on the money and
bond market
1
Pt Citdj <	 ( WjtLjt Ilit)dj	 (5.13)
while the equilibrium condition on goods markets (5.3) implies
1 
PtCitdi = f PtYitdi = PtYt	 (5.14)
— 
fol Pit Yiediwhere Yt 	 = Ct is real aggregate output, defined as in nationalPt
income accounting.
An equilibrium for this economy is described by a vector of allocations
Pt, Yt, Rt, Q( st+1 1 st)} for k = 0,	 N — 1{Cj t, Mi t, Bit, Xt—k, Lj t, Yit, Pit,
such that: (i) taking other sectors' variables and aggregate variables as given,
consumer allocations solve the consumer's problem Vj, that is, (5.7), (5.8),
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(5.9) and (5.10) hold Vj; (ii) taking the nominal wage as given, firms' output
and labour demand maximise profits according to (5.2) and (5.4); (iii) the
transfers and the money supply process satisfy (5.11) and (5.12); (iv) the
resource constraint (5.13) and the goods market equilibria ((5.3) and (5.14))
are satisfied.
To solve for the dynamics, we first calculate the steady state of the model.
We then apply the standard Blanchard and Kahn (1980) methodology to the
log-linearised model around the steady state, using GAUSS codes. Some
details on the solution and the GAUSS codes for Case C are provided in the
Appendix 5.8.
5.4 Analytical Implications of Relative Wage
Concern
5.4.1 The "7-puzzle"
The literature building upon the original works by Taylor (1979, 1980a) has
focused on the ability of the "contract multiplier" induced by staggered wage-
setting to propagate monetary shocks and mimic the persistence properties
exhibited by US. data. As we know already from the previous chapter, those
models can be summarised by a wage setting equation, a price level equation
and a static aggregate demand equation, that is
CHAPTER 5. RELATIVE WAGE CONCERN AND PERSISTENCE 189
1	 7
xt = -2 (pt + EtPt+i) + --(Etyt + EtYt+i)
1 ,
Pt = -2 xt + xt-i)
Yt = mt - Pt
We also know already that fluctuations of output will have a small impact
on prices if and only if the elasticity of wages with respect to output, Taylor's
-y, is low. For the US, Taylor (1980b) estimates -y to be between 0.05 and
0.1, while Sachs (1980) estimates it to be between 0.01 and 0.07. In his
numerical investigation of persistence properties of Taylor's (1980a) model,
West (1988) uses two possible values for 7: 0.01 and 0.1. More recently,
Phaneuf (1990) takes estimated values for -y for Canada, Germany, Italy,
UK and US. He finds -y to lie between 0 and 0.32 and hence Ambler and
Phaneuf (1992) calibrate -y = 0.15. Jeanne (1998) suggests that -y should
lie between 0.05 and 0.2. Furthermore, in an important recent contribution
from the labour literature, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), using microdata
from household statistics, provides estimates of the effects of unemployment
on wages in more than 10 countries. Their estimates are consistently around
-0.1. Therefore, the empirical literature suggests a value of -y around 0.1,
which is consistent with the existence of a contract multiplier.
As seen in the previous chapter, recent research on output persistence in-
corporates the staggered wage/price models into a DGE framework. Sound
microfoundations for the wage/price equation under staggering are then pro-
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vided, opening the "black box" of the ad hoc parameters. A log-linearisation
of the wage setting rule around a deterministic steady-state with constant
money supply (-g, = 1) and constant returns to scale (a- = 1) implies that the
fundamental parameter 7 depends on the labour supply decision. It is in turn
determined by the elasticities of the marginal utilities of consumption (with
respect to consumption) (77c)
evaluated at steady state. Given the existing evidence from microdata on
the intertemporal elasticities of substitution of consumption (-1/70 and of
labour supply (1/77L ), a sensible calibration of 7 gives a value too high to gen-
erate persistence. For example, in CKM a sensible calibration gives a value of
7> 1. In conclusion, the calibration of -y based on well-established microevi-
dence becomes incompatible with the empirical estimates from macrodata, as
we concluded in the previous chapter. This is what we called the "7-puzzle".
21) In this chapter we will use n s for the elasticity of the marginal utility of s with respect
to s, instead of ',Ls as in the previous chapter to lighten notation. Thus, for example,
now the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to consumption is
denoted by Tic instead of 7/cc as in the previous chapter. This is possible now since in
our analytical section we only consider additively separable utility functions and hence the
cross elasticities are zero.
20 and of labour (with respect to labour) (77L),
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5.4.2 Effects of Relative Wage Concern
Can the model with relative wage concern solve the "y-puzzle"? We argue
that this is the case. The intuition is as follows. A negative 71Rw causes a
"following" behaviour in wage setting by the agents. 21 Suppose there is a
negative shock to the rate of growth of money. Agents want to keep their real
wage in line with the existing ones. Under staggering, it generates a slower
adjustment in nominal variables, that is, a degree of endogenous stickiness,
which leads to persistence of the real effects of money shocks. Specifically,
relative real wage concern influences wage setting decisions by critically low-
ering the sensitivity of nominal variables to the business cycle conditions.
The following proposition formalises the intuition.
Proposition 5.1. Let the utility function be separable in all its argument
and the RWt term be a linear function of X. Then, log-linearising the
resulting wage setting rule around the steady-state with /7, = 1, the equivalent
in our model to Taylor's 7 is:22
71M/
Pit -17C {[L+,,n+cd (5.18)1.	 ErIL +1 [-	 uuLl';" 1()t )ce ll
1 — + E l I	 URW(.)	 11[	 +1 j NE UM.) Kt Xr
21 See Clark and Oswald (1996b).
22 With respect to the model of this chapter, this proposition is basically the equivalent
of proposition 4.4 and -y Rw corresponds to g in Chapter 4. The model of this chapter is
however closer to FM's one than to Taylor's one, as the next section shows (see 5.21 and
5.22).
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Therefore, -y kw is decreasing in the absolute value of nRw.
The first term in curly brackets in the numerator corresponds to the 7
arising simply from staggered wages, i.e., g in Chapter 4. In this model, it
is complemented by additional terms incorporating the marginal utility of
the relative wage term, URw (•), and its elasticity n„,,„. The inconsistency
of the microfounded wage setting equations and the empirical estimates can
then be resolved. The presence of (—n Rw ) increasing the denominator of
the expression is crucial. It lowers the sensitivity of wages to the business
cycle conditions, allows for endogenous stickiness and thus makes output
persistence a likely outcome. Its quantitative implications are the focus of
the remaining sections of this chapter.'
5.4.3 A Comparison with FM Specification
This section completes the description of the analytics of the model. Its
purpose is twofold. First, we discuss the log-linearisation of the money-wage
setting rule. Our log-linearised model is somehow close to the FM contract
specification. Hence, a brief comparison between the two specifications clari-
fies further the mechanisms at work in the model. Second, the log-linearised
specification of the wage-setting rule will play a fundamental role in the cal-
'Furthermore, it is worth noting that the effect of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution in labour supply, i.e. n L , is ambiguous.
EtPt+z + -
4 i=0i=0
3
,
Et (vt+i - CA) + —
4
1 . E Etyt±i
i=0
(5.20)
= a(c--1)[1+E(e-1)]-1bee	 A =	 r = a(E-1)[0-1-e(e-1)]-11,ee
a(6-1)	 a(e - 1) 7	 Oa(E-1)
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ibration of the parameters in Section 5.5.2.
We parameterise the instantaneous utility function as follows
1
u (C, —m L, RW) = -
v 
in [bCv
 + (1 - b) (—) - xL e +
1
	  (RW)1-7 .P 	- T
(5.19)
Note that the crucial	 is simply equal to —r.RW
A log-linearisation of (5.10) around the steady state with Ti = 1 and 0 = 1
yields
where lower case letters denote log-deviations from steady state values and
The intuition behind it can be easily explained. 24 CZ represents the weight
on the own real wage. F represents the sensitivity of the nominal wage with
respect to the business cycle conditions, exactly as in Taylor's model. A
captures the importance of relative wage concern. That term in the wage
setting rule is the novelty of the chapter. Traditional staggered wage models,
like Taylor (1980a), CKM and Chapter 4, impose A = 0.
Our log-linearised model is close to FM. Indeed, our model could be
thought as a microfounded version of their model. They present and estimate
2 `I For standard parameter values C2, A and F are non-negative.
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an ad hoc "...contracting model, in which agents are concerned with relative
real wages, that is data consistent" (FM, abstract). They suppose that agents
set nominal wages such that C P equals the average real contract price index
expected to prevail over the life of the contract, adjusted for excess demand
conditions. That is
3
cpt =	 fiEt(vt+, + 7Yt-Fi)	 (5.21)
They present two cases which correspond to our cases B and C in Section
5.2.2. In particular, in the theoretically preferable case (Case C in Section
5.2.2) equation (5.20) can be written as
3
1 A	 1
cp t = 	 	 Etvt+,
	
r
+ 	 	 EtYt+i
	
(5.22)
4 A + C2	 4 A + C2i=o
	 i=0
There are two important differences between our microfounded wage set-
ting equation and the ad-hoc one of FM. 25
 First, FM define the v t+, terms
as the average of the existing real contract prices including the real contract
price of the sector currently negotiating the wage. As explained in Section
5.2.2, we believe that our outward comparison better replicates actual rela-
tive wage concern. Second, the coefficient on the v t+, is not necessarily equal
to unity in our model, so one-to-one following behaviour is not imposed.
25 A third minor difference highlights the additional insights obtained from microfoun-
dations. FM impose the weights fi to be decreasing linearly and estimate the slope para-
meter. Instead, without imposing )3 = 1, in our model the equivalent to the fi terms are
decreasing and have a very intuitive interpretation: they depend naturally on the discount
factor 3 (similarly to d and b in the previous chapter).
3
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For equation (5.22) to match FM's formulation we need to impose CZ
0. This implies: (i) setting equal to zero the standard 'neoclassical' real
wage concern on the part of the workers; (ii) imposing a one-to-one following
behaviour in wage setting, since a 10% change in vt+, leads then to a 10%
change in CP.
5.5 Quantitative Implications of Relative Wage
Concern
5.5.1 Model Calibration
We assume that contracts last for four quarters (N = 4). The rate of growth
of money follows the stochastic process
in	 = p in pt_i + (1 - p) in 71 + et	 (5.23)
where is a normally distributed i.i.d. mean zero shock with standard devi-
ation a. Following CKM, we calibrate 71 = 1.061 and p = 0.57.26
Since households can exchange contingent claims, they perfectly insure
26 Since we are just interested in the persistence properties of the model, we actually
focus only on impulse response functions to money shocks. Hence, the standard deviation
of the rate of growth of money process does not play any role. In addition, in what
follows, we calibrate the model as closely as possible to CKM in order to make possible
the comparison with their results.
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themselves against fluctuations in income, pooling resources. Given that
households are ex-ante identical, they will therefore enjoy the same marginal
utility of consumption in every period. Given (5.19), they will enjoy the same
level of consumption and real money balances in each period. Moreover, given
(5.19), (5.7) implies the following money demand equation
ln ( Mt	 + ln Ct	 1  ln (	 )Rt 1 
TT) = 1 —1 7) in (1	 b)	 (5.24)1 u	 Rt
which is exactly the same as equation (43) in CKM. Following CKM, we
use Mankiw and Summers' (1986) money demand regressions, and obtain
v = —17.52 and b = 0.73.
The parameter e determines the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply
(1/77 L = 1/(e — 1)). Macurdy (1981) suggests e = 4.3, while most Pencavel's
(1986) estimations place e between 3.2 and infinity. We calibrate e = 6
(which implies a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour supply
of 0.2).
For the discount factor we choose the standard value from business cycle
literature, i.e. 3 = 0.961. We interpret our production function as a short-
run production function where the level of capital is fixed. Hence, the labour
share of output, i.e. a, is set equal to 0.67, as it is standard in this literature.
We calibrate 0 = 6, as Hairault and Portier (1993). 27 Finally we calibrate x
27 There is no parameter corresponding to our 9 in CKM. Since they use a CES function
as technology for producing final goods from intermediate goods, it follows that their CES
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such that the number of average aggregate hours of work in steady state is
equal to 1/3 and a (which is just a scaling factor) such that aggregate output
is equal to one.
5.5.2 Calibration of the Relative Wage Concern Para-
meters
Crucial for the analysis are the values of the parameters of the relative wage
concern argument in the utility function, i.e. b and T. To our knowledge,
there are no microestimates to be used as reference values for these parame-
ters in the labour literature.
Traditional staggered wage models (as Taylor (1980a), CKM or Chapter
4) impose A = 0. As said in 5.2.1, empirical evidence however suggests that
wage setting behaviour is better characterized by pure relative wage consid-
erations and strong following behaviour, with the level of absolute real wage
playing a minor role, if any at all. We therefore impose C2 = 0 and employ
the estimates in FM to calibrate and T. Specifically, looking at (5.22),
we use the constraint 2 = 0 to pin down '028 ; then use FM's estimate of -y
to determine T. The estimated value of -y in FM is 0.00109 for the theoret-
parameter is a technology parameter which gives the elasticity of substitution in input
demand.
28 Note that T enter only in the expression for A and not in the ones for C2 and F.
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ically preferable specification and 0.00435 for the simplified specification."
We obtain a value for 1,b of 0.76. 3° However the value of r implied by the
estimate of FM is sky-high, equal to 844!! With T = 844 the model generates
a ridiculous degree of persistence, as Figure 5.1 shows. The level of output
remains above its steady state value for more than 60 periods!!
Figure 5.1: Theoretically Preferable Relative Wage Concern. 1% Money
Shock: Output and Inflation. T = 843.9689, = 0.7588
29 These values are extremely low and only marginally significant. The t-ratio is 1.54
for the theoretically preferable specification and 2.3 for the simplified one. The results are
therefore in line with Risager (1992).
39 The steady state of the model imposes an upper bound on the value of //) equal to
//) 0.84, otherwise the nominal wage is negative.
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Preferences /3 = 0.961 ; v = —17.52 ; b = 0.73 ; 0 = 6 ; e = 6
Technology a = 0.67
Money Growth Process Ti = 1.061 ; p = 0.57
Relative Wage Concern = 0.76 ; 'T = 10.2
Table 5.1: Calibrated Parameter Values
FM estimates of -y are however substantially lower than the results in
the empirical literature discussed in Section 5.2.1 and 5.4.1. That literature
suggests a value around 0.1. We have shown in Section 5.4.2 that such value
is not in principle incompatible with sound microfundations once relative
wage concern is taken into account. We therefore consider as a benchmark
case a value of 7 equal to 0.1. The implied value of T is 10.2. Table 5.1
summarises the calibration of the model parameters.
5.5.3 Simulation Results
Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show the impulse response functions for output and
inflation, following a 1% money shock, as implied by the three models, respec-
tively Cases A (Current value), B (Simplified) and C (Theoretically Prefer-
able), described in Section 5.2.2. The impact effect is the same in all models
since we assume the money wage to be fixed before the realisation of the
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Figure 5.2: Current Value Relative Wage Concern. 1% Money Shock: Output
and Inflation. r 10.1884, = 0.7588
shock.31 Output jumps on impact of 1.02%. Note that in all cases the model
is able to mimic the hump-shaped response in the trend reverting compo-
nent of output as shown by Blanchard and Quah (1989), Cochrane (1994)
and Cogley and Nason (1995). Moreover, in all cases persistence both in
output and in inflation is substantia1. 32 The current value real wage concern
31 Hence, in the first period the money wage is at its steady state level and is not affected
by the money shock.
32 To measure the degree of persistence we take the quarter in which the log-deviation
of output from steady state falls and remains thereafter below 0.05% in absolute value.
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Figure 5.3: Simplified Relative Wage Concern. 1% Money Shock: Output
and Inflation. T = 10.1884, b = 0.7588
case (Case A) exhibits the lowest degree of output persistence equal to 11
quarters. Persistence increases to 18 quarters in the simplified relative real
wage concern case (Case B). 33 In the theoretically preferable case (Case C)
the effects on output last for 3 years. There is an intuitive reason for these
differences. The current value real wage concern case implies the lowest or-
der of dynamics in the model, since the price level is absent from CP. In
other words, agents look backward the same degree they look forward, but
both these degrees are limited with respect to the two other cases. That
33 After ten quarters, output actually falls below the steady state value.
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Figure 5.4: Theoretically Preferable Relative Wage Concern. .1% Money
Shock: Output and Inflation., T = 10.1884, 0 = 0.7588
is, substituting the definitions of CP and the equation for the price leve134
in equation (5.20), the highest lagged nominal wage term is x t_3 , while the
highest lead nominal wage term is x t+3 . The dynamics instead goes from xt_6
to Xt+3 in the simplified case (B) and from xt_s to Xt+6 in the theoretically
preferable case (C). 35 In fact in the simplified case, the price level enters the
cr	 i34The log-linearised formula for the price level is pt = ( 1—.-) yt + Ei3 =0 q xt_i where
.-
ni
,./ — ( E !
li(1)
op.(e-1))•
35 The same holds if we express (5.20) in terms of inflation, because we get:
Ort-3, — ) 74+3, gt) = 0 in case A; F(rt-6, .•., 74+3, gt) = 0 in case B and
F(7rt-6, ...,71"t+6,gt) = 0 in case C.
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specification of CF and hence, since 14 includes CPt_3 , Xt_6 enters equation
(5.20). However, since future prices do not enter the specification of CPt,
Vt+3 brings in only Pt+3 and hence Xt+3. In the theoretically preferable case,
instead, agents are less myopic and C P includes future prices through p. It
follows that v t+3 depends on P-t+3 and hence x t+6 . To sum up, in Case A
agents basically care about their relative nominal wages over the length of
the contract and hence the order of the dynamics is limited with respect to
the other two cases, since the price level does not enter CF. In Case B agents
are only concerned about the real wage attained in the negotiation period
and hence they myopically look backward more than they look forward. In
Case C instead agents compare relative real wages over the whole length of
the contract and hence look backward the same degree they look forward.
This implies an higher degree of inertia in Case B with respect to Case C
and hence an higher degree of persistence, as shown in the Figures.'
In all the cases therefore, the model is able to generate a fairly substan-
tial amount of persistence both in output and in inflation, without needing a
gigantic value of T. Our analysis hence suggests that staggered wage setting
'Higher dynamics do not necessarily imply higher persistence. It mainly depends on
the relative weights on backward vs. forward looking variables. Hence, it seems that the
relative weight of backward and forward looking variables is not the same in the three
models. This suggests that the different specifications do not simply spread the same
relative weights over higher order dynamics.
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incorporating a relative real wage concern on the part of the workers might
be a very important mechanism through which monetary shocks are propa-
gated in the economy. Previous results may have thus failed to account for
output persistence in a microfounded model with staggering because of their
oversimplified modelling of the wage setting decisions.
5.6 Some Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we provide some sensitivity analysis of the two key parameters
T and 0. We focus on the theoretically preferable specification.
5.6.1 Sensitivity of Persistence with respect to T.
Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 plot the impulse response functions for values of 7-
of 31.63, 19.38 and 5.59, corresponding to values of 7 of 0.03, 0.05 and 0.2
respectively. Unsurprisingly, the degree of output persistence consistently
decreases with T. With T = 31.36, the effects of money shocks on output
die away after 21 quarters, if T = 19.38 after 4 years and if T = 5.59 after 9
quarters.
In CKM's model: "the persistence properties of output are highly nonlin-
ear in 7, so that increasing 7 to a small amount above 0.05 reduces persis-
tence sharply. /...] even with values of 7 as low as 0.25 output movements
are not very persistent." (CKM, p. 15). Values of 'y higher than 0.25 also de-
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Figure 5.5: Theoretically Preferable Relative Wage Concern. 1% Money
Shock: Output and Inflation. r = 31.6279, = 0.7588
crease persistence in our model. Nevertheless, the perspective should change:
even with values of -y as high as 0.25, our staggered wage model is still able
to generate output persistence. As discussed in Section 5.4.1, empirical es-
timates put 0.25 among the highest possible values for 7. CKM consider
instead their calibration value -y = 1.22 the actual reference point. Indeed,
they argue that only values of 7 greater than one are compatible with sound
microfundations in staggered wage models. However, that is not necessarily
the case, as we proved in Section 5.4.2. On the contrary, our model suggests
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Figure 5.6: Theoretically Preferable Relative Wage Concern. 1% Money
Shock: Output and Inflation. 7" = 19.3767, ?,b = 0.7588
that their analysis omitted fundamental features of the wage setting.' Once
the relative wage concern on the part of the workers is incorporated, it solves
the data inconsistency of microfunded staggered wage models with respect
to the calibration of 7. We investigate further the relationship between -y
and the key parameter r. Figure 5.8 shows the trade-off between the values
37 1n fact, some of the results they report are quite puzzling: "It turns out that if we
assume a labor supply elasticity large enough to get -y down to 0.05, the model generates
ridiculously large output effects in the impact period. [...] following a shock which raises
the growth rate of money supply by 1% after one year 1.1 output rises of 30%." (CKM,
p. 16). This is instead not true in our model.
CHAPTER 5. RELATIVE WAGE CONCERN AND PERSISTENCE 207
Figure 5.7: Theoretically Preferable Relative Wage Concern. 1% Money
Shock: Output and Inflation. T = 5.5942, zi) = 0.7588
of -y and T. This relationship is highly non-linear. It implies that fairly small
departures from our conservative parameter choices can increase persistence
sharply.
Inflation persistence is, on the other hand, very little sensitive to changes
in T. The effects of money shocks on inflation die away in all cases after
10/12 quarters, as in the base case.
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Figure 5.8: -y and T Trade-off
5.6.2 Sensitivity of Persistence with respect to V)
In the previous section, we set C2 = 0 in our wage setting rule and cali-
brated zi) to be 0.76. Empirical evidence presented in Section 5.2.1 points
at that case as the most relevant one. However, our money-wage setting
equation (5.20) incorporates two elements: (i) the absolute real wage con-
cern (weighted by C2); (ii) the relative wage concern (weighted by A). In this
section we analyse the implications of both relative wage and level of own
real wage considerations for wage setting decisions.
Recall that in the theoretically preferable case equation (5.20) can be
written as (5.22). We consider two alternative cases. In the first case A = 3S-'2
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Figure 5.9: Theoretically Preferable Relative Wage Concern. 1% Money
Shock: Output and Inflation. T = 10.1884, 0 = 0.6192
The parameter on the indexes of real wages in the other sectors (E Etvt+i)
in equation (5.22) above is equal 3/4. Thus, there is no more one-to-one
following behaviour: a 10% increase in the sum of the future indexes of real
contract prices leads to a 7.5% in the current contract price, CP. The implied
value for V) in this case is 0.62. 38 Output and inflation persistence decreases
38 X is the weight of the labour supply term and 0 that of the relative wage concern in
the utility function. x is calibrated to produce an average level of hours worked in the
economy equal to 1/3, as standard in this literature. For the benchmark case 1,1, = 0.76,
x = 3.4. Note however that as 0 decreases, then x has to increase to maintain the average
aggregate labour hours at 1/3. Specifically, x in this case becomes 10.77. This tends to
--
-
_
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to 9 quarters (Figure 5.9). In the second case we set A = a There is then
equal weighting of the absolute and the relative real wage considerations in
wage setting. Now a 10% increase in the sum of the future indexes of real
contract prices leads only to a 5% in the contract price, CP. The implied
value for V) in this case is extremely low and equal to 0.2. 39 Persistence in
both inflation (2 years) and output (7 quarters) decreases further (Figure
5.10)
Figure 5.10: Theoretically Preferable Relative Wage Concern. 1% Money
Shock: Output and Inflation. T = 10.1884, 0 = 0.2032
make more costly any marginal increase in the supply of labour.
39 The implied value of x is 32.7!!
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Both output and inflation persistence therefore decrease with 7/). The in-
tuition is simple. If f2 = 0 wage setting is mainly influenced by relative wage
considerations. Persistence is then a very likely outcome. As SZ increases,
note that we get back to Taylor's model, that we already know cannot gen-
erate neither output nor inflation persistence.
5.6.3 Sensitivity of Persistence with respect to a
Figure 5.11: Theoretically Preferable Relative Wage Concern. I% Money
Shock: Output and Inflation. a = 1, T = 10.7, V) = 4.2, x = 10.7
A final remark concerns the sensitivity of output and inflation response to
a-. We consider our stylised production function as a short-run production
CHAPTER 5. RELATIVE WAGE CONCERN AND PERSISTENCE 212
function where capital is fixed and calibrate a = 0.67. This implies (1 —
o-)/a- 0.5. Hence a 10% increase in output automatically leads to a 5%
increase in prices (see footnote 34). However, factor hoarding and inventory
stocks may limit the impact of increased output on prices by allowing for
constant returns to scale in the short-run, that is, a 1. Our model does not
incorporate any factor hoarding. However, for illustrative purposes, Figure
5.11 shows the impulse responses of output and inflation for a = 1.4° Inflation
becomes much more sluggish: it peaks after 5 quarters and then gradually
returns to its steady state level. As a result, the shape of the impulse response
function for output also changes: after 6 quarters from the shock the economy
would enter a recession which peaks after 8 quarters. This shows how this
model, if allowed to incorporate some factors hoarding, can generate strong
inflation persistence.
5.7 Conclusions
Here we have reconsidered the presence of a strong contract multiplier as a
fundamental nominal propagation mechanism in staggered wage economies.
40 In this case, some values of the parameters change: T = 10.67 (to keep 7 = 0.1),
=_- 4.2 (to keep C2 = 0) and x 10.72 (to keep steady-state working hours equal to 1/3).
Note that also the upper value on 1/) changes, i.e. Ti) is now equal to 4.82; the value of ip
above is thus still consistent.
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The previous chapter and other recent works has questioned the existence of
such a multiplier. Those staggered price/wage models have failed to generate
persistence of the real effects of money shocks. Our model does. We add
relative wage concern on the part of the workers to the model analysed in the
previous chapter. This provides a combination of nominal and real rigidities
capable of generate a substantial amount of endogenous stickiness, even with
a very inelastic intertemporal elasticity of labour supply. As a result, output
and inflation persistence are a likely outcome in our framework.
The relative wage concern on the part of the workers is the key feature
of the model. The notion of relative wage concern is not new for economists
and goes back a long way, at least to J.M. Keynes. Moreover, a great deal of
applied studies provide overwhelming evidence for a relative wage concern on
the part of the workers. Furthermore, an increasing number of works in any
field of the literature started considering status and sociological considera-
tions to be able to explain various puzzles that standard economic framework
could not explain. Introducing a relative wage concern in the analysis, by
adding a term to the utility function, places our work within this growing
economic literature. Our results show that failing to account for this specific
source of real rigidity might be an important weakness of previous staggered
wage models, responsible for their negative results concerning output and
inflation persistence.
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Our analysis also highlights the mechanism by which our specific combi-
nation of nominal and real rigidities contributes to the presence of endoge-
nous stickiness. We analyse this mechanism by focusing on the elasticity
of the wages with respect to the business cycle conditions, i.e., the famous
parameter 7 in Taylor's wage setting rule specification. Only for relatively
low values of that parameter does output persistence arise (in the order of
0.05, the benchmark Taylor's estimate). From a log-linearized version of
the wage setting equation around a deterministic steady-state with constant
money supply, CKM and Chapter 4 have proved the dependence of 7 on the
intertemporal elasticity of labour supply and intertemporal elasticity of con-
sumption. According to well-established micro evidence, CKM calibrated
7 = 1.22 for their price-staggering model, in sharp contrast to numerous
empirical studies that place it around 0.1. They conclude by discarding
completely staggered wages as relevant propagation mechanism "...because
7 is necessarily greater than 1". In our staggered-wage model, from a log-
linearized version of the wage setting rule once relative wage concern is in-
troduced in the analysis, we instead show that 7 ?.. 1 is not necessarily the
case. Nor are the estimated values of the empirical literature incompatible
with sound microfoundations at all. High values of -y may well arise, however,
from an oversimplified account of the wage setting decisions.
Our model delivers a substantial amount of persistence both in output and
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inflation. This result is very robust to different calibrations/specifications of
the model. Moreover, we derive a simple relationship between the key para-
meter and the value of 7. This relationship is highly non-linear. It implies
that fairly small departures from our conservative parameter choices can
increase persistence sharply. Given the substantial amount of empirical evi-
dence supporting a relative wage concern on the part of workers, our analysis
leads us to conclude that this may well be the missing piece in the money
shocks persistence puzzle.
5.8 Appendix: The Solution Method and the
GAUSS Codes
The procedure used to simulate the model is quite standard in the business
cycle literature. We would like to thank Dr. Morten Ravn who gave a course
at Warwick University on simulation methods. Our codes are based on the
ones he supplied during the course.
The procedure rests on the following steps: (i) solve for the steady state
of the model; (ii) linearise the model around the steady state;' (iii) build the
dynamic system distinguishing among control, state, and costate variables;
41 Given that the model deals with nominal variables and that the money supply follows
a certain rate of growth, we need to make the system stationary. We did that dividing all
period t variables by Mt_l.
CHAPTER 5. RELATIVE WAGE CONCERN AND PERSISTENCE 216
(iv) apply the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) methodology for solving linear
dynamic system with forward-looking variables to the dynamic system just
built; (v) simulate the model to produce impulse response functions. The
last three stages correspond to the three GAUSS codes below which are the
codes we used to simulate Case C.42
The first code implements (iii) and part of (iv). The dynamic system for
this particular version of our model is made up by 29 control variables (Y1,
t, Zt+i ) Zt+2)t+1, t+2) Yt+3) Yt+4) Yt+57 Pt) Pt+11 Pt+2) Pt-I-3) P +4, Pt+5) Z
Zt+3, zt+45 P , Pt+1, Pt+27 CPt , CPt+i, CPt-1-2) CPt-3 ) C Pt-2, CPt-1) Pt-31t
Pt-2, Pt-1), 6 state variables (Pt_ 3 , Pt-2) Pt-1) Xt-3, Xt-2, Xt-1), 7 costate
variables (Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2Xt+3) Xt+4, Xt+5, Zt+5) and one exogenous variable
(1). 43 The code is then divided in parts (as can be seen by the comments
in the codes which should help the reader; comments are between ©A): (i)
define the parameter values and all of the auxiliary variables we find conve-
nient to build; (ii) define the steady sate formulas and other useful variables
42 Even if what distinguishes Case A and Case B from Case C is only the definiton of
CP, the dynamic systems are quite different in their order. The different definitions of CP
imply different lag and lead structure and hence a different number of state and costate
variables in the system. However, the codes for Case A and Case B are very similar to
the codes for Case C, once the correct log-linearised dynamic system is built. Given that,
these codes are not presented.
43 A11 the variables are normailsed according to what reported in footnote 41.
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based on the steady state values; (iii) define the dynamic system, defining
the equations for the control, state and costate variables plus other variables
one wants to build for interest (e.g., inflation) or for checking purposes (re-
lationships between variables that should be satisfied in each period); (iv)
transform the model according to Blanchard and Kahn.
The second code calculates the optimal decision rules for the perfect fore-
sight model, that is the solution of the perfect foresight model. In other
words how all the variables depend upon the predetermined (state) variables
and the exogenous variables. Here we need to solve a problem peculiar to
our model. We suppose that households decide about the wage before the
realisation of the shock, while the other decisions are taken after the realisa-
tion of the shock. One way to solve the system is implemented in this second
code. Since wages are set before the realisation of the shock, we can easily
calculate the impact effect of a shock. Then, for the period thereafter, we can
use the optimal decision rules to calculate the adjustment dynamics of the
model from the point in which the system is pushed to by the impact effect.
Note that since we are just interested in the impulse response function of
the model, this procedure is feasible. In fact, the impulse response function
gives the response of the model after a one-for-all shock. Hence, after the
shock is realised the system behaves like a perfect foresight model. However,
if, as in the real business cycle tradition, one wants to calculate correlations
CHAPTER 5. RELATIVE WAGE CONCERN AND PERSISTENCE 218
this way it is not feasible (since in this case random shocks are continuously
occurring in each period). In that case, another way of proceeding should
be implemented. This is done by the fourth and fifth code presented below.
In particular, first the optimal decision rules for a perfect foresight model
are found, by running the first and the second code. Then, we can pass the
expectation operator through the decision rules to find the expressions for
the expected variables. Then a new system is built where the expectations
are taken into account (this is done running the fourth code). Then one can
run again the second code to solve for the optimal decision rules of this new
dynamic system with expectations.
The third code finally calculates and plot the impulse response functions.
The fifth code does the same for the system with expectations.
FIRST CODE
CLEAR ALL;
(01 DIMENSION OF CONTROL SPACE (NC), PREDETERMINED (NK),AND NON-PREDETERMINED
VECTORS (NS),EXOGENEOUS STATE VECTOR (NN)
0 ORDERING OF VARIABLES:
PREDETERM1NED=ENDOGENOUS STATE=K :
PIII PIT I PI I XIII I XII I XI
NON-PREDETERMINED = C()STATES = L:
X I X1 I X2 I X3 I X4 I X5 I Z5
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES=N:
RGI\I
FLOWS=CONTROLS=C:
Y 1 Y1 I Y2 I Y3 1 Y4 I Y5 I P P1 I P2 I P3 I P4 1 P5 I Z I Z1 I Z2 Z3 I Z4 I AP I AP1 I AP2 I CP
I CP1 I CP2 1 CPIII 1 CPI 1 CPI I APIII I APII 1 API
0 DIMENSION AND NAME OF CONTROL SPACE (NC), PREDETERMINED (NK), AND NON-
PREDETERMINED VECTORS (NL), EXOGENEOUS STATE VECTOR (NN)
NC=29;NK=6;NL=7;NN=1;
NAMEC="Y"1"Y1"1"Y2"1"Y3"1"Y4"1"Y5"1"P"I"Pl"1"P2"1"P3"1"P4"1"P5"1
"Z "I "Z1"1 "Z2 "I "Z3"I "Z4 "I "PA TPA 1"I "PA2 "I"CP "I"CP1"I "CP2 "I
"CPIIITCP11"1"CP1"1"AP111"1"APII"1"API"; 0 CONTROLS 0
NAMEK="PIII"I"PII"1"PI"1"XIII"1"XII"1"XI"; 0 ENDOGENOUS STATES 0
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NAMEL="X"I"Xl"I"X2"1"X3"1"X4"1"X5"1"Z5"; COSTATES
NAMEE="R.GM"; EXOGENOUS STATES (SHOCKS) A
	
qh 	
(0) ECONOMIC PARAMETER VALUES a 
	
(i» 	
OTRANSITION MATRIXa
RAA=0.57;
RII0=ZER.OS(NN,NN);
RII0[1,1]=RAA;
RGMBAR=1.06^(0.25);
NUBAR=1/R.GMBAR;
T=6;
E=6;
GAM=0.1;
S=0.67;
B=0.73;
V=-17.52;
BETA=0.96^(0.25);
EPS=TAS-1-(1-S)*T);
ZBAR=“B*(1-BETA*NUBAR,))/(1-B))^(1/(V-1));
U1=1+((l-B)/B)*ZBARAV;
ZNUl=“B*(1-BETA))/(1-B))^(1/(V-1));
A5S=1-1-((1-B)/B)*ZNU1AV;
PSI=(S*(EPS-1)*(EPS*(E-1)+1))/(EPS*E*ASS);
TAU=11-((EPS*E*(T-l))/(GAM*T*(EPS*(E-1)+1)));
acase gainina=3omegaa
"Psi=3*(s*(eps-1)*(1+eps*(e-1)))/((tati-1)*A55+3*e*cps*A55);a
(ease gainnia=olnega0
apsi=(s*((ps-1)*(1-1-(ps*(e-1)))/((tau-1)*u1-1-3*c*cps*u1);0
C0=.-(NUBAR-FNUBARA2+NUBARA3)^(-1);
G1=(14-NUBAR ^2±NUBAR A 3)^ (-1);
G2=(1-FNUBAR.+NUBARA3)^(-1);
C3=(11-NUBAR-FNUBAR.^2) A (-1 );
VOBAR=1;
VlBAR=1;
V2BAR=1;
V3BAR=1;
FNU=-(VOBAR)^(1-TAU)+BETA*(V1BAR)^(1-TAU)+
BETAA2*(V2BAR)^(1-TAU)+BETAA3*(V3BAR)^(1-TAU);
Al1=1-1-BETA*NUBARA(-E*EPS)±(BETA*NUBAR.A(-E*EPS))^2-1-(BETA*NUBARA(-E*EPS))^3;
Al2=1+BETA*NUBAR.^(R0)+(BETA*NUBAR^(110))^2+(BETA*NUBARA(J1.0))^3;
AI=A11/Al2;
A2=FNU/Al2;
A3=1+NUBAR A R 0+NUBAR A (2*R.0)+NUBAR A (3*11 0);
A4=4*S*(EPS-1)-PSI*A3*A2*U1;
PUB=4*S*(EPS-1)/(A3*A2*U1);
A7=1-1-13GMBARAEPS+RGMBARA(2*EPS)+RGMBARA(3*EPS);
FBN=1+(BETA/NUBAR)+(BETA/NUBAR)^24-(BETA/NUEAR)\3;
.1130=FBNA(-1);
.1[31=BETAANUBAR*FBN);
.1132=((BETA/NUBAR)^2)/FBN;
.1B3=((BETA/NUBAR)^3)/FBN;
.1134=(.1B1+.1B2+.1B3)*BAA+(.1B2+.1B3)*(11AAA2)+.1B3*(RAAA3);
PIP=“4/3)^(-E))*(A7^E)/(A3*A1);
DI=(A4/(E*EPS*U1))*PIP;
A5=(DI*E*EPS*U1)/(A4);
ALPHA=(4^(S-S/R.0))*(A5A(S/E))*(A3A(S/R.O+S*(1-EVE))*(A1A(S/E));
EBAR=RGMBAR./ZBAR;
a STEADY STATE CALCULATIONS 0 
0
0 AGGREGATE VARIABLES a
XBAR=4*S*(A5^(1/E))*EBAR*A3^((1-E)/E)*A1^(1/E);
PBAR=ALPHA A (-1)*S A (-S)*(0.25)^(S/110)*EBAR ^(1-S)*XBAR/‘2*A3A(S/R.0);
YBAR.=EBAR /PBAR.;
RBAR=1/(BETA*NUBAR);
LAMBAR=1/(PBAR*YBAR5U1);
APBAR=PBAR*FNU*IFBN;
CPBAR=XBAR/APBAR;
H SECTORS' VARIABLES a
XIBAR=XBAR*NUBAR;
XIIBAR=XIBAR*NUBAR;
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XIIIBAR=XIIBAR*NUBAR;
X 1BAR=XBAR*R.GMBAR.;
X2BAR=X1BAR.*RGMBAR;
X3BAR=X2BAR*RG MBAR;
X4BAR=X3BAR*R.GM BAR;
X5BAR=X4BAR.*R.GM BAR;
PIBA R=PBAR*NUBAR;
PIIBAR=PIBAR*NUBAR;
PHIBAR.=PIIBAR*NUBAR;
P1BAR=PBAR*RGMBAR;
P2BAR.= P1BAR*R G M BAR;
P3BAR=P2BAR*RGM BAR;
P4BAR=P3BAR.*RGMBAR.;
P5BAR=P4BAR*RGMBAR;
APIBAR.=APBAR*NUBAR;
APIIBAR.=APIBAR*NUBAR.;
APHIBAR =APIIBAR *NUBAR ;
AP1BAR =APBAR.*R GM BAR;
AP2BAR=AP1BAR*RGMBAR;
X PBAR = XBA RIP BAR
WBAR.=(XBARI-XIBAR.+XIIBAR-1-XIIIBAR)/(4*PBAR);
PABAR =(4*EBAR /A3)^ (1-S)*ALPHAA(-1)*SA(-S)*XBARAS;
PBBAR=PABAR*NUBAR (EPS*S/T);
PCBAR=PABAR.*NUBAR A (2*EPS*S/T);
PDBAR=PABAR*NUBAR.^(3*EPS*S/T);
YABAR=ALPHA*A5^(-S/E)*A3^(-S/E)*A1A(-S/E);
YBBAR=YABAR*R.GMBAR.^(EPS*S);
YCBAR=YABAR*RGMBAR (2*EPS*S);
YDBAR=YABAII*RGMBARA(3*EPS*S);
LABAR =A 5^ (-1/E)*A3 A (-1/E)*A1 A (-1/E);
LBBAR =LABAR*RGM BAR AEPS;
LCBAR=LABAR*RGMBAR (2*EPS);
LD BAR = LA BAR*RGNI BAR A (3*EPS);
LBAR =(1/4)*LABAR *A7;
/*
PARAMETERS MODEL AND WAGE RULE 4
LHS WAGE RULE
*/
K 1=410/A 12;
K2=BETA*K1*NUBAR AR 0;
K3=BETA A 2*K l*NUBAR (2*11 0);
K4=BETA A 3*K l*NUBAR (3*B0);
K5=((EPS/T)-1)/Al2;
K6=BETA*K5*NUBAR A 0;
K7=BETA^2*K5*NUBAR (2*I10);
K8=BETAA3*K5*NUBARA(3*R0);
1(9=-K 2-10-K4;
K10=-K3-K4;
K11=-K4;
K29=-(V*(1-BETA*NUBAR )*ZBAR./(Ul*Al2));
K30=BETA*NUBAR (1-EPS)*1(29;
101 =BETA*NUBAR (1-EPS)*K30;
.
K32=BETA*NUBAB (1-EPS)*K31;
HS WAGE 11ULE4
OM 1=DI*E*EPS*(ALPHA*S)^ (E*EPS)*ALPHAN_E*Ep S/T)
()M	
;OMBAR1=0M1*PBAR (E*EPS)*YBAR.^(E*EPS/T)*A1
BAR 2=XBARA	 1'(E*EPS)*PSI*FNU; 
()MBAR =-0MBAR 1+0MBAR 2;
K 12=(0M1*E*EPS*PBARA(E*EPS)*YBARA(E*
K 13=K12*BETA*NUBARA(-E*EPS); 	 EPS/T))/ONIBAR;
K14=K12*BETA A 2*NUBAR (-2*E*EPS);
K 15=K12*BETA A 3*NUBAR (-3*E*EPS);
K16=-K12/T;
K 1 7=K13/T;
1(18=1(1 4/T;
1(19=1<1 5/T;
1(20=-K13-1(14-1(15;
K 21=-K 14-1(15;
K 22=-K 15;
1(23=(1-TAU)*OM BAR 2/0M BAR;
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K24=(XBARA(E*EPS)*PSI*(TAU-1)*VOBAR.^(1-TAU))/OMBAR;
K25=(XBAR,A(E*EPS)*PSI*(TAU-1)*BETA*V1BAR.^(1-TAU))/OMBAR;
K26=(XBAR.^(E*EPS)*PSI*(TAU-1)*BETA^2*V2BAR.^(1-TAU))/OMBAR;
K27=(XBARA(E*EPS)*PSI*(TAU-1)*BETAA3*V3BARA(1-TAU))/OMBAR;
K28-=E*EPS*OMBAR.2/0MBAR;
(OTHER. USEFUL COSTANTSO.
.10=1/A3;
.11=(NUBARAR.0)/A3;
.12=(NUBAR A (2*R.0))/A3;
.13=-(NUBARA(3*R.0))/A3;
B1=- -1+(ZBAR*V*(1-BETA*NUBAR)/(1+ZBAR.*(1-BETA*NUBAR)))
((V-1)*(1-BETA*NUBAR)/(BETA*NUBAR.));
B2=1-(ZBAR*V*(1-BETA*NUBAR)/(1-1-ZBA11.*(1-BETA*NUBAR)));
SS=PABAR*YABAR+PBBAR.*YBBAR+PCBAR*YCBAR+PDBAR*YDBAR;
SSS=PBAR*YBAR;
ONOTE: MUST BE SS=SSS=EBAR
SS1=PABAR*YABAR/SS;
SS2=PBBAR*YBBARISS;
S53=PCBAR*YCBAR/SS;
SS4=PDBAR*YDBAR/SS;
0)SSVAL=ENDSTATESICOSTATESIEXSTATESICONTROLSIEXTRACONTROLS
SSVAL=PHIBARIPHBARIPMARIXHIBARIXIIBARIXIBARIXBARIX1BARIX2BARI
X3BA11 IX4BAR IX5BARIZBARI
R.GMBARIYBARIYBARIYBAB IYBARIYBARIPBAHIP1BARIP2BARIP3BARIP4BAR IP5BARI
ZBARIZBAR IZBARIZBARIZBARIAPBARIAP1BARIAP2BARICPBARICPBARICPBARI
CPBARICPBARICPBAB IAPHIBARIAPHBARIAPIBARI
PABAR1PBBAR IPCBARIPDBARIYABARIYBBARIYCBARIYDBARI
LAB AR ILBBAR ILCBARILDBARILBAR.111 BAR ILAMBARI
01010101010101010;
BUILDING THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM: EQUATIONS FOR CONTROLS, (CO)STATES AND
AUXULIARY (FLOW) VARIABLES©
(0) MATRICES IN CONTROL SYSTEM: MCC*C(I)=MCS*S(t)+MCE*E(I)+ MCEI*E(t-1)-1-MCEII*E(t-
2) (0,
NICC=ZEBOS(NC,NC);
MCC 1,11=1;
MCC 1,71=1;
MCC 1,131=1;
MCC 2,21=1;
MCC 2,81=1;
MCC 2,141=1;
MCC 3,31=1;
NICC 3,91=1;
MCC 3,151=-1;
MCC 4,91=1;
MCC 4,101=1;
MCC 4,161=-1;
MCC 5,51=1;
MCC 5,111=1;
MCC 5,171=1;
MCC 6,61=1;
MCC 6,121=-1;
MCC 7,71=1;
MCC 7,11=--(1-S)/S;
MCC 8,81=1;
MCC 8,21=-(i-S)/S;
MCC 9,91=1;
MCC 9,31-----(1-S)/S;
MCC 10,101--,..J.;
S.MCC
MCC 11,111,----1;
MCC111,51.--(1-S)/S;
MCC112,121,..-.:1;
MCC112,61-=--(1-S)/5;
NICC[13,13],.-.131;
MCC113,141,..-132;
MCC114,14kB1;
MCC114,15kB2;
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MCC 15,151=B1;
MCC 15,161=132;
MCC 16,161=B1;
MCC 16,171=B2;
MCC 17,171=B1;
MCC 18,181=1;
MCC 18,7].,1130;
MCC 18,81=-3B1;
MCC 18,91...--.1B2;
MCC 18,101=-.1B3;
MCC 19,191=1;
MCC 19,81=-JB0;
MCC 19,91.-_--3B1;
MCC 19,10 =4132;
MCC 19,11 =-3133;
MCC 20,20 =1;
MCC 20,91,_--3B0;
MCC 20,10 =-.1B1;
MCC 20,11 =_-.1B2;
MCC 20,12 =-.1B3;
MCC 21,21 =1;
MCC 21,18 =1;
MCC 22,22 =1;
MCC 22,19 =1;
MCC 23,23 =1;
MCC 23,20 =1;
MCC 24,24 =1;
MCC 24,27 =1;
MCC 25,25 =1;
MCC 25,28 =1;
MCC 26,26 =1;
MCC 26,29 =1;
MCC 27,27 =1;
MCC 27,7H-3133;
MCC 28,28 =1;
MCC 28,7H-JB2;
MCC 28,8H-3133;
MCC 29,291=1;
MCC 29,71=-1B1;
MCC 29,81=-1B2;
MCC 29,91.---.1B3;
MCS=ZEROS(NC,(NK-FNL));
MCS 6,131=4;
MCS 7,4 =33;
MCS 7,5 =32;
MCS 7,6 =31;
MCS 7,7 =30;
MCS 8,5 =33;
MCS 8,6 =32;
mcs 8,7=11;
MCS 8,8 =.10;
MCS 9,6 =33;
MCS 9,7 =32;
MCS 9,8 =31;
MCS 9,9 =.10;
MCS 10,71=33;
MCS 10,81=32;
MCS 10,91=31;
MCS 10,101=30;
MCS 11,81=33;
MCS 11,91=32;
MCS 11,101=31;
IvICS 11,111=30;
MCS 12,91=33;
MCS 12,101=32;
MCS 12,111=31;
MCS 12,121=30;
1\1CS117,131=-B2;
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MCS[21,7 =1;
NICS[22,8 =1;
IVICS[23,9 =1;
IVICS[24,4 =1;
MCS[25,5 =1;
MCS[26,6 =1;
MCS[27,1 =MO;
IVICS[27,2 =.1B1;
IVICS 27,3 =.1B2;
NICS 28,2 =MO;
MCS 28,3 =.IB1;
MCS 29,3 =.1B0;
MCE=ZEROS(NC,NN);
1vICE 1,11=1;
NICE 2,11=1+RAA;
NICE 3,11=1+RAA+BAA^2;
NICE 4,11=1+RAA+BAA^2+IIAA^3;
MCE 5,1]=1+RAA+11AA^2+RAAA3+RAAA4;
MCE 6,1]=1+RAA+BAA^2+RAAA3+RAAA4+BAAA5;
NICE 13,11----RAA;
NICE 14,11=-(RAAA2);
NICE 15,11=(RAAA3);
NICE 16,11,---(BAAA4);
NICE 17,1]=(BAAA5);
0 MATRICES IN STATE EQUATIONS ©
NISSO*E(S(t+1))+NISS1*S(I)=MSCO*E(C(I+1))+NISC1*C(I)+IVISEO*E(E(t+1)) + MSEl*E(t)
(91
1\1550=ZEBOS((NK+NL),(NK+NL));
NISSO[1,1 =1;
NISSO[2,2 =1;
NISSO[3,3 =1;
NISSO[4,4 =1;
NISS0[5,5 =1;
NISSO[6,6 =1;
NISS0[7,7 =1;
MS50[8,8 =1;
NISSO[9,9 =1;
NISSO[10,10]=1;
MSSO[11,11]=1;
NISSO[13,13]=B2;
NISS1=ZEBOS((NK+NL),(NK+NL));
NISS1[1,2 =-1;
NISS1[2,3 =-1;
1VISS1[4,5 =-1;
NISS1[5,6 =-1;
1\1551[6,7 =-1;
NISS1[7,8 =-1;
NISS1[8,9 =-1;
NISS1[9,11]=-1;
N1SS1[10,111=-1;
NISS1[11,12]=-1;
NISS1[12,7]=1+EPS*(E-1)-K28;
NISS1[13,13]=B1;
NISCO=ZEROS((NK+NL),NC);
NISCO 12,231=K27/3;
NISC1=ZEROS((NK+NL),NC);
NISC1 3,71=1;
NISC1 12,11=K16-K5;
NISC1 12,21=-K6+K17;
NISC1 12,31=-K7+K18;
NISC1 12,71=K12-K1;
NISC1 12,81=-K2+K13;
NISC1 12,91=-K3+K14;
NISC1 12,101=-K4+1<15;
NISC1 12,41=-K8+1<19;
NISC1 12,131=-K29;
NISC1 12,14]=-K30;
NISC1[12,15]=-K31;
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MSC1[12,16 =-K32;
MSC1[12,21 =K23;
MSC1[12,22 -=(K25+K26+K27)/3;
MSC1[12,23 =(K26+K27)/3;
MSC1[12,24 =K24/3;
MSC1[12,25 =(K24+K25)/3;
MSC1[12,26 =(K24+K25+K26)/3;
MSE0=ZEROS((NK+NL),NN);
NISE0[13,11=(11.AAA5);
NISE1=ZEROS((NK+NL),NN);
NISE1[1,1
NISE1[2,1 =-1;
NISE1[3,1 =-1;
NISE1[4,1 =-1;
NISE1[5,1 =-1;
MSE1[6,1
MSE1[7,1 -=-1;
NISE1[8,1 =-1;
NISE1[9,1 =-1;
NISE1[10,1]=-1;
MSE1[11,1],----1;
0) AUXILIARY FLOW VARIABLES0
NXF=24; 0 DIMENSION AND NAMES OF EXTRA FLOWS 0
NAMEXC="PATPB"1"PC"1"1313"1"YA"1"YB"I"YC"1"YD"I
"LA "1"LB "I "LC "I "LD "I "L "I"11,"1"LAM "I "Cl"1"C2 "I"C3 "I"C4 "I
"C5"I"C6"1"C7"1"C8"I"C9";
MF*XC(t) = NIFC*C(t) + MFKEIK(t)IE(t)1 + MFL*L(t)
NIF=ZEROS(NXF,NXF);
NIF[1,1 =1;
MF 2,2 =1;
1\4F 2,1 =-1;
MF[3,3 =1;
NIF 3,1 =-1;
MF 4,4 =1;
I\IF 4,1 =-1;
I\IF 5,5 =1;
1\IF 5,1 =S/(S-1);
NIF 6,6 =1;
MF 6,5 =-1;
1\4F 6,1 =-T;
MF 6,2 =T;
I\IF 7,7 =1;
MF 7,5 =-1;
NIF 7,1 =-T;
MF 7,3 =T;
MF 8,8 =1;
MF 8,5 =-1;
MF 8,1 =-T;
NW 8,4 =T;
NIF 9,9 =1;
MF 9,1 =1/(1-S);
MF 10,101=1;
MF 10,21=1/(1-S);
MF 11,111=1;
NIF 11,31=1/(1-S);
MF 12,121=1;
I\IF 12,41=1/(1-S);
I\IF 13,131=1;
MF 13,91=1/A7;
MF 13,101=(11GMBAR^EPS)/A7;
NIF 13,111=--(11GMBA11.^(2*EPS))/A71
MF[13,12]=(11GIVIBAR^(3*EPS))/A71
MF 14,141=1/(RBAR.-1);
I\IF 15,151=1;
NIF[16,16]=1;
NIF 16,51=1;
W. 16,11=T;
MF[17,17]=1;
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IVIF 17,6 =1;
MF 17,2 =T;
MF 18,181=1;
MF 18,7 =1;
MF 18,3 =T;
MF 19,1,11=1;
MF 19,8 =1;
MF 19,4 =T;
MF 20,2)1=1;
IVIF 20,1 =SS1;
MF 20,5 -=SS1;
IVIF 20,2 =SS2;
MF 20,6 =-SS2;
MF 20,3 =SS3;
NIF 20,7 =-SS3;
MF 20,4 =SS4;
MF 20,8 =-SS4;
MF 21,211=1;
MF 21,141=1;
IVIF 22,221=1;
/v1F 22,61=-1;
MF 22,21=SAS-1);
NIF 23,231=1;
MF 23,7)=1;
NIF 23,31=S/(S-1);
MF 24,241=1;
MF 24,81=1;
MF 24,41=-SgS-1);
CAZ=INV(IVIF);
MFC=ZEROS(NXF,NC);
MFC 1,11=1-S;
MFC 1,71=1-S;
MFC 14,131=V-1;
MFC 15,1 =-1;
IVIFC 15,7 =-1;
MFC 15,131=-V*(U1-1)/U1;
MFC 16,1 =1;
NIFC 16,7 =T;
MFC 17,1 =1;
MFC 17,7 -=T;
MFC 18,1 =1;
MFC 18,7 =T;
MFC 19,1 =1;
MFC 19,7 -=T;
MFC 20,1 =1;
IVIFC 20,7 =1;
NIFC 21,2 =1;
MFC 21,1 =-1;
MFG 21,7 =-1;
MFC 21,8 =1;
NIFC 21,131=-V*(U1-1)/U1;
MFC 21,141--.--V*(U1-1)/U1;
NIFKE=ZEBOS(NXF,NK+NN);
NIFKE[1,4]=41-S)*110*,13;
MFKE[1,5)=-(1-S)*1-10*.12;
MFKE[1,6],----(1-S)*130*.11;
MFEE[2,6]=EPS*S/T;
MFEE[3,5]=EPS*S/T;
NIFKE[4,4]-=EPS*S/T;
1\IFKE[10,6].---1/(S-1);
MFKE[11,5],-- 1/(S-1);
I\IFKE[12,4]=1/(S-1);
MFEE[22,6]=S/(S-1);
MFKE[23,5]=-SRS-1);
MFKE[24,41=SRS-1);
MFL=ZE110S(NXF,NL);
IVIFL[1,11=-(1-S)*110*(1-.10)-1-S;
MFL[2,1]=-EPS*S/T;
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MFL[3,11=-EPS*S/T;
MFL[4,1]=-EPS*S/T;
MFL[5,1]=SAS-1);
MFL[9,1]=1/(S-1);
FVC LINKS EXTRA CONTROLS TO FUNDAMENTAL CONTROLS
FVC=,(INV(MF))*MFC;
FVC LINKS EXTRA CONTROLS TO ENDOGENOUS STATES AND EXOGENOUS STATES
FVKE=(INV(MF))*MFKE;
FVL LINKS EXTRA CONTROLS TO COSTATES
FVL=(INV(MF))*MFL;
FUNDAMENTAL STATE-COSTATE DIFFERENCE EQUATION 0(ci.) 	
MSss0 = MSS() - IVISCO*(INV(MCC))*MCS;
MSssl = MSS1 - MSC1*(INV(MCC))*MCS;
MSse0 = MSEO + MSCO*(INV(MCC))*IVICE;
MSsel = MSE1 + MSC1*(INV(MCC))*MCE;
W = -(INV(IviSss0))*MSss1;
13. = (INV(MSss0))*IVISse0;
Q = (INV(MSss0))*IVISse1;
EIGENVECTOR.-EIGENVALUE DECOMPOSITION OF STATE  TRANSITION MATRIX 0
© FIRST WE FIND THE REAL PARTS OF THE EIGENVALUES (X1)
AND EIGENVECTORS (X3)
{X1,X3}=EIGV(W);
X11=REAL(X1);
AMU=ABS(X11);
0 SECOND WE ORDER THE EIGENVALUES0
IN=SORTC(AIVIU,1);
IND1=INDNV(IN,AMU);
1=1;
DO UNTIL I>(NK+NL)-1;
IF IND1[I,11 == IND1[I+1,1];
IND1[I+1,1] = 1+IND1[I,1];
ENDIF;
1=1+1;
END 0;
0 THIRD WE ORDER THE COLUMNS OF THE EIGENVECTORS (X3) BY THE
INDICATOR RESULTING FROM THE ORDERING OF THE EIGENVALUES0
P=ZEROS((NK+NL),(NK+NL));
1=1;
DO UNTIL I>(NK+NL);
P[1:(NK+NL),1]=X3[1:(NK+NL),IND1[I,1]];
I=I+1;
ENDO;
0 FINALLY WE FORM A DIAGONAL MATRIX (MU) IN WHICH THE DIAGONAL HAVE THE
EIGENVALUES IN ASCENDING ABSOLUTE VALUE@
MU=ZEROSaNK+NL),(NK-I-NL));
I=1;
DO UNTIL I>(NK+NL);
MU[I,I]=X1[IND1[I,11,1];
1=1+1;
ENDO;
WE NOW HAVE P AND MU FOR WHICH WE KNOW THAT P*MU*P^-1=W (ALSO
X3*DIAG(X1)*X3=W) 0
	
0 	
n PARTITIONING THE MATRICES A 
	
A 	
MU1=MU[1:NK,1:NK];
MU2=IVIU[NK+1:NK-I-NL,NK+1:NK+NL];
P11=P[1:NK,1:NK];
P12=P[1:NK,NK+1:NK+NL];
P21=P[NK+1:NK+NL,1:Nlq;
P22=P[NK+1:NK+NL,NK+1:NK+NL];
PS=INV(P);
PS11=PS[1:NK,1:NK];
PS12=PS[1:NK,NK+1:NK+NL];
PS21=PS[NK+1:NK-FNL,LNK];
PS22=PS[NK+1:NK+NL,NK+1:NK-I-NL];
13KE=11 [1:NK,1:NN];
RLE=13.[NK+1:NK+NL,1:NN];
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QKE=Q[1:NK,1:NN];
QLE=Q[NK+1:NK+NL,1:NN];
(6) 	
COMPOSITE EXPRESSIONS (0 
SP1=-(INV(MU2))*(PS21*RKE+PS22*RLE);
SP2=-(INV(MU2))*(13S21*QKE+PS22*QLE);
KLK=P11*MU1*(INV(P11));
KTL-=(P11*MU1*PS12+P12*MU2*PS22)*(INV(PS22));
NAME=NAIvIEKINAMEEINAMELINAMECINAMEXC;
SECOND CODE
	 	 0
0) COMPUTATION OF DECISION RULES 0 
0 IN THIS PROGRAM WE WILL COMPUTE MARKOV DECISION RULES (MDR)
FOR THE LINEAR DYNAMIC MODEL©
FL = SP1*RHO + SP2;
IIIII0=EYE(ROWS(R.H0));
I=1;
LEE=ZEROS(NL,NN);
DO UNTIL I>NL;
Q=FL[I,1:NN];
MU2I=1/MU2[I,I];
DSUM=INV((IRHO-MU2I*RHO));
LEE[I,1:NNI=Q*DSUM;
I=I+1;
ENDO;
0 STATE DECISION RULES 
	 0
KEC=RKE*RHO+QKE+KTL*LEE;
ULE=(INV(PS22))*LEE;
ULK=-(INV(PS22))*PS21;
	  "-
0) SYSTEM DECISION RULES 0 
MKE=ZEROS(ROWS(KLK)+NN,COLS(KLK)+COLS(KEC));
MKE[1:ROWS(KLK),1:COLS(KLK)]=KLK;
MKE[ROWS(KLK)-1-1:ROWS(KLK)+NN,1:NK]=ZE110S(NN,NK);
NIKE[1:ROWS(KEC),COLS(KLK)+1:COLS(KLK)+COLS(KEC)]=KEC;
NIKE[R OW S(KEC)+1:R OWS (KEC)+13 OWS(II HO),COLS(KLK )+1:COLS(KLK )+COLS (KEC)]=R HO;
	
((I) 	
0 INCORPORATION OF SHADOW PRICE, CONTROLS AND OTHER. FLOWS 0
LKE=ZEROS(NL,NK+NN);
LKE[.,1:COLS(ULK)]=ULK; LKELCOLS(ULK)+1:COLS(ULK)+COLS(ULE)]=ULE;
Z=(INV(MCC))*MCS;
NIOCK=Z[1:NC,1:NK];
MOCL=Z[1:NC,NK-1-1:NK+NL];
MOCE=(INV(NICC))*NICE;
NIOCKE=-(MOCK+MOCL*ULK),-(MOCE+MOCL*ULE);
FIKE=FVC*NIOCKE+FVKE+FVL*LKE;
01-IRKE=(ULK-ULK*KLK)---,(ULE-(ULK*KEC+ULE*R.H0));0
H=LKEINIOCKEIFKE;
0)  THE IMPACT PERIOD 
(0) 	 (c6
B3 -=( - B2/B1);
0) SHOCK 06
IIGNIT=0.01;
ZT=11.GMT*RAA/(B1*(1-B3*RAA));
ELT-ZEBOS(2,1);
ELT[1,1]=RGMT;
ELT[2,1]=ZT;
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0 VARIABLES: YIPPRILAM
VIP=ZER.OS(5,2);
VIP [1,1 =S;
VIP[1,2
VIP [2,1 =1—S;
VIP[2,2 =-1+S;
VIP[3,1 =1;
VIP[3,2 =-1;
VIP[4,2 =(11.BAR-1)*(V-1);
VIP[5,1 —=-1;
VIP[5,2 =1—V*(U1-1)/U1;
IP=VIP*ELT;
IP = YIPILIRILAM COLUMN VECTOR 0
MKE=REAL(MKE);
LKE=REAL(LKE);
MOCKE=REAL(MOCKE);
H=REAL(H);
FKE=R.EAL(FKE);
LOCATE 1,1;
FORMAT /LDS 4,3;
OUTPUT ON;
OUTPUT FILE=CKTPFM.OUT RESET;
14;
"IMPACT EFFECT
It
13GM(t)
"Z ";;ZT;
"Y ";;1P[1,1];
"P ";;1P[2,1];
"L ";;IP[3,1];
"R ";;IP[4,11;
"LAIv1 ";;IP[5,1];
WAIT;
--
"NEAR STEADY STATE DYNAMICS AFTER. FIRST PERIOD";
IC
c,	 PI'S
" ";;SNAME[1:NK+NN,1]';
I=1;
DO UNTIL I>NK;
SNAME[I,11;;MKE[I,.];
I=I+1;
END();
1=1;
DO UNTIL I>NL;
SNAME[I+NN+NK,1];;LKE[I,.];
I=I+1;
END();
1=1;
DO UNTIL I>NC;
SNANIE[I+NK+NL+NN,1];;MOCKE[I,.];
I=I+1;
END();
1=1;
DO UNTIL I>NXF;
$NAME[I+NK+NL+NN+NC,1];;FKE[I,.];
I=I+1;
END();
WAIT;
FORMAT 4,4;
IC	
— PARAMETERIZATION	
- -;
IL
IC
" PARAMETERS";
IL
"DISCOUNT FACTOR. ";;BETA;
"B ";;B;
"V ";;V;
"ALPHA ";;ALPHA;
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"DI ";;DI;
"PSI ";;PSI;
"RELATIVE WAGE RISK AVERSION (TAU) ";;TAU;
"SIGMA ";;S;
"THETA ";;T;
"INTERTEMPOR.AL ELASTICITY OF LABOUR SUPPLY ";;1/(E-1);
"TREND IN THE MONEY SUPPLY PROCESS ";;RGMBAR;
"AUTOCORRELATION MONEY SUPPLY PROCESS ";;RAA;
WAIT;
44
"STEADY STATE: AGGREGATE VARIABLES";
"STEADY STATE OUTPUT "'.;YBAR;
"STEADY STATE VELOCITY OF MONEY ";;1/ZBAR.;
"STEADY STATE PRICE LEVEL ";;PBAR;
"STEADY STATE AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT ";;LBAR;
"STEADY STATE NOMINAL INTEREST RATE ";;RBAR.;
"SS REAL INTEREST RATE ";;RBAR/R.GMBAR;
"SS LAMDBA ";;LAMBAR;
WAIT;
"STEADY STATE: SECTORS' VARIABLES";
44.
"STEADY STATE WAGE SECTOR A ";;XBAR;
"STEADY STATE WAGE SECTOR B ";;XIBAR.;
"STEADY STATE WAGE SECTOR C ";;XIIBAR;
"STEADY STATE WAGE SECTOR D ";;XIIIBAR;
"STEADY STATE OUTPUT SECTOR A ";;YABAR;
"STEADY STATE OUTPUT SECTOR B ";;YBBAR;
"STEADY STATE OUTPUT SECTOR C ";;YCBAR;
"STEADY STATE OUTPUT SECTOR D ";;YDBAR.;
"STEADY STATE PRICE SECTOR A ";;PABAR;
"STEADY STATE PRICE SECTOR B ";;PBBAR;
"STEADY STATE PRICE SECTOR. C ";;PCBAR.;
"STEADY STATE PRICE SECTOR D ".;PDBAR.;
"STEADY STATE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR. A ";;LABAR;
"STEADY STATE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR B ";;LBBAR.;
"STEADY STATE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR C ";;LCBAR.;
"STEADY STATE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR D ";;LDBAR.;
-";
OUTPUT OFF;
THIRD CODE
(aSTARTING POINT AFTER THE IMPACT EFFECT H.
S=-13GMTI-RGMTIIP[2,11-RONITI-RGMTI-RGMTI-R.GMTIRGIVIT*R.AA;
(0) FORECAST HORIZON (9)
NIB=11;
(ct GENERATING IMPULSES (a
TI=--SEQA(1,1,NIR+1);
IR=ZEROS(ROWS(MKE)+ROWS(H),NIR);
1=1;
DO UNTIL I>NIR;
IR [1:ROWS (MKE),I]=S;
M [ROWS(MKE)-1-1:ROWS(IR ),I1=(II*S);
S=MKE*S;
1=1+1;
END();
IR=REAL(IR);
IR.I=ZEROS(ROWS(IR),1);
IR.1[7,1]=RCNIT;
JR I[15,1]=IP [1,1];
II11[21,11=IP[2,11;
111.1[27,11=ZT;
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III.R.I=ONES(4,1);
III.I[48:51,11=IP[1,1]*I11.11I;
IRI[52:55,1]=IP[3,11*IRRI;
III.I[56,1]=IP[3,11;
IRI[57,1]=IP [4,1];
IIII[58,1]=IP[5,1];
I)) THE GROSS INFLATION SERIES 0
INF=ZER.OS(1,NIII.+1);
INF[1,11=IP [2,1];
INF[1,2]=IRI[7,1]-1-IR[21,1] -IP[2,11;
INF[1,3:NI11.+1],411.[7,1:(NIR-1)]-1-IR[21,2:N111.]-111.[21,1:(NIR.-1)];
IR=IR*100;
0 PLOT IMPULSE RESPONSES 0
LIBRARY PGRAPH;
GR.APHSET;
PLEGCTL={2,3,6,4.5};
_PCOLOR={15};
PLTYPE={1,6,3};
PDATE="";
PLEGSTR=
"INF\000"\
"Y\000"\
"R.GM \000";
FOURTH CODE
ORUN BOTH FIRST AND SECOND CODES BEFORE THIS FILE AND RUN AGAIN THE FIRST
ONE AFTER THIS FILE BEFORE THE FIFTH CODE0
0 DIMENSION OF CONTROL SPACE (NC), PREDETERMINED (NK), AND NON-PREDETERMINED
VECTORS (NS), EXOGENEOUS STATE VECTOR. (NN)
(0 OR 	 OF VARIABLES: PREDETERMINED=ENDOGENOUS STATE=K :
PHI I PII I P11 XIII I XII I XI I ERGM
NON-PREDETERMINED = COSTATES = L:
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES=N:
R GM
FLOWS=CONTROLS=C:
EY I EY1 I EY2 1 EY3 I EP I EP1 I EP2 I EP3 I EZ 1 EZ1 1 EZ2 I EZ3 1 ECP I ECP1 1 ECP2
ECPIII I ECPII I ECPI 1 ECP3
01 DIMENSION AND NAME 0
NC=22;
NK=7;
NL=1;
NN=1;
NAMEC="EY"1"EY1"1"EY2"1"EY3"1
"EP"I"EP1"1"EP2"1"EP3"1
"EZTEZ1"1"EZ2"1"EZ3"1"ECP"1"ECP1"1"ECP2"1
"ECPIIITECPIITECPITECP3"1"X"1"Y"1"P"; CONTROLS Kt)
NAMEK="PIII"1"PII"1"PI"1"XIII"1"XII"1"XITERGM"; END STATES 0
NAMEL-="Z"; C()STATES
NAMEE="R.GM"; 0) EXOGENOUS STATES (SHOCKS) tt
OSSVAL=ENDSTATES1EXSTATESICOSTATESICONTR.OLSIEXTRACONTROLS
SSVAL=PIIIBARIPHBARIPIBARIXIIIBARIXIIBARIXIBARIR.GMBARI
RGMBARI
ZBARI
YBARIYBARIYBARIYBARIPBARIP1BARIP2BARIP3BARI
ZBAR IZBARIZBAR IZBARICPBAR ICPBAR ICPBARI
CPBARICPBARICPBARICPBARIXBARIYBARIPBAR.1
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PABAR1PBBARIPCBARIPDBAR IYABARIYBBARIYCBANYDBARI
LABAR1LBBARILCBARILDBAR1LBARIRBARILAMBARI
01010101010101010;
MATRICES IN CONTROL SYSTEM: MCC*C(t)=MCS*S(t)+MCE*E(t) @
MCC=ZEROS(NC,NC);
MCC 1,1 =1;
MCC 2,2 =1;
MCC 3,3 =1;
MCC 4,4 =1;
MCC 5,5 =1;
MCC 6,6 =1;
MCC 7,7 =1;
MCC 8,8 =1;
MCC 9,9 =1;
MCC 10,10 =1;
MCC 11,11 =1;
MCC 12,12 =1;
MCC 13,13 =1;
MCC 14,14 =1;
MCC 15,15 =1;
MCC 16,16 =1;
MCC 17,17=1;
MCC 18,18 =1;
MCC 19,19 =1;
MCC 20,20 =1+EPS*(E-1)-K28;
MCC 20,1 =-K16+K5;
MCC 20,2 =K6-K17;
MCC 20,3 =K7-K18;
MCC 20,5 =--K12+K1;
MCC 20,6 =K2-K13;
MCC 20,7 =1(3-1(14;
MCC 20,8 =K4-K15;
MCC 20,4 =K8-K19;
MCC 20,9 =1(29;
MCC[20,10 =K30;
MCC 20,11 =K31;
MCC 20,12 =K32;
MCC 20,13 =-K23;
MCC 20,14 =-(K25+K26+K27)/3;
MCC 20,15 =-(K26+K27)/3;
MCC 20,16 =4(24/3;
MCC 20,17 =-(K24+K25)/3;
MCC 20,18 =-(K24+K25+K26)/3;
MCC 20,19 =-(K27)/3;
MCC 21,21 =1;
MCC 21,22 =1;
MCC 22,22 =1;
MCC 22,21 =-(1-S)/S;
MCC 22,20 =-,10;
MKEI=KEC1RHO;
NICS=ZEROS(NC,(NK+NL));
MCS[1:4,1:NK]=MOCKE[1:4,1:NK];
IvICS[5:8,1:NK]=MOCKE[7:10,1:NK];
MCS[9:12,1:NK]=MOCKE[13:16,1:NK];
MCS[13:18,1:NK]=MOCKE[21:26,1:NK];
MCS[19,1:(NK-1)1=MOCKE[23,1:(NK-1)]*KLK;
MCS[19,NK]=MOCKE[23,1*MKEI;
MCS[21,8]=-1;
MCS[22,4]=J3;
MCS[22,5]=J2;
MCS[22,6]=.11;
NICE=ZEROS(NC,NN);
MCE[21,11=1;
© MATRICES IN STATE EQUATIONS @
NISSO*E(S(t+1))+MSS1*S(t)=MSCO*E(C(t+1))+MSC1*C(t)+IVISEO*E(E(t+1)) + MSEl*E(t.)@
MSSO=ZEROS((NK+NL),(NK+NL));
MSSO[1,1]=1;
MSSO[2,2]=1;
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MSSO[3,3]=1;
IVISSO[4,4]=1;
IMSSO[5,5]=1;
MSSO[6,6]=1;
MSSO[7,7]=1;
MSSO[8,8]=B2;
MSS1=ZEROS((NK+NL),(NK+NL));
MSS1[1,2]=-1;
MSS1[2,3]=-1;
MSS1[4,5]=-1;
MSS1[5,6]=-1;
IMSS1[8,8]=B1;
MSCO=ZEROS((NK+NL),NC);
MSC1=ZEROS((NK+NL),NC);
MSC1[3,22]=1;
NISC1[6,211=1;
MSE0=ZEROS((NK-1-NL),NN);
MSE0[8,1 =1;
MSE1=ZEROS((NK-1-NL),NN);
MSE1[1,1 =-1;
MSE1[2,1 =-1;
MSE1[3,1 =1;
MSE1[4,1 =-1;
MSE1[5,1 =-1;
MSE1[6,1 =-1;
MSE1[7,1 =13.AA;
	 	 (61
0 RELATIONS LINKING FLOW VARIABLES (EXTRA CONTROLS) TO
FUNDAMENTAL CONTROLS AND STATES 
0 THE ORDER. OF VARIABLES IS: (Lb
NXF=24; (C h DIMENSION AND NAMES OF EXTRA CONTROLS 0
NA M EXC= "PA " I "PB" I "PC " "PD" "YA" "YB" I "YC " I"YD" I "LA" I"LB" I "LC " I "LD" "L "
1"11" I"LAM" I"Cl" I"C2" I"C3" I"C4" I"C5" I"C6" I"C7" I"C8"I "C9";
IME*XC(t) = MFC*C(t) + MEKE*[K(t)]E(t)1 -1- MEL*L(t)
MF=ZEROS(NXF,NXF);
IMF 1,1 =1;
IMF 2,2 =1;
IMF[2,1 =-1;
MF[3,3 =1;
ME 3,1 =-1;
IMF 4,4 =1;
IMF 4,1 =-1;
MF 5,5 =1;
MF 5,11=8/(S-1);
IMF 6,6 =1;
MF 6,5 -=-1;
IMF 6,1 =-T;
MF 6,2 =T;
MF 7,7 =1;
ME 7,5 =-1;
MF 7,1 =-T;
MF 7,3 =T;
MF 8,8 =1;
MF 8,5 -=-1;
ME 8,1 =-T;
IMF 8,4 =T;
IMF 9,9 =1;
ME 9,1 =1/(1-S);
IMF 10,101=1;
IMF 10,21=1/(1-5);
IMF 11,111=1;
ME 11,3[=1/(1-5);
IMF 12,12]--.1;
ME 12,41=1/(1-5);
ME 13,131=1;
ME 13,9)=1/A7;
ME 13,101=(R.GIMBARAEP5)/A7;
IMF 13,111--.-(RGNIBARA(2*EP5))/A7;
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MF 13,121=(11GMBARN3*EPS))/A7;
MF 14,141-=1/(RBAR-1);
MF 15,151=1;
MF 16,161=1;
MF 16,51=1;
MF 16,11=T;
MF 17,171=1;
MF 17,61=1;
MF 17,21=T;
MF 18,181=1;
ME 18,71=1;
ME 18,3I=T;
ME 19,191=1;
ME 19,81=1;
ME 19,41=T;
ME 20,201=1;
ME 20,11=SS1;
ME 20,5]=SS1;
ME 20,2I=SS2;
ME 20,61=SS2;
ME 20,3I=SS3;
ME 20,71=SS3;
ME 20,41=SS4;
ME 20,8I=SS4;
ME 21,211=1;
ME 21,141=1;
ME 22,221=1;
ME 22,61=1;
!OF 22,21=S/(S-1);
ME 23,231=1;
MF 23,71=1;
MF 23,31=S/(S-1);
MF 24,241=1;
MF 24,81=1;
MF 24,41=SAS-1);
IVIFC=ZEROS(NXF,NC);
MFC 1,211=1-S;
IVIFC 1,221=1-S;
IvIFC 15,21 =-1;
MFC 15,22 =1;
MFC 16,21 =1;
NIFC 16,22 =T;
MFC 17,21 =1;
MFC 17,22 =T;
IVIFC 18,21 =1;
MFC 18,22 =T;
MFC 19,21 =1;
IVIFC 19,22 =T;
MFC 20,21 =1;
MFC 20,22 =1;
MFC 21,21=1;
MFG 21,21 =-1;
MFC 21,22 =-1;
MFC 21,61=1;
MFC 21,10 r--V*(U1-1)/U1;
IVIFC 1,201-=-(1-S)*I30*(1-.10)+S;
MFC[2,20]=-EPS*S/T;
MFC[3,20]=--EPS*S/T;
MFC[4,201-=--EPS*S/T;
MFC[5,20]=SAS-1);
IVIFC[9,20]=1/(S-1);
MFKE=ZEROS(NXF,NK+NN);
MFKE11,41=-(1-S)*110*.13;
MEKE[1,5]=-(1-S)*110*J2;
IVIFKE[1,6]--(1-S)*110*J1;
MFKEI2,6]=EPS*S/T;
MFKE13,51=EPS*S/T;
MEKE[4,4]=EPS*S/T;
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MFKE[10,6]-=1/(S-1);
MFKE[11,5]=1/(S-1);
MFKE[12,4]=1/(S-1);
MFKE[22,6]=S/(S-1);
MFKE[23,5]=S/(S-1);
MFKE[24,4]=S/(S-1);
MFL=ZEI3.0S(NXF,NL);
MFL[14,11=V-1;
MFL[15,1]=-V*(U1-1)/U1;
MFL[21,1)=-V*(U1-1)/U1;
FVC=(INV(MF))*MFC;
FVKE=(INV(MF))*MFKE;
FVL=(INV(MF))*MFL;
IVISss0 = MSS() - MSCO*(INV(MCC))*IVICS;
MSssl = IVISS1 - IVISC1*(INV(MCC))*MCS;
MSse0 = MSE0 + MSCO*(INV(MCC))*MCE;
MSse1 = MSE1 + MSC1*(INV(MCC))*MCE;
W = -(INV(MSss0))*MSss1;
II = (INV(MSssO))*MSse0;
Q =- (INV(MSss0))*MSsel;
{X1,X3}=EIGV(W);
X11=REAL(X1);
AMU-=ABS(X11);
IN=SOBTC(AMU,1);
IND1=INDNV(IN,AMU);
1=1;
DO UNTIL I>(NK+NL)-1;
IF IND1[I,11== IND1[I+1,1];
IND1[I+1,11 = 1+IND1[1,1];
ENDIF;
I=I+1;
ENDO;
P=ZEROS((NK+NL),(NK+NL));
I=1;
DO UNTIL I>(NK+NL);
P[1:(NK+NL),I]=X3[1:(NK+NL),IND1[I,11];
I=I+1;
ENDO;
1V1U=ZEROS((NK+NL),(NK+NL));
I=1;
DO UNTIL I>(NK+NL);
MU[I,I]=X1[IND1[L1],11;
I=I+1;
END 0;
MU1=MU[1:NK,1:NK];
MU2=MU[NK+1:NK+NL,NK+1:NK+NL];
P11=P[1:NK,1:NICI;
P12=P[1:NK,NK+1:NK+NL];
P21=P[NK+1:NK+NL,LNK];
P22=P[NK+1:NK+NL,NK+1:NK+NL];
PS=INV(P);
PS11=PS[1:NK,LNK];
PS12=PS[1:NK,NK+1:NK+NL];
PS21=PS[NK+1:NK+NL,1:NK];
PS22=PS[NK+1:NK+NL,NK+1:NK+NL];
RKE=R [1:NK,1:NN];
R LE=R [NK+1:NK+NL,1:NN];
QKE=Q[1:NK,1:NN];
QLE=Q[NK+1:NK+NL,1:NN];
SP1=-(INV(MU2))*(PS21*RKE+PS22*RLE);
SP2=-(INV(MU2))*(PS21*QKE+PS22*QLE);
KLK=P11*MU1*(INV(P11));
KTL=(P11*MU1*PS12+P12*MU2*PS22)*(INV(PS22));
NAME=NAMEKINAMEEINAMELINAMECINAMEXC;
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FIFTH CODE
Oqi.EMEMBER. THE ORDER OF FILES R.UNNING:1) FIRST = PERFECT FORESIGHT SYS-
TEM; 2) SECOMND = PERFECT FORESIGHT DECISION RULES; 3) FOURTH = EXPECTATION
SYSTEM (GIVEN THE PF DECISION RULES); 4) SECOND = EXPECTATION SYSTEM DECISION
RULES; 5) FIFTH = IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTION OF THE EXP SYSTEM©
SHOCK THE EXOGENOUS VARIABLE©
S=010101010101010.01;
(a) FORECAST HORIZON 4
NIR=20;
4 GENERATING IMPULSES O.
TI=SEQA(1,1,NIR.);
IR.=ZEROS(ROWS(MKE)+ROWS(H),NIR.);
I=1;
DO UNTIL I>NIR.;
IR[1:ROWS(MKE),I]=S;
IRJR.OWS(MKE)+1:ROWS(IR ),I]=(H*S);
S=MKE*S;
I=I+1;
END 0;
IR=REAL(I11);
INF=ZEROS(1,NIR);
INF[1,1]=IR [31,11;
INF[1,2:NIR]=IR [8,1:(NIR.-1)1+IR[31,2:NIR]-IR[31,1:(NIR-1)];
IR.=IR IINF1W;
(o) PLOT IMPULSE RESPONSES
LIBRARY PGR.APH;
GR.APHSET;
PLEGCTL-={2,3,5,4.5};
PLEGSTR="R.GIvI \000"\
"Y\000"\
"INF \000";
XY(TI,IR	 [304,-1R.[564);
Chapter 6
On Price/Wage Staggering and
Persistence: A Unifying
Framework
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have seen that some models (i.e., Chari et al.
(1996) and Chapter 4) have seriously questioned the explanatory power of
staggered price/wage setting in accounting for output persistence for rea-
sonable parameter values. On the other hand, Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) and Erceg (1997) claim that their model can match the observed
degree of persistence. In the literature it hence seems there is no consensus.
236
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Besides, the comparison among existing models is far from straightforward
since Chari et al. (1996) focus on price staggering, Chapter 4 on wage stag-
gering, Erceg (1997) on both and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) employ
the yeoman-farmer hypothesis.
In this final chapter, we provide a unifying framework to analyse the is-
sue of output persistence in staggered wage/price models, an issue to which
a large part of this thesis has been devoted. Our aim is to clarify it by: (i)
highlighting the differences between price and wage staggering; (ii) analysing
which features of the underlying economy with superimposed price/wage
staggering are crucial for generating output persistence; (iii) ranking the dif-
ferent potential specifications according to their ability to generate output
persistence. In order to do so, we build a stylised log-linear model that
encompasses (most of) the existing microfounded models of price/wage stag-
gering.
Our results highlight that: (i) the difference between the persistence prop-
erties of price and wage staggering models derives from the underlying eco-
nomic structure, not merely from the fact of price staggering rather than
wage staggering. In particular, the substitutability between goods and/or
labour types plays the major role in generating persistence. In models with
only substitutability between goods, then price staggering naturally delivers
higher persistence than wage staggering, while in models with substitutabil-
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ity between labour types, the opposite is true. (ii) The distinction between
free mobility and no mobility of labour is fundamental. No-mobility-of labour
models (both "industrial" and "craft" union models) bring in new mecha-
nisms that increase persistence. (iii) "While in price/wage staggering models,
a substantial (in the sense of near random walk behaviour) degree of persis-
tence is an unlikely outcome, two models can deliver significant persistence:
the yeoman farmer model and the "craft" union models with wage stagger-
ing. (iv) Ceteris paribus (i.e., for realistic values of all the other parameters),
these conclusions do not depend on the particular value assigned to the in-
tertemporal elasticity of labour supply, which instead has been so far the
focus of this literature.
Note that the first result is at odds with Andersen's (1998a) one that
wage staggering models deliver higher persistence than price staggering one.
However, our analysis shows that Andersen's (1998a) finding is not due to
an intrinsic difference between wage and price staggering models, but to
the particular assumptions in the two cases there presented. The results
are useful not only for interpreting the existing literature but also for those
who might consider undertaking further research in this area. Specifically,
the combination of nominal and real rigidities has recently received renewed
attention (e.g., Jeanne (1998), Andersen (1998b), Kiley (1997), Bergin and
Feenstra (1998), Chapter 5). That line of research is likely to continue in the
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near future. We therefore think that our analysis of the effects of the deep
parameters of the underlying economy on the degree of persistence will prove
enlightening.
6.2 Reduced Form Staggered
Price/Wage Models
In this section we briefly review some results from the previous chapters to
concisely sum up the differences between the original Taylor (1979) model
and the corresponding models which can be obtained in a microfounded
framework. This will help us to understand the argument in the next sections
of the chapter.
(6.1)
(6.2)
(6.4)
(6.5)
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6.2.1 Taylor's Original (1979) Model
Taylor's (1979) model (ignoring discounting and the expectation operator)'
is
1 ,	 ,	 1	 ,
	
xt+i)
	 lyt	 Yt+i)
1 ,
Pt	 xt)
== mt — Pt •	 (6.3)
As Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and Blanchard (1990) noted (6.1) and (6.2)
imply
1 ,	 ,	 ,
xt = —2 (pt Pt+i) ± —2 g lYt 4- Yt+i)
where g --=	 The persistence root is
1 — •V-4 1 —
A = 	
1 +	 ± .4 •
Comments:
(i) Effect of -y (the only parameter in this model). The higher 7, the lower
the persistence. -y = 2 is the threshold value between negative and positive
persistence. If = 0, any temporary money shock has a permanent effect on
'We have seen in Chapter 4 that: (i) Discounting does not have a controversial effect.
The effect of [3 is very clear because it only changes (1/2) to something different, but it does
not enter the other parameters of the reduced form staggered model (i.e. 7, a). Moreover,
its quantitative effect (since 3 is thought to be very close to one) seems unimportant. (ii)
Uncertainty is not going to change the persistence properties of the models. Because these
are what we are interested in here, for simplicity it is better to leave uncertainty out.
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output. Hence, interesting values of -y are 7 E [0, 2]. Moreover, to get a value
of A = 0.8, -y should be as low as 0.025.
(ii) Since (6.2) does not include an output term, then constant returns to
labour are assumed, i.e., a = 1 (in the productiona function Y = Lc') and -y
is simply 2g.
6.2.2 Taylor's Generalised (1979) model
Taylor's (1979) model can be generalised to include decreasing return to scale
to labour. When a 1, then the aggregate supply equation becomes
1 ,
Pt = -2 lxt-i + xt) + aY t
where a is positive (and equal to 0-
Now suppose a model composed of (6.1), (6.6) and (6.3). Now -y and a
are the primitive parameters. The degree of persistence for this model is
A _	 2
	- 1+.+ VT
Substituting (6.6) in (6.1) yields (6.4) with g = i - a.
Comments:
(i) 7 and g no longer coincide (apart from the scaling factor 1/2) as in the
other case. Moreover, they can have (and are likely to have) different signs.
Recall that 7 is the primitive, while g is derived by substitution of (6.6) into
(6.1). Suppose -y is positive and low, as originally intended by Taylor. Then,
for a = 0.67, a -_-_- 0.5 and g is negative whenever 7 is lower than 1.
(6.6)
(6.7)
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(ii) It follows that the Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and Blanchard (1990)
statement does not hold anymore when a 1, because it will be difficult
to interpret (6.4) as a directly postulated wage rule (or, equivalently as a
labour supply curve) when g is negative. The model is a true 'relative wage
concern' model and there is no longer a direct correspondence between a
relative wage concern (6.1) and a real wage concern (6.4). In other words,
recalling (5.20), prices do not feedback into (6.1) and wages do respond only
to other wages and output. 2 That is exactly why g can be negative. Once
(6.1) is expressed in terms of prices, as in (6.4), prices already incorporate
the increase in output due to ay t and this should be subtracted from -y/2.
(iii) Look at (6.7). Given that 7 is a primitive object, the effect of a
is always counterintuitive: the higher a, the lower the persistence. 3 This is
because only output affects wages. The higher a, the higher the response of
output (and lower the one of prices) to a money shock, then the higher the
response in wages and quicker the adjustment. Therefore there is a trade-off
between the size of the impact effect on output and its persistence, induced
by a-.
2 Such a model is hence very similar to the one in the previous chapter in Case A with
Q=0.
3 Simple intuition would suggest that a = 1 corresponds to the maximum degree of
nominal rigidities (because firms could satisfy any excess demand without changing their
prices) and thus that persistence would be increasing in a.
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6.2.3 A reduced form `microfounded' model
In standard microeconomic reasoning, agents care about their own real wage
and not about their relative wage. Hence, a standard microfounded model
would deliver a model composed of (6.4), (6.6), (6.3). As said in (ii) before,
this model and the one presented before, even if analytically equivalent, are
radically different in their economic interpretation. Now g and a are the
primitive parameters and -y = 2(g + a) is derived. The solution is
1 — -V1 ± cr (g — 1)A=
1 + V1 + o-(g — 1)
Comments:
(i) Since g is positive, calibrating a = 0.5 would deliver a value of -y always
bigger than 1.
(ii) The effect of a is now ambiguous and depends on the value of g.
If g > 1, then persistence is decreasing in a and viceversa. The intuition
is as follows. Suppose a money shock mt occurs after the wages are set.
Then, in the impact period yt = amt and pt --- (1 — o)mt . The wage set next
period will be influenced by two components: (a) the first equal to (1 —
because prices have increased; (b) the second equal to go-m t , because output
has increased. A change Au in a diminishes (a) by -Au and (b) by g Ao-,
with a net effect of (g — 1)Aa, as (6.8) shows.
(iii) Moreover, if g > 1, then A < 0. It follows that for this model to
deliver persistence g must necessarily be lower than one and in this case
(6.8)
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persistence is decreasing in o-.
6.3 A Perfectly Flexible Wage and Price Mi-
crofounded Model
In this section we sketch a perfectly flexible wage/price log-linear model
which can be thought as derived from a log-linearised version of a micro-
founded model. The model is very general in its formulation and could be
easily derived as a log-linearised version of most models of monopolistic com-
petition such as the one in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) or the different
versions presented by Dixon and Rankin (1994)in their survey. Even if all the
equations are log-linear, therefore, the model is not an ad hoc model; we will
keep referring to the underlying microeconomic structure of the model and of
its several versions in the next section. The general framework is similar to
the one of the previous chapters. The size of the whole economy is normalised
to 1 and thus the economy consists of a continuum of industries indexed by
E [0, 1]. 4 Every industry produces a single differentiated perishable prod-
4 The fact that we have a continuum (a 'large' number) of agents means that each firm
and household takes the aggregate variables as given and there is no strategic interaction
among them. Readers need to keep this in mind. We often just present the formulas for
sectors, which are obtained simply aggregating across typical firms or households belonging
to the sector. However, it is not like having only two agents (one for each sector). If that
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uct. Households are indexed by j E [0, 1] and they live forever. All firms
have the same technology and households have the same preferences. Prefer-
ences are CES over consumption goods which are gross substitutes. In order
to ease the introduction of staggering in the next section, the supply side of
the economy is divided in two sectors: A and B, for simplicity of equal size
(one half). The aggregate demand is given by a standard aggregate demand
equation'
= mt p, •	 (6.9)
As usual, lower case variables denote log-deviations from steady state. The
aggregate price level is just the average of the two sectors' prices (since firms
was the case we would need to take into account strategic interactions.
5 Note that we impose a constant-velocity-of-circulation aggregate demand function on
the model, because we want to focus on the supply side of the model. Even if this aggregate
demand looks as a static one, (6.9) can be derived from intertemporal optimisation in two
cases. First, as Benassy (1995) shows, the velocity of circulation of money is constant
in an intertemporal optimising model, whenever money is injected only through interest
payments on bonds. Second, given the utility function of Chapter 4, we have seen that
the log-linearised aggregate demand is equal to y t = mt — Pt + zt , where the last term
evolves according to a pure forward-looking equation. Following a one, temporary i.i.d.
money shock, then zt jumps immediately to the steady state, that is, it stays constant.
Then, if money shocks are temporary and not autocorrelated zt does not have any effect
on persistence and we can just impose (6.9) on the model, as we did in Chapter 4.
1 ,
Pt = —2 Wilt + PBt) (6.10)
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belonging to the same sectors will set independently the same price)
where pxt = price of sector X for X = A, B. Firms are identical and labour
is the only factor of production. From a short-run production function (in
levels) of the form Yt -= ceL7, the sectors' supply functions are
PA, = WA, + aYA t 	 (6.11)
PBt
 = WBt ± agst	 (6.12)
where a = 1-1 and wxt = nominal wage in sector X; yxt = sector's X real
,
output. Note that (6.11) and (6.12) hold regardless of whether the goods
market is competitive or monopolistic, as long as each firm faces a demand
curve with constant elasticity.' The only difference between the two cases,
in fact, is the presence of a constant mark-up (given that the elasticity of
demand is constant) in the equation in levels for the monopolistic goods
markets; but then in the log-linearised version the constants disappear. The
two cases then have the same log-linear formula for the supply functions of
a typical firm.
Industries produce differentiated goods and 0 is the elasticity of substitu-
tion among goods. 7 Industries' demands are derived from a log-linearisation
G This actually is the usual assumption in monopolistic competition macromodels.
'Despite the fact that industries produce differentiated goods, we can still regard a
CHAPTER 6. A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK	 247
of the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formula
YAt = 0 (13 , — Pit t ) + Yt
YB, = 0 (Pt — Pst)+Yt -
Note that (6.13), (6.14) and (6.10) yield
1 ,
Yt = —2 lYA, + YBe
(6.13)
(6.14)
(6.15)
which simply states that aggregate output is given by the weighted average
of outputs in a typical industry of each sector.
Households are also divided in two groups of equal size (one half), C and
D. The standard first-order condition for labour supply (in levels) equates
the ratio between the marginal disutility of labour and the marginal utility
of consumption to the real wage (Le 
5
	
=
	
•
-1-) Assuming an additivelyPt	 Uc 
separable utility function, we can write
wc, = 7111 1c, + 71cccct +Pt	 (6.16)
W	 11111Dt + icc CDt + Pt	 (6.17)
where ws, = nominal wage in group S, for S = C, D ; 1st = amount of
labour supplied by a typical household in group S ; cg = consumption of a
competitive goods market as encompassed by these formulas. This would be the case in
the framework of the previous chapters, where in each industry there are a 'large' number
of firms, and not only one.
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typical household in group S ; --= > 0 is the elasticity of the marginal
disutility of labour with respect to labour; 77, = -ujcC > 0 is (minus) the
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to consumption.
Throughout, we will assume that m i and 17„ are constant (as for most of
the utility functions used in macromodels). Given that we have assumed
an additively separable underlying utility function, then ri ll and 7/cc are the
inverses of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labour supply and
in consumption respectively. Moreover, ricc coincides with the income effect
on labour supply.8
Whenever there is some heterogeneity across infinitely-lived households in
macromodels, this creates an analytical problem. As discussed in Chapter 1,
the usual way to deal with heterogeneity and to avoid any distributional com-
plication is to assume complete markets. Agents can then completely insure
themselves against idiosyncratic shocks or unpredictable fluctuations. This
implies the marginal utility of consumption to be equalised across households
each period. Hence, given an additively separable utility function, households
consume the same in each period. Since the goods market equilibrium im-
plies y, = (cc, + c D, ), then each of the two groups consumes half of the real
'Parallel to the supply functions for the goods market, i.e., (6.11) and (6.12), the supply
functions in the labour market, i.e., (6.16) and (6.17) hold both in a competitive labour
market and in a labour market characterised by monopoly unions, provided labour demand
functions have a constant elasticity.
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output each period, that is
= Yt	 (6.18)
(6.19)
So far we have presented a rather general perfectly flexible wage/price log-
linear model whose equations are consistent with virtually any monopolistic
competition macromodel. However, we have a perfectly flexible wage/price
model with 12 variables (i.e., yt, Pt, PAt Pst, wAt, wBe YAe YB t 1ct , lpt,
cct , cDt ), one exogenous variable, i.e. mt , and 10 equations ((6.9), (6.10),
(6.11), (6.12), (6.13), (6.14), (6.16), (6.17), (6.18), (6.19)). The two missing
equations are the sectors' labour demands, /ct and 1 Dt . These two latter
equations will be different according to the type of labour market structure
we assume. As we will see, different labour market structures turn out to be
crucial for the persistence properties of the staggered version of the model.
To introduce staggering in the model we proceeds in the following way.
The first step is to close the perfectly flexible wage/price model, that is
to write down the two equations for the sectors' labour demands according
to the different labour market structures we will analyse in the next section.
The second step is to find the optimal rule in the perfectly flexible wage/price
model for the nominal variable we want to stagger (price or wage), given the
labour market structure. The third step transforms the perfectly flexible
wage/price model in a staggered one, by assuming that the nominal variable
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of interest is set for two periods in staggered fashion, and it is simply given
by the average of today's and tomorrow's optimal rules (which we have just
found for the perfectly flexible wage/price model in step two). Thus, our
approach is very similar to Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapter 8. 9
 We
investigate the persistence properties of several different models according to
the type of labour market we consider and to the nominal variable (price or
wage) we stagger. We show how each of these different models corresponds
to a model in the literature and can be expressed in the same reduced form
as one of the three models of the previous section. The implications of
the alternative economic structures for persistence will then be immediately
evident.
6.4 Staggered Models
In this section we present different wage/price staggering models, derived
from the perfectly flexible wage/price model of the previous section. The
discussion and the comparison among all these different models are postponed
to section 6.5.
9 The same result can be obtained by staggering directly the equation for the nominal
variable of interest in the static model and then substitute out to get a reduced form alike
one of the models in the previous section. That is, we can first make step three and then
step two. This is just saying that it does not matter the order in which step two and three
are performed.
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6.4.1 Staggered Prices and Perfect Labour Mobility:
Chari et al. (1996)
First, we need to close the perfectly flexible wage/price model. If labour is
completely mobile across sectors, households supply labour to both sectors
in the economy and the wage is equalised across households and firms, i.e.
WA , = wB, =	 wpt. Given (6.16), (6.17), (6.18) and (6.19) then the
two groups of households supply the same amount of labour. Thus
1
Yt	 (6.20)
and this gives the two missing sectors' labour demands in the perfectly flexible
wage/price model.
Second, we find the optimal rule in the perfectly flexible wage/price model
for the variable we want to stagger, that is sectors' prices. Substituting (6.20)
in (6.16) and (6.17) and using (6.18) and (6.19), yields
7111
wc, = WD, wt = Pt +	 + cc) Yt Pt	 Yt • (6.21)
Use this expression in (6.11) and (6.12) and substitute out sectors' output
making use of (6.13) and (6.14), to obtain
;--y + a
PA t = PBt = pt (
	
+
1 + ctO) Yt
(6.22)
which is the optimal pricing rule of sector-A firms as a function of pt and y,.
Third, we introduce staggering. We then suppose that each firm in a given
sector, acting independently, sets the price for two periods in a staggered
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fashion. That is, while firms in sector A fix the price in even periods, the
ones in sector B fix it in odd periods. Thus
	
1,	 ,	 1 (  -y + a
Pi t+ 3 	 pit+	 l.+1 = Pt+3 + pt+.+1) + 2	 ao (Yt+s +y+8+1) (6.23)
for i E A and for s = 0, 2, 4...
1(	
-
\ 1 (  + a 
+81 O— Pit.+s —	 it+ 1 + 13t+81 ± 2 1 + a0 (t+-1+ yt+s)	 (6.24)2	 s
for i E B and for s = 0,2,4... .
Aggregating across sectors and denoting the staggered variable by ;, the
reduced form of the model can be written asl°
1	 1
xt = —2 (Pt + p 1 ) ± —2 ( y, +y+1)
1
Pt = —2 ( xt-1 + x)
1() As explained in footnote 9 above, we can reverse the order of steps two and three.
That is, the same expressions can be obtained by staggering at the outset (6.11) and (6.12)
for a typical firm in each sector. That is, for a typical firm i in sector A
1 ,	 ,	 a ,
Pit = Pi l+.4+1 = lw ,+
" +	 ) + Mt+. + for i E A and for s = 0, 2, 4...
and then aggregate across sector A and substitute out for w and yA using (6.21) and
(6.13).
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Yt = Tnt —
where 7 =	 ) 11 The model1±a0 •	 then corresponds to the one in 6.2.1 with
g, and its solution for the root governing output thus is
1 — \/=?I
A-
- 1+
7711 + (771„± 1 — 0•
; where
	
-=-=- —
a- ± 0 (1 — o-) (6.25)
Given the staggered version of (6.11), the equation for the staggered van-
able is
1	 a
x = —(w + w ) +
	 + YAt+i)t	 2	 t	 t+1
	 2
which can be expressed as
(6.26)
1
xt
 =
	 (x_ 1
 xt+1) (wt + w t+1) + a(yA t + YAt+i) =	 (6.27)
1	 a 
(	 x
t+1 '	 (1 +1	a0) (wt wt+1)	
(
+ )	 yt+1)
where (.4.), = (w, — p,) represents the real wage. If a- = 1 (constant returns
to labour), then a = 0 and equation (6.27) exactly matches equation (46) in
Chari et al. (1996), p. 13. Moreover, in this case 7 = = + 71ce , exactly
as their 'y at page 15.
The model is also a generalisation of the ad hoc price staggering model
of Andersen (1998a), which is obtained setting a =1.
11 To avoid confusion, it is better to stress that we denote: 5% as the sensitivity of real
wage to aggregate output (wx, — p i = y, ) and 7 as the sensitivity of sectors' price to
aggregate output (px, —p, =_- 7-yy, ).
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6.4.2 Staggered Prices and No Mobility of Labour: the
Yeoman-Farmer Model: Blanchard and Fischer
(1989) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
In this case, households of group C work for firms in sector A, while house-
holds of group D work for firms in sector B. The model is equivalent to
the yeoman-farmer model where each household produces a differentiated
good and there is no labour market. Thus, the two missing equations in the
perfectly flexible wage/price model are: lct = 1A, = -Y=4t- , WA ,	 wct and
1D, = /B, =
	 wB, = wip t . The wage equation in the perfectly flexible
wage/price model is given by
WAt	
Yo.At
 +y, + Pt	 (6.28)
ri ll + Ti cc (1+ 0a)ai
= Pt ±	 Yt = Pt+ Yt •
a(1+ Oa) +
(6.28) corresponds to (6.21) in the previous model, and we can proceed
following the same steps as before to get the optimal pricing rule for the
farmer. However, apart from the different expression for 3, the model is
analytically equivalent to the previous one. Thus, we know the solution is
A = 	  
	 where ;7 = -J=—Ea- Again, the persistence properties of this
model depend only on
7/// + aricc + 1 — 
R2 = 7=
a +8 (1 — 0-) + 077 11 •
(6.29)
The model encompasses two recent yeoman-farmer models: Blanchard
P,	 (	 (V1(yi)
— — 1) (6.30)
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and Fischer (1989) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Normally a stan-
dard yeoman-farmer model includes in the utility function a term V (yi ) to
represent the disutility from producing for the farmer. The standard first
order condition that gives the optimal price in a farmer model is (in levels)
It states that the optimal ratio between the price of the good produced
by the farmer and the aggregate price level is given by a constant mark-
up over the ratio between the marginal disutility from effort in production
and the marginal utility of consumption. Log-linearising (6.30) for sector A
households, it yields
PAt — Pt = nyyYAt ILA	 (6.31)
where 71yy = (VyiyiYi/Vyi) > 0 is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of
production. Given our production function, i.e., Yt = aL7 , simple algebra
shows that nyy = (7711/a a). Substituting (6.13) in (6.31) gives
Chiy 7/cc )	 mi+ ancc+ 1 — a)
7Y-PA  — Pt =	 =	 Yt =  Yt1 Onyy	 a + 0 (1 — +
(6.32)
which is the optimal pricing rule for the perfectly flexible wage/price model.
Performing then step three, that is considering (6.32) under staggering, shows
our model to be equivalent to Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) (see their
formula for t at p.316).12
12 With respect to Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) model, this claim is subject to the
caveats of footnote 15 in Chapter 4.
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Our model is also a generalisation of Blanchard and Fischer (1989) model,
whose specification of preferences implies zero income effect on labour supply
(i.e., ri cc = 0). Then
+ (t9	 1)71yy
Pitt = Pt + [ 71"	 Yt = [1 	 pt + [ 	  mt (6.33)1 + 7720 0	 1+ ilyy	 1 + llyy0
which is equivalent to equation (9) of Blanchard and Fischer (1989), p. 385.1'
6.4.3 Staggered Wages and Perfect Labour Mobility:
the ad hoc models
The combination of wage staggering and perfect labour mobility is unusual
in microfounded models. The reason is very simple: there are no convincing
microfoundations for this case. Indeed, if wages are staggered, it means that
someone must have the power to set them. That is, staggered wages should
go together with monopoly unions which set the wages. The unions therefore
must enjoy market power and there can not be perfect labour mobility or a
competitive labour market. However, this case is of interest to illustrate the
difference between price and wage staggering. Further and most importantly,
this is the so called "expected-market—clearing-case" employed by the ad hoc
literature of the 70's and 80's on staggered wage models (e.g., Gray (1976),
"They use the following utility function for the yeoman farmer:	 U =
—(91 -) d ( 11-4) 1 d — 	 Hence, the elasticity of the marginal disutility of production
is given by (0 — 1). Substituting 71yy with (0 — 1) equation (6.33) exactly match theirs.
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Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979)). Gray's (1976), Fischer's (1977) or Taylor's
(1979) types of nominally rigid labour contract are set in order to achieve an
ad hoc target wage level, which is the one that clears the labour market 'in
expectation'. 14
 In terms of our microfounded perfectly flexible wage/price
model, this assumption implies that in each firm the workforce is equally
divided between the two groups of workers. Then the reference wage for all
the firms in each period is equal to (1/2) (w At + wth ). Moreover, all the firms
would charge the same price and produce the same level of output. Hence
the one-period nominal wage contract will simply be
w, = p, + (7): + 7/cc) Yt = Pt ± Yt
and under staggering
1
X t = (Pt + pt+1) + —2 'Y(Yt +y) •
The aggregate price level is given by
1
=- PAt Ps t == —2 (xt + xt) + aYt •
(6.34)
(6.35)
(6.36)
The model then corresponds to the one in 6.2.3 with g =5% . The solution
— \r/7-is hence given by A — 1—V1+a(g-1)	 1 	 where
1-1-V1-1-a(g-1)
R3 -= 0--7y+1-0-= + anec + — a •	 (6.37)
"Therefore the assumption that employment is always on the labour demand curve is
inconsistent with optimisation. This is not true in monopoly union models. There the
wage is above the competitive one, and ex post it is optimal for the household-union to
satisfy an unexpected increase in labour demand.
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This model also corresponds to the staggered wage ad hoc model in An-
dersen (1998a) when ;5% = 0 is imposed. This restriction is at the root of
Andersen's (1998a) result that wage staggering models are potentially able
to deliver persistence while the price staggering ones are not. The intuition
provided by Andersen (1998a) states that in wage staggering models the ad-
justment burden is borne by the prices, while wages do not react to excess
demand conditions. While this is correct as the description of the impact
effect of a money shock when wages are preset, the argument can not be au-
tomatically transferred to the dynamic model. In other words, when workers
renegotiate a new wage, they will take into account the expected (labour)
demand conditions (hence 3 should be different from 0).
6.4.4 Staggered Wages and No Mobility of Labour:
Chapter 4 Model
Here households of group C only work for firms in sector A, while households
of group D work for firms in sector B. Then, equation (6.28) holds and
staggering yields
1 ,
xt = —2 wt + Pt+i)+ -2 (Yt + Yt+i) (6.38)
where now
	
[ria+71,c(i+ea),1. The model is then analytically equivalent to0 (i±ea)+0Thi
the previous one, and the solution just depends on
[a + 0(1 — (7)][71 11	 o-ri cc + 1 —
R4 = 1 ± 0-(y - 1) =
	
	
(6.39)
o- + 0(1 — a) + 071a
[7111 +77ce (0- +0( 1— al _ [ 5 7iii + 71
:"-Y =
(a ± 0(1— 0-)) + 077u
	
1 ± Frill
(6.40)
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_7 can be written as
which corresponds to the expression for g in Chapter 4 (p. 136).
6.4.5 Staggered Wages and Craft Unions: Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987), Erceg (1997)
Another very widely used hypothesis to depict the labour market in micro-
founded models is the one of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and recently used
in works focused on the persistence issue (e.g., Erceg (1997), Kim (1996)).
The labour market is there assumed to be composed of a large number
of households that supply differentiated labour inputs. Firms regard each
household's labour services as an imperfect substitute for the labour services
of other households. Then, households who provide a particular labour ser-
vice group together as a union and act as wage-setters in the labour market.
This labour market structure is sometimes called a "craft" union structure,
while the one presented in the previous sections is named "industrial" union
structure (see e.g., Dixon and Rankin (1994)). Indeed, in the first case unions
are organised by labour skills, while in the other case unions are characterised
as specific to the industry to which its members supply (the only type of)
labour. Note further that both cases imply a different kind of labour immo-
bility. In a "craft" union labour market structure labour can not move across
1
13 , = 19 (w t w3t) + 77 y t • (6.43)
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skills, while in a "industrial" union labour market structure workers can not
move across sectors.
With respect to the perfectly flexible wage/price model of section 6.3, the
production function for a firm i is now a CES, that is (in levels)
cri9
Yit = [J.
3
	 (6.41)
where '19 is the elasticity of technical substitution between different types
of labour inputs.' This production function yields the following constant
elasticity demand for labour type j of firm i
W  ] -19 1
Liit = [ wt	 Yit (6.42)
	
where W, = [f.
	 is the wage index (which exactly parallels the
	
3	 Jt
standard Dixit-Stiglitz price index for differentiated goods). Note that since
all the firms face the same wage index, they will produce the same level of
output. We can aggregate across firms and then log-linearise (6.42), to obtain
the labour demand for labour type j in the whole economy (in log-deviations)
We can then aggregate across households who fix the wage in the same
periods, realising that within each cohort a symmetric equilibrium holds such
15 Note that we use 0 for the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods and
for the elasticity of technical substitution between different types of labour inputs.
(6.44)
(6.45)
71) [91 w t +	 77.) yt + Pt](1 +179m i \ o-WDt (6.48)
o- 
+ 77.) Yt + Pt]
	
(6.49)
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that households in the same cohort will fix the same wage. Hence, the missing
equations for labour demand to close the perfectly flexible wage/price model
are
1
lct = 79 ( wt WCt) —yt
CT
\	 1
/D, = 79(wt
 — WD)t + (.yt
where
1 ,
= —2 Olict + Wipe) • (6.46)
Equation (6.44) matches equation (30) in Erceg (1997).
Substituting (6.44) and (6.45) respectively in (6.16) and (6.17), we get
the optimal wage setting rule for households of group C and D, that is
WCt7111( 	 1 	 ) [797711W,
	 lice) Yt	 Pt]1 + /9mi	 o- (6.47)
and this is the equation we need to consider for the staggering model."
Before doing that it is convenient to substitute out the wage index using
(6.46) into (6.47) and (6.48) to get
7971//WCt = (	
1
1	
[in2 — Dr
16 Note that unsurprisingly (6.47) and (6.48) immediately imply that in the static model
the two groups of households set the same wage, that is a symmetric equilibrium holds.
This obviously is not the case in the wage staggering model, because the two cohorts of
households set the wage in different periods.
(Yt	 Yt+1)
1 1 [ 1-1,1 ± 71c, — a'1971]
x, =	 (.13t
	 Pt+i) ± 2	 + 7977// (6.53)
R5 = 1 + c)-(;y- — 1) = hi + 0-71cc+ 1 — a1 + 7111 (6.54)
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WDt =
( 1 
(-7111 + 71cc) + Pt][7/ )	 lu wc1 ±
(6.50)
Now suppose we use these two formulas to derive the staggered wage
model, then we can write the supply side as
(
1 	 1 f [ 1971/i x + CL + 77 ) y + p ]
	
1 ± qu- 2 U. 2 t- 1	 0-	 cc t	 '
i[ 2 Xt+1 1 (T. 1 licc) Yt+1 ++] }_i_	 19rlit 	 _i_	 7111 j__
1
	
Pt — PAr = PB t = wt ± ay t =	 + X,_,) + ay,
x t =
(6.51)
(6.52)
which, substituting out for	 and x
	 in (6.51), delivers the following
reduced form of this model
1
Pt = W t
 ayt = —2 ( X t xt-1) ayt
Yt	 Tilt Pt
where now -7 = +77' al97111 . As did the two previous ones, the model againi+unll
corresponds to the one in 6.2.3 with g = -7 and the solution hence is
First, as Erceg (1997) noted, the group of households adjusting its wage
upward following a positive money shock realises that it will experience some
reduction in relative demand for its labour skill, according to the elasticity 79.
This will make it to choose a smaller nominal wage increase. The intuition is
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confirmed by the following equation, obtained by substituting out the price
level in (6.53)
xf
1	 I- 71 + Tice + a l
=	
-
- (x , + 
x+1t ) + [ a 1 +	 i (y, + yt+1)2	 t197/// (6.55)
which is the equivalent of equation (31) in Erceg (1997). As 79 —> oo, then
the coefficient on the aggregate demand term, i.e., 7, tends to zero and
persistence tends to a unit root.
Second, note that (6.51) actually resembles equation (5.20), in Case A in
Chapter 5. The "craft" union model makes a sort of relative wage concern
arise endogenously. However, the interpretation is radically different. Here,
workers are concerned with losing demand for their labour, while in Chapter
5 workers are concerned with status and sociological considerations.
Finally, if 79 =- 0, we are back to the "expected-market-clearing-case"
of section 6.4.3. This explicitly demonstrates why the "expected-market-
clearing-case" can not be supported by any sensible microfoundations. In
fact, a necessary condition for interior solution of the "craft" union model is
79 > 1. If 19 = 0, then the monopoly union would face a demand curve with
zero elasticity and in this case it would fix an infinite wage.
If we use the Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) labour market framework
to derive implications for persistence in the price staggering case, we are
obviously back to the case in section 6.4.1. In fact, if all the households reset
the wages in each period, then a symmetric equilibrium holds and they will
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all choose the same wage. Wages will be equalised across different "crafts".
Analytically it is like having just one type of labour and the parameter
becomes irrelevant for the dynamics of the model. The optimal wage rule
in the perfectly flexible wage/price model will simply be wc, = ?Dr), wt
Pt	 nce) y, as in (6.21) and we get the same reduced form model as
in section 6.4.1.
6.4.6 Liquidity Constraints
So far we have assumed the existence of complete markets which implies
households to consume always half of aggregate real output. In this section we
make instead the other extreme assumption: workers are completely liquidity
constrained. This assumption is actually going to make a difference only
in the "industrial" union - no labour mobility cases. Then, the liquidity
constraint hypothesis would imply that households consume the output of
the sector to which they supply labour (i.e., cct
 = YAt CDt YBt)•17
In the yeoman farmer model then farmers will consume what they pro-
duce. Basically, what changes is that the marginal effort cost in production
is now equal to
nit ,
W Pt = (7). -r ?)C) YAt = Co YAt (6.56)
17 A further assumption is actually needed: households only receive profits from firms in
their own sector.
[a+0(1-0-)]friii+o-ncc+i—oi R4	 a+0 (1-0")+07111
_ [040(1—a)]triu+criicc+i—oi 
R7 — a+0 (1-,)+on -4-19
• -0-71ec
R5 = 7111+arlcc+1-a
1+197)11
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Perfect labour mobility
No mobility of labour
("Industrial" unions)
Liquidity constraint
"Craft" unions
Price Staggering
R1 -- nti±ar1cr+1-aa-1-0 (1-a)
+1-cr 
R2 =	 cca+0 (1-o-)-1-Oriu
R6 	 riu+aricc+i-cr 
a+0 (1-a)-1-07111±Ouricc
R1 , 71ii+c7Th,„+1-0-
a+0 (1-a)
Wage Staggering
R3 = 7711 (771,„-F 1 — cr
Table 6.1: Persistence Properties of the Different Models
while the rest of the model stays the same. Thus, repeating steps one to
three, it yields
[	 a+ço	 1 + ("Lc ± 1 —R6 — g = (6.57)[i ± (a ± =a + 0
	
— a) + em i +
Similarly, in the wage staggering case instead, we have
T.,	 [Cr + 0 ( 1 
— 
a )] [71//	 arice ± 1 — (6.58)117 —
+ 0 (1 — o-) + Orin + Ourice
6.5 Wage/Price Staggering and Persistence
6.5.1 Analytical Results
Table 6.1 reports the different solutions delivered by the models according to
A=
1-1-V-R7•
Proposition 6.1. Look at Table 6.1 by rows. In all the cases but the last
one, wage staggering models always deliver lower ( or at most equal ) output
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persistence than price staggering models. With regard to the "craft" union
case the condition for R 1 < R5 is: '19 < (8-1)(1—a)
7711	 .
Specifically, apart from the "craft" union case, given a particular model
of price staggering Rips = [a + 0(1— a)]Rps, that is, the corresponding model
of wage staggering exhibits a value of R which is [a + 0(1— a)] times bigger
than the corresponding price staggering model. Given that 0 < a < 1 and
0 > 1, then [o- ± 0(1 — a)] > 1 and this implies Rw, > R. Note that
the wage staggering - "craft" union case contains the parameter 19 which is
missing from all the other cases. Its analytical comparison with the other
models therefore is obviously going to result in ambiguous statements.
Corollary 6.1.1. Under constant returns to scale to labour, i.e. a --= 1,
[a + 0(1 — a)] = 1 and hence R ip, =-- Rps . That is: R1 = R3, R2 = R4 and
R6 = R7. Hence, apart from the "craft" union case, if a = 1, wage staggering
and price staggering generate the same degree of output persistence.
Proposition 6.2. Look at Table 6.1 by columns.
(i) Whichever the staggered nominal variable, prices or wages, persis-
tence is the lowest if there is perfect labour mobility. That is, constraints on
labour mobility (both "industrial" and "craft" union cases) tend to increase
persistence.
(ii) Liquidity constraints tend to increase persistence. Indeed, models
with liquidity constraints exhibit a lower value of R with respect to the same
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models without such constraints.
Moreover, models with free mobility of labour, price or wage staggering,
are likely to fail the necessary condition R < 1 for monotonic convergence -
i.e., they are likely to deliver a negative root.
Additional results
(1) Effect of mi.
aR,
> 0	 for i = 1,3,6,7 ;
aR,	 1
<> 0 <-	 > —e 	 for i = 2, 4;unu
aR5	
	  1
<> 0 <	 1 ± a(n ce — 1) .
una
The effect of ni , is an interesting and delicate issue, as we know from the
previous chapters. Simple intuition suggests that nil 	  I 7	 I R
J, persistence as found by Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Chari et al.
(1996). Thus they conclude that a low value of nu (i.e., a high intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in labour supply) is necessary to generate
persistence. Here we show that depending on the particular set up of the
model the intuition might or might not hold. In particular, (1) it holds for
models with perfect labour mobility; (ii) it is likely not to hold for standard
calibration values in the no-labour mobility cases (both in "industrial" and
in "craft" union models); (iii) it holds again when liquidity constraints are
added to these latter models. We want to stress that again it is the underly-
ing economic structure chosen and not the difference between price and wage
ORi
Oa
a R2
a
OR,
a
aR4
30-
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staggering that matters.18
(2) Effect of ncc.
OR
> 0
077c,
for all the models.
This suggests that the specification of preferences with high intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption (low income effect on labour supply)
are a promising route to generate output persistence, as already suggested by
Chari et al. (1996) or in Chapter 4. However, the likely magnitude of these
derivatives changes from model to model being particularly low for liquidity
constraint models.
(9) Effect of o-.19
> o 	<	 .e,_, TiccZ el	 [ 0
	—01]7111:
> o 	<	 <	 > nec Z ;
> o <	 > 77„zi for i = 3, 5<
< 0
	 ii cc < 1
Simple intuition would suggest that a = 1 is the maximum degree of
18 Note that Blanchard and Fischer (1989) in a yeoman farmer model arrive with respect
to the effect of 7111 at the same conclusion of Chari et al. (1996) in their price staggering
model and free mobility of labour. This is because Blanchard and Fischer (1989) use a
particular utility function with zero income effects on labour supply (i.e., 1/0 > 7), 0 .
19 The cases for R6 and R7 are not presented because the conditions are very complicated
and meaningless expressions.
oe
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nominal rigidity, hence this case would deliver the maximum degree of per-
sistence. On the contrary, in staggered price models persistence is decreasing
in a for realistic parameter values. It is more difficult to reach any definite
conclusion for staggered wage models. However, 77 cc 1 is a sufficient, but
not necessary condition for persistence to be increasing in a for case 4 and
the overall condition for aRoo- to be negative is very likely to be satisfied.2°
(4) Effect of O.
< 0	 for i = 1,2,4,6,7
0	 for i = 3, 5
An increase in 0 therefore tends to increase persistence. The effect is the
same one described in Chapter 4. Following a positive money shock, the
new price (money wage) will be set higher than the one already fixed in the
previous period by the other sector. However, the bigger 0, the bigger the
loss in demand for goods (for labour) that firms (unions) in the sector will
face, fixing the new level of price (money wage) bigger than the one of the
other sector. Therefore, firms (unions) will tend to fix the new price (wage)
close to the existing one inducing more price (wage) level inertia.'
2() The condition is:
aR4	 enii(e — 1 )(nit+ (nice + 1 — 0-) 
<o <=> 77„ < 1 +
ao-	 [0- + (9(1— 0-)][0- + 6(1— 0) + (mit]
which substituting standard calibration values (see below) gives: 1 < 11.4.
21 Note that, apart the "craft" union case, the only case in which this effect is absent is the
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The same effect acts in the wage staggering - "craft" union model, but
now the relevant parameter is 79, the elasticity of substitution among different
types of skills. Hence: (0R5 /019) < 0. In the price staggering - "craft" union
model, instead, these effect is absent since all the unions renegotiate the wage
in each period, setting the same wage.
6.5.2 Quantitative Results
In this section we want to address the following question: is any of these
models likely to deliver high persistence?
Firstly note that persistence is rapidly decreasing for low values of R:
only values of R very close to zero could deliver some notable persistence.
For example, if we quite arbitrarily define a significant degree of persistence
to be a value of at least 0.5, then R should not be higher than 0.11.
Given the calibration literature, as indicative benchmark values, we take:
a = 0.67 , 0 = 6 , ricc = 1 , ij = 5 and 19 = 10. 22 For our benchmark case,
the values of R in the different models presented here and the implied values
one which corresponds to the ad hoc models, i.e., wage staggering and competitive labour
market. In this case, in fact, 0 does not play any role since both groups of households are
equally employed by all the firms.
22 This latter value is the one used by Erceg (1997). Moreover, we already know that
mi is actually quite difficult to tie down and that, given Pencavel's (1986) results, it could
range from 1 to infinity.
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for persistence are the following:
2.264 A1 = —0.24
R2 = 0.184 A2 = 0.4
R3 = 6 A3 = —0.42
R4 = 0.487 A4 = 0.18
R5 = 0.118 A5 = 0.49
R6 = 0.164 A6 = 0.42
R7 = 0.43 A7 = 0.21
As underlined in the previous section, while there are some slight differ-
ences between price staggering models and wage staggering ones, the critical
difference arises from the assumption on labour mobility. In fact, models
with free mobility of labour are likely to deliver a negative root for output
persistence. In "industrial" and "craft" union cases, there seems to be how-
ever a quantitative difference between price and wage staggering models. In
"industrial" union models, price staggering delivers more persistence, while
in "craft" union models wage staggering delivers more persistence. As a
conclusion only two class of models can deliver a substantial degree of persis-
tence: the yeoman farmer model (i.e., price staggering and no labour mobility
across sectors ( "industrial" unions)) and the model with wage staggering and
no labour mobility across skills ( "craft" unions). Moreover, even if liquid-
CHAPTER 6. A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK	 272
ity constraints do increase persistence, their quantitative importance seems
negligible.
6.5.3 Discussion
Given our unifying framework, we now review the models in the recent lit-
erature. With respect to Chari et al. (1996) model of staggered prices and
perfect labour mobility, our results can explain why they conclude that by
no means a staggered price model could deliver any notable persistence. In
their Section 4, Chari et al. (1996) shows that in their staggered price model,
putting a = 1, the sensitivity of the real wage to output is: R1
 = 7 = = 17//
ri cc . Hence, they conclude that, since rill
 should be at least 1, then 7 1.
That is, even assuming zero income effects, 7 is too high to generate any per-
sistence at all. It is worth noting that, since aR i /ao- is likely to be positive,
Chan et al. (1996) in their section on 'intuition', assuming a = 1, actually
presented a case biased against persistence (obviously, only with regard to
a). In other words, their 7 is biased upwards. Nevertheless, their main ar-
gument goes through since their model exhibits staggered prices and perfect
labour mobility. Central to the argument is the fact that persistence (7) is
increasing (decreasing) in the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply, which
is agreed to be very low.
However, as stated by (I), the argument is likely to be reversed for models
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with no mobility of labour. Indeed, the no-labour-mobility models reach a
minimum for R when m i tends to infinity, which goes exactly against the
critics of nominal rigidity propagation mechanism models. Nevertheless, in
contrast with what has been suggested so far by the literature, in the no-
labour-mobility models, the degree of persistence seems extremely insensitive
to the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour supply.
Consider just plausible values for E [1, oo). Then, ceteris paribus, in
the yeoman farmer model R2 varies from 0.23 to 0.17, that is, A2 E [0.35, 0.42],
in the staggered wage - "industrial" union model R4 varies from 0.61 to 0.44,
that is, A4 E [0.12, 0.2] and in the staggered wage - "craft" union model
R5 varies from 0.18 to 0.1, that is, A4 C [0.4, 0.52]. In other words, ceteris
paribus (i.e., for realistic values of the other parameters of the model), the
intertemporal elasticity of labour supply is NOT a key parameter of the
model with respect to its ability of generating persistence; 77 1/ alone can not
change substantially the persistence properties of these models.
An extreme example of this implication is the calibration of Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) . The benchmark calibration of their yeoman farmer
model is the following: Ti cc = 0.16, riyy = 0.47, a = 0.75 and 0 = 7.88, which
delivers a low value of 757 = 0.134 in (6.32). 23 However, they stress that their
23 They acknowledge the fact that such a low value of Tlyy is difficult to believe, since they
suggest it implies an intertemporal substitution in labour supply of 9.5 (i.e., nit	 0.105).
However, they calculate 71 11	 cr(ry— 77„), which they calibrate 11 //
 = 0.75(0.3 — 0.16) =
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results do not rely on high labour supply elasticity (i.e., low value of
Indeed, look at the formula for 7, i.e., (6.32). With such values of ric, and
0, if r
	
[0, 0° ) then 7 E	 = 0.16, 1/0 = 0.13]. That is, the value of 77yy
(and hence of 7m) is basically unimportant, as far as persistence is concerned,
since 7 does not change very much (alternatively, very marginal changes in
the value of 0 can keep 7 = 0.134).24
This example shows not only that the value of ?hi can be unimportant,
but also that instead the interrelation between nu and ncc is important. For
example, in the constant returns to scale case, as shown in Chari et al.
(1996) and in Chapter 4, particular (and peculiar) assumptions on the form
of the utility function could make all the models deliver very high persistence.
Specifically, a high intertemporal elasticity of labour supply (i.e.,
	 0)
and of consumption (i.e., iicc —> 0) make R.,	 0 and A,	 1 for all the
models.
From the above we can draw the following conclusion. Reading the lit-
erature, one gets the feeling that everything rests on the value of the in-
0.105. The formula for i, however, is consistent with a competitive labour market as
(6.21) shows. Simple algebra, instead, shows that in a yeoman farmer model the consistent
formula for nit as a function of 7y is: 77u = (r(1 + 0a)(n„ — -i)/(0-3; — 1) which given their
parameter values yields a negative (?) nit.
24 Figure 4.1 actually visualises this effect: the vertical distance between n„ and 1/0 is
squeezed to 0.03 and hence the curve in Figure 4.1 is basically flat.
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tertemporal substitution in labour supply. The above results show that to
focus only this parameter can be misleading. In models with staggering and
labour mobility, persistence is decreasing with m i , while the contrary is true
for models with staggering and no-labour-mobility. However, this is not the
reason why the first class of models can not deliver any persistence, while
the second one can. Changes in ri ll alone do not substantially change the
capability of the models of generating persistence.' In other words, if one
thought that the no-labour-mobility models were able to generate some per-
sistence simply because persistence was increasing in m i which is very high,
this would be wrong.
Moreover, the difference in the capability of the models in generating
persistence does not only depend upon one parameter (i.e., qii ), but it is
deeper and given by the structure of the model. In particular, the elasticities
of substitution between goods or skills are the key parameters in all the
staggering models. The intuition is straightforward. Endogenous nominal
stickiness arises if price (wage)-setting agents choose not to change their
prices (wages) by a large amount when they reset them, following a money
shock. In the above models, they would be willing to do so for only one
reason: to preserve demand. They recognise that when, following a positive
25 Note that, in the Chari et al. (1996) case, we could have also written: since R1 = g =
= 7111 + 7/ 	 ii ec is around one 1, then g	 1; that is, even assuming infinite elasticity
of labour supply, g is too high to generate persistence.
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money shock, they reset a higher price (wage) they will lose demand for goods
(labour) with respect to the other firms (workers) locked into the contract
already signed one period before. Then, depending on the structure of the
model, the goods market (and hence the elasticity of substitution between
goods, i.e., 0) or the labour market (and hence the elasticity of substitution
between skills, i.e., 19) plays the pivotal role. In the first case, price staggering
would naturally deliver more persistence than wage staggering and vice versa
in the latter case.
Consider the first three model structures in Table 6.1. Looking at them
by rows, we saw that, given a particular model of price staggering Rw8
[a + 0(1 — a)]Rp s , and this implies Rips > R. This just derives from the
different relevant elasticity in the different cases. The focus is here on the
good markets, since there are no substitution between different labour skills.
In the price staggering models, firms will face a demand for goods whose
elasticity is 0, while the relevant elasticity for wage setters is the elasticity of
the demand for labour with respect to the money wage, that is e
In words, the elasticity of demand faced by price setters is [a + 0(1 — a)]
bigger than the elasticity of demand faced by wage setters, and, as a result,
R of the price staggering models is [a + 0(1 — a)] lower than the one of the
26 Again the exception is the wage staggering and competitive labour market case, where
0 does not play any role since both groups of households are equally employed by all the
firms.
0.+0(0 	 261-0.) . 
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corresponding wage staggering model.
Now look at the first three model structures in Table 6.1 by columns and
particularly at the important difference between the perfect labour mobility
case and the no labour mobility one. In the no labour mobility models, the
workers internalise the fact that demanding higher wages affects the price of
the good produced by the industry. This in turn affects the demand (through
0) for the good and subsequently the demand for labour. Algebraically, this
difference is highlighted by the term Or in the denominator of R2 and R4.
The fact that in setting the wage the workers internalise this effect is what
distinguishes the two classes of models, making marginal cost rises much
slower in the no labour mobility case. Indeed, given the likely magnitudes of
0 and 7, this internalisation quantitatively makes a big difference, as shown
above. Again, however, since the focus is on the goods market, price stag-
gering delivers more persistence than wage staggering models, as explained
in the previous paragraph.
The story in the "craft" unions model is instead radically different. Here
substitutability between labour types is added to the substitutability between
goods. However, this is going to make a difference only if wage decision are
not synchronised, hence only in the wage staggering case. As explained in
the previous two paragraphs, as far as the goods market is concerned, R1
is [o- + 0(1 — (7)] bigger than R5, but in the wage staggering case there is
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an additional effect which is absent in the price staggering case. Workers
realise that they are facing a labour demand curve where elasticity has now
an extra term, 79. Then, as for the no labour mobility case, 797h i appears in
the denominator of R5.
The quantitative difference between the two models which are able to
deliver significant persistence (namely, the yeoman farmer model and the
wage staggering model with skills substitutability) is thus going to rest on
the quantitative difference between the relevant elasticities, i.e., 0 and 79. If
we calibrate 0 10, 27 then in the yeoman farmer case, we get R4 = 0.11 and
A4 = 0.5, basically equivalent the benchmark case for the R5 and A5.28
A final remark is needed. The perfectly flexible wage/price model pre-
sented here is quite stylised, but also quite general, as we tried to show
above. Indeed, since it encompasses most of the microfounded models with
staggering in the literature, it can be thought as derived from the log-
linearisation of a more general microfounded model. However, implicitly
27 0ften in the literature (e.g., Chari et al. (1996)) the CES function is used to describe
the technology for producing final goods from intermediate goods. It follows that, even
if the elasticity of demand for intermediate goods is given by 8, the latter is basically
a technology parameter which gives the elasticity of substitution in inputs. Chari et al.
(1996) calibrate it equal to 10.
28 Moreover, this would suggest that combining price and wage staggering in a "craft"
union model could deliver substantial persistence. This intuition is developed by Erceg
(1997)
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the log-linearised model presumes another not innocuous assumption. The
model is log-linearised around a particular steady-state with constant money
supply (i.e., zero inflation steady state). In fact, the policy parameters (or
the inflation trend) do not appear in the model. However, in Chapter 4
we showed the degree of persistence to be considerably decreasing in the
steady state inflation trend. This point has to be take into account and to
be combined with the results above.
6.6 Conclusions
We have derived a stylised log-linear model which encompasses most of the
microfounded models of price/wage staggering. We have shown the im-
portance of the underlying economic structure for the ability of staggered
price/wage models to explain the persistence of the real effects of money
shocks. The main conclusions are:
(i) Qualitative implications
- The difference between the persistence properties of price and wage stag-
gering models derives from the underlying economic structure. In particu-
lar, the substitutability between goods and/or labour types plays the major
role in generating persistence. In models with only substitutability between
goods, then price staggering naturally delivers higher persistence than wage
staggering, while in models with substitutability between labour types, the
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opposite is true. It follows than only in "craft" union models a la Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987), wage staggering generates higher persistence than price
staggering.
- The distinction between free mobility and no mobility of labour is funda-
mental. No-mobility-of labour models (both "industrial" and "craft" union
models) bring in new mechanisms that increase persistence. In "industrial"
union models the mechanism rests on the fact that workers internalise the
effect of higher wage claims on the industry good price and hence on demand.
In "craft" union models, it is the substitutability between labour skills that
generates wage adjustment inertia.
- Liquidity constraints tend to (marginally) increase persistence.
(ii) Quantitative implications
- While in these models, a substantial (in the sense of near random walk
behaviour) degree of persistence is an unlikely outcome, two models can de-
liver significant persistence: the yeoman farmer model and the "craft" union
models with wage staggering. It is not by chance then that the two models
in the literature which claim to be able to generate a contract multiplier
are Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Erceg (1997). The first one is a
yeoman-farmer model, the latter one is a "craft" union model.'
29 Some other works actually share the same claim, but in a somewhat non-standard
framework and hence our model cannot encompass their ones. For example, Andersen
(1998b) considers an ad hoc utility function of a monopoly union, Chapter 5 of this thesis
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- Ceteris paribus (i.e., for realistic values of all the other parameters),
these conclusions do not depend on the particular value assigned to the in-
tertemporal elasticity of labour supply, which has been so far the focus of this
literature. This suggests that the importance of the intertemporal elasticity
of labour supply in generating persistence in staggered wage/price models
may have been somewhat overstated.
- All the quantitative results are subject to the caveat that the framework
we used can be obtained by a log-linearisation around a zero inflation steady
state. It is very likely, given our results in Chapter 4, that the quantitative
results change once a log-linearisation around a positive inflation steady state
is considered.
consider the existence of relative wage concern, Bergin and Feenstra (1998) consider a
translog form for preferences.
Conclusions
In this thesis we have analysed the effects of monetary policy in staggered
wage models a la Taylor (1979, 1980a). In the first four chapters of the
thesis we have exploited the dynamic general equilibrium model with stag-
gered wage setting a la Taylor, built in Chapter 1, to address different issues
concerning monetary policy changes: superneutrality, dynamic effects of a
disinflation and dynamic effects of money shocks. The latter has given rise
to the persistence puzzle, since it has demonstrated that staggered wages are
not able to explain a high degree of persistence of money shocks once they are
embedded in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. We share this main
result of Chapter 4 with a contemporaneous, and already very influential,
paper by Chari et al. (1996). Despite the fact that this latter paper has not
been published yet, it has already generated a very lively debate in the liter-
ature about the persistence puzzle. We have participated in this debate with
the last two chapters of the thesis. While Chapter 5 has proposed a solution
to the puzzle by taking into explicit consideration relative wage concern on
282
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the part of the workers, Chapter 6 has presented a unifying framework which
encompasses most of the microfounded model of staggering in the literature
and it thus may be very useful to interpret and understand the current debate
on the subject. The debate, still under way, is at the heart of the attempt to
build a quantitative macroeconomic model describing the monetary policy
transmission mechanism in order to analyse the effects of monetary policy
changes and to design optimal monetary policy rules (e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997)). Thanks to the numerous contributors some steps forward
have been made, but there is still a great deal of exciting work to be done.
We immodestly hope that this thesis may be seen as a little stick to help the
steps.
The remainder of the conclusions summarises the main finding of each
chapter.
The first chapter has introduced the tools needed to tackle the main
issues that have been treated in the following chapters. In particular, we
have described two models that have continuously come up in the following
analysis. First, we have reviewed the famous Taylor (1979, 1980) model of
staggered wage setting. Second, we have presented original work in describing
the structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered wage
setting a la Taylor. This model is central to the thesis since the results
presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4 are based on it. Moreover, also the models
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in chapters 5 and 6, while somewhat different, have originated from it.
Chapter 2 has addressed the issue of superneutrality of money using the
model presented in the Chapter 1. It has demonstrated that, once staggered
wages are introduced in an optimising framework, a mild permanent change
in the rate of growth of money could have substantial effects on the steady
state aggregate level of output and welfare. The numerical results have thus
suggested that, in staggered adjustment models, superneutrality is far from
being the minor issue that has been thought so far. Previous models with
staggered wage/price behaviour have failed to acknowledge this fact. In the
steady state, Calvo's (1983a) model behaves as a flexible price one, due to the
peculiar hypothesis of a price-regulation mechanism. Ireland's (1995) model
is too simple in its structure to detect strong effects of the rate of growth of
money on the steady state output and welfare. In particular, because of the
linearity in the production and utility functions in labour and the elasticity
of substitution among goods equal to one, Ireland's (1995) model has not
been able to capture the effects due to the usual non-linearities in technology
and preferences: decreasing return to scale to labour, increasing marginal
disutility of labour and elasticity of substitution among goods bigger than
one. Once these effects have been taken into account, it has turned out
that staggered wage setting behaviour induces strong non-superneutrality
properties and high costs of inflation. Hence, given that staggered wages are
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observed in western countries, we could easily explain high costs of inflation
and provide a rationale for the pursuit of price stability in western countries.
In Chapter 3 we have used the dynamic general equilibrium model with
staggered wages presented in the first two chapters to study analytically the
effects of a reduction in the rate of monetary growth (a disinflation). We
have found that the result of disinflation is a recession in the short and
medium run, and that output is slightly lower in the long run, too. This is
true both when the disinflation is unanticipated and when it is announced in
advance. Our particular motivation was the puzzling finding of Ball (1994),
in a directly postulated model, that disinflations cause booms. We have first
noted that this finding is associated with the element of preannouncement
in the policy assumed by Ball. More microfoundations have told us that
Ball's paradox was mainly due to simplifying assumptions regarding the time
preference rate and the formulation of the aggregate demand equation. These
simplifications were inconsistent with microfoundations - at least, with the
particular rather standard set of microfoundations has been introduced here.
The microfounded model produces a reaction to a disinflation (a reduction in
monetary growth) which is not, after all, sharply different from the standard
reaction to a deflation (a reduction in the level of the money supply) found
in Taylor's (1979) model. Hence, in contrast to what several authors have
recently concluded, it does not appear necessary to appeal to lack of policy
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credibility in order to explain why disinflations cause slumps.
Chapter 4 has looked at the issue of the persistence of the real effects of
money shocks. If, as were West (1988) and Phaneuf (1990), we had been
looking for results to corroborate the view that staggered wage models could
induce a high degree of persistence of money shocks, the microfounded model
does not seem to have provided them. On the contrary, it has confuted that
view. The model has demonstrated that for a large range of reasonable pa-
rameter values a notable degree of persistence is an unlikely outcome. More-
over, even for parameter values such that the model generated persistence,
a moderate rate of underlying inflation cut down persistence sharply. In
conclusion, sensible values of the microeconomic parameters and/or a mod-
erate rate of underlying inflation such as we observe in western economies
cut down persistence not only far below near random-walk behaviour, but
also below any level notably different from zero. Moreover, investigating the
microeconomic fundamentals of the ad hoc Taylor wage rule. the model has
emphasised the role of non-linearity and of the Lucas critique. In brief, the
model has shown that staggered wages alone are not able to explain a notable
degree of persistence of the real effects of money shocks.
Chapter 5 has proposed a solution to the persistence puzzle which had
arisen from the analysis of the previous chapter. which had questioned the ex-
istence of a contract multiplier. We have added explicit relative wage concern
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on the part of the workers to the model analysed in the previous chapter.
This has provided a combination of nominal and real rigidities capable of
generating a substantial amount of endogenous stickiness, even with a very
inelastic intertemporal elasticity of labour supply. As a result, output and
inflation persistence are a likely outcome in our framework. The relative
wage concern on the part of the workers is the key feature of the model. The
notion of relative wage concern is not new for economists and goes back a
long way, at least to J.M. Keynes. Moreover, a great deal of applied studies
have provided overwhelming evidence for a relative wage concern on the part
of the workers. Furthermore, an increasing amount of work in many fields of
economics has started considering status and sociological considerations in
order to be able to explain various puzzles that the standard economic frame-
work could not explain. Introducing a relative wage concern in the analysis,
by adding a term to the utility function, has placed our work within this
growing economic literature. Our results have shown that failing to account
for this specific source of real rigidity might be an important weakness of
previous staggered wage models, responsible for their negative results con-
cerning output and inflation persistence. Our model delivers a substantial
amount of persistence both in output and inflation. Given the substantial
amount of empirical evidence supporting a relative wage concern on the part
of workers, our analysis has led us to conclude that this may be the missing
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piece in the money shocks persistence puzzle.
Chapter 6 has presented a stylised log-linear model which encompasses
most of the microfounded models of price/wage staggering and has focused on
the persistence of the real effects of money shocks generated by the different
versions of the basic model. We have shown the importance of the underlying
economic structure for the capability of staggered price/wage models to gen-
erate persistence. In particular, the no mobility of labour assumption seems
crucial for these kinds of models to be able to generate a notable degree of
persistence.
As said above, future research has still a great deal of work to do in this
relatively new field of the literature. With respect to monetary policy issues,
the next step would probably be to try to design the optimal policy rule in this
general equilibrium framework (a first attempt in this direction is Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997)). A step further would consist in trying to endogenise
the policy bringing in time consistency considerations. However, apart from
monetary policy, there are other features that need to be considered and
introduced into the model. Fiscal policy, for example, is still too stylised in
this models. Moreover, since in most of this models Ricardian equivalence
holds, most of the interesting effects of fiscal policy are simply washed away.
Another important extension is considering open economies (Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995) is one the first dynamic general equilibrium model of open
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economies with nominal rigidities, but their model do not have staggering).
The road to a quantitative macroeconomic model with rigorous theoretical
microfoundations, which can be used for policy analysis is still long, but the
literature seems to know the direction for this long journey.
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Errata Corrige
This few lines are an amendment to an imprecision in Chapter 4. In particular
equation (4.13) on p. 131 should be written as:
x t = bo t + cl ipt+i + b2 yt + d2y1+1 + b3 n-t t
 + d3mt+1
	 (4.13)
where Fit = mt — p t , that is, real money balances in period t.
Accordingly equation (4.15) on the same page should be written as:
xt = b4 xt _ i + d4 x t ± 1 + b5 yt + dot+i + bent + d6mt±i	 (4.15)
The same two equations are reported in the subsequent page (p.132) and also
there they should be amended. Accordingly Proposition 4.1 pp. 132-133 should
be (the correction is bold):
Proposition 4.1. If the utility function is additively separable in real money
balances, that is, if u L ,m/ p = 	  = 0 and uc,m/ p = 	OL, t 0(1111P) t	OCtaa2(t:1(1%P)t	 0, then
real money balances do not appear in (4.13) and (4.15).
According to this amendment also equation (4.30) on p. 163 (in the Appendix
of Chapter 4) should be written as:
x t --= a i yt
 + a2yt-1-1 + a 3 / t + a4 /t+1 + a5 mt + a6 mt± 1 + a7pt + a8pt± i	(4.30)
and so also equation (4.40) on p. 164, that is:
b3771
	 d3rizt+i+ b2yt + dat-Fixt bo t +
which is just equation (4.13) above.
(4.40)
